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Abstract 
Cassius Dio, Competition and the Decline of the Roman 
Republic 
This thesis argues that Dio’s narrative of the Late Republic constitutes a sophisticated 
and consistent interpretation of the fall of the Republican governmental form, centred on 
competition. In Dio’s narrative, institutionally generated political competition is the central 
destructive factor of the Late Republic, which causes its deterioration and eventual 
collapse. This competition was inherent to the Republic according to Dio but underwent a 
destructive transformation in the Late Republic and Dio hereby presents an institutional 
explanation for the decline of the Republic. 
The discussion is divided into an introduction, two thematic chapters and two chapters 
containing case studies, all of which include a number of subchapters each. Chapter 1 
(“Introduction”) presents the argument and the scholarly tradition on Dio’s Late Republic, 
and hereafter examines Dio’s fundamental ideas about and perspectives on competition. 
Chapter 2 (“Dio and the sources for the Late Republic”) compares Dio with the parallel 
sources for the events surrounding Lucullus and his command, the lex Gabinia and the 
Catilinarian Conspiracy. Through this, I will argue that Dio manipulated and selected his 
material carefully in order to present and strengthen an original interpretation in which 
competition is central. Chapter 3 (“Dio and the annalistic method”) examines Dio’s use of 
the annalistic tradition and, via a main focus on elections, omens and legislation, 
demonstrates that Dio was highly selective in his use of annalistic material as he only 
incorporated it when it furthered his interpretative aims. 
Chapter 4 (“A diachronic analysis of Book 36”) argues that Dio incorporated his main 
exploration of external competition in Book 36, and through skilful manipulation and 
structuring of the narrative, created a cumulative interrelation between individual parts of 
the book. This interrelation furthered the communication and strengthening of Dio’s 
overarching interpretative framework centred on institutional competition. Chapter 5 
(“Book 39 and competition in practice”) asserts that Book 39 is Dio’s central investigation 
of internal competition and its intimate connection to the fall of the Republic. To support 
and communicate this, Dio again creates a sophisticated interrelation within the book, 
which presents violence, bribery and political manipulation as central tools used by dynasts 
3 
 
 
  
to further their ambition. Thus Dio here further strengthens his explanation of the fall of 
the Republic, where institutionally generated competition is the central focal point.   
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1: Introduction 
Cassius Dio has generally been portrayed as a crude and simplistic historian who is 
supposed to have had no “specific aim in view save that of composing the work [of his 
history] itself”.1 This view has been highly influential: the Historia Romana has since 
Millar almost exclusively been seen as unoriginal and overly influenced by Dio’s own 
time, even by the newest works on the historian.
2
 I, however, will argue that Dio structured 
his work in a sophisticated and premeditated manner and that he approached and 
interpreted the Late Republic according to an overarching interpretative framework. This 
framework centred on the competition for offices and commands that emerged from the 
institutional composition of the Republic, and Dio viewed this institutionally generated 
competition as the central destructive factor in the Late Republic. This period played a 
significant role in Dio’s overall work and he manipulated, structured and selected his 
material carefully in order to bring out his institutional explanation of the fall of the 
Republic. 
The idea that the Late Republic succumbed to degeneration is almost canonical in 
Roman historiography of the first century onwards. However, Dio’s incorporation of Late 
Republican competition at the centre of an institutional explanation of this degeneration, as 
opposed to the character-driven narratives of other writers, is highly original.
3
 
Furthermore, this portrayal is not merely a commentary on Dio’s own time; rather it is an 
exploration of the Late Republic on its own terms. Moreover, Dio has often been criticised 
for a poor understanding of the Republic
4
 but modern scholars have also frequently 
focused on the institutional problems of the Roman Republic as a cause for its downfall.
5
 
Commonly, they too attempt to detract from the importance of individuals and see the 
problems of the Republic in a broader perspective that is not solely concentrated on Caesar 
and Pompey. Dio is therefore in fact the ancient source that most closely resembles modern 
explanations. These assertions amount to a comprehensive rejection of central parts of both 
older and newer scholarship. I will achieve this by exploring a hitherto relatively 
untouched area, namely Dio’s narrative of the Late Republic. Only Rees, Burden-Strevens 
                                                 
1
 Millar (1964) 73. 
2
 See e.g. Rees (2011); Kemezis (2014). 
3
 See pp. 14-15 for an explanation of these two types of history. 
4
 Schwartz (1899) 1690-1691; Millar (1964) 47-49; Lintott (1997) 2514-2517. 
5
 Meier (1966) sees a crisis without alternative, at least for the period from 49; Brunt (1971) argues for social 
conflicts; Millar (1998) concentrates on the people; Steel (2013) focuses on the senate. 
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and Kemezis have so far accorded this period focused study but the former two, especially 
Burden-Strevens, focus on Dio’s speeches, whereas Kemezis concentrates on more general 
narrative strategies and largely passes over the detailed narrative. The above works are 
certainly important advances in the study of Dio but the lack of close attention to the 
narrative constitutes a hole in the scholarship, which undermines attempts at rehabilitating 
Dio as a more capable historian. No scholar has thus so far analysed Dio’s narrative 
choices outside the speeches in the detailed, sustained manner that I propose. 
This new approach to Dio is sorely needed as Millar’s simplistic assessment has had 
consequences far broader than the field of Dionean studies itself; Dio has as a result been 
used far too uncritically in modern works about the Late Republic where he is commonly 
held in low esteem as incompetent and unreliable, but also uncomplicated. However, he 
remains one of the most frequently used sources for the Late Republic and his is one of the 
fullest surviving works on Roman history. The frequent use of a supposedly unreliable and 
crude historian is deeply problematic and is seen clearly in a range of seminal works on the 
Late Republic as for example Scullard (1959), Gruen (1974) and Millar (1998) all use Dio 
regularly but include no sustained methodological considerations of Dio’s work or the 
ways in which it can be used as a source.
6
 Millar’s index even reveals that Dio is the most 
used historian in his entire work.
7
 One of the fuller considerations of Dio as a source in a 
general work about the Late Republic is Steel (2013): “Appian, and the slightly later, 
Cassius Dio are inescapable, but their distance, chronologically and intellectually, from 
what they describe cannot be ignored”.8 This approach to Dio is certainly understandable 
due to the uncritical attitude towards the historian in specialist scholarship but also 
highlights the lack of complex methodological considerations regarding Dio despite his 
admitted importance. A more critical approach to Dio is needed. However, this must be 
founded on a deeper and more complex understanding of the Historia Romana in itself and 
the role of the Late Republic herein. It is with this important understanding that my thesis 
is concerned. 
Previous scholarly work on Dio and the Late Republic, or rather the lack hereof, only 
emphasises the need for further exploration of this field; the scholarly attention before 
Millar’s seminal book A Study of Cassius Dio (1964) was focused on Quellenforschung 
                                                 
6
 See e.g. Scullard (1959) 126. 
7
 Millar (1998) 231-232: used a full 42 times. 
8
 Steel (2013) 6-7. 
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and included a highly critical view of Dio. Reimarus
9
 and Gutschmid
10
 did praise Dio but 
these are lonely voices in the pre-Millar literature as Haupt’s Jahresberichte from 1882 
and 1884 demonstrate:
11
 Haupt here gives an overview of the thoroughly negative view of 
Dio in this period and concurs for example by arguing that Dio’s primary use is not as a 
source but rather as a tool to reconstruct lost, supposedly better sources.
12
 This negative 
view of Dio was widespread also outside the German tradition as it found expression in for 
instance English, French and Italian scholarship as well.
13
 This critical strand climaxed in 
the most influential work before Millar, namely Schwartz’s entry in the Realencyclopädie. 
Schwartz, as his predecessors, mainly focused on establishing Dio’s sources and is highly 
critical. However, despite criticism of Dio’s understanding of the Republic, an important 
part of the condemnation is centred on Dio’s writing style: Schwartz asserts that the Late 
Republic was ripe for narrating, but under Dio’s clumsy hands it became “einer grauen 
formlosen Masse”14 that is unpleasing and rather disguises history than teaches it.15 These 
hostile comments owe something to the writing style of nineteenth century German 
scholars but also reveal an important reason for the disregard and low esteem that Dio has 
experienced even to this day: Dio was criticised and deemed a poor source in older 
scholarship largely due to a negative assessment of his writing style. When stated 
explicitly, this is plainly unjustified as historical reliability and usefulness as a source on 
the one hand and stylistic merit on the other ought to be separated, but the approach has 
been highly influential nonetheless.  
The influence of this view is for example clearly seen also in Millar’s monograph from 
1964 which remains by far the most comprehensive work on Dio to date: “Dio’s History is, 
to say the least, not a literary work of the first rank. It is hardly surprising that he has been 
used mainly as a source of individual facts and examined simply for his ‘credibility’.”16 
This is a clear continuation of the previous scholarship, exemplified forcefully by 
Schwartz, as Dio’s supposed faults as a writer are projected onto his abilities as a historian, 
which is of course logically untenable. Recent works tend to draw a sharp line between 
scholarship before and after Millar.
17
 However, the pre-Millar critique of Dio the historian 
                                                 
9
 Reimarus (1750) IX. 
10
 Gutschmid (1894) 548. 
11
 See also these for previous scholarship which I will not treat here. 
12
 Haupt (1882) 146; (1884) 679. 
13
 Micalella (1896); Jullian (1901); Columba (1902); Vlachos (1905). 
14
 Schwartz (1899) 1689. 
15
 Schwartz (1899) 1689-1691. 
16
 Millar (1964) 28. 
17
 Burden-Strevens (2015) 6; see also Rees (2011) 1-6. 
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through his writing style is clearly seen in both Millar and the subsequent scholarship 
where especially Dio’s penchant for rhetoric is criticised.18 Yet, Millar’s work did also 
herald a shift in the scholarly perspective on Dio since it decisively broke with 
Quellenforschung as Millar wrote that “the search for a proto-Dio is futile.”19 Millar adds 
that without further knowledge of the working methods of ancient historians, “source-
criticism is mere speculation”.20 This is an important and noteworthy advance as Dio 
himself is now accorded attention rather than merely seen as a tool to reconstruct lost 
sources. 
However, Millar is hardly more forgiving towards Dio as a historian than his 
continental predecessors: 
“the long years of working through the whole of Roman history brought Dio to 
formulate no general historical views whatsoever. The sheer effort of note-
taking and composition absorbed his energies and left no time for analysis or 
interpretation, and what he produced was a history whose justification lay 
simply in being itself, a continuous literary record which began at the 
beginning and went on as far as its author could take it. The opinions he 
expresses are therefore incidental, and largely called into existence by the 
demands of literary form.”21 
The idea that Dio lacked aims or framework and simply desired to write a history is 
perhaps Millar’s most important legacy as it has reverberated in the scholarly debate ever 
since. A connected assertion of Millar’s is that Dio was unoriginal and especially the Late 
Republic supposedly left little room for originality: “For Dio who came to it only as part of 
the whole sweep of Roman history, the chances of dealing with it in a way that was 
profound or original were small indeed.”22 The vastness of Dio’s work thus precluded any 
original perspectives, which is of course connected to Dio’s alleged lack of broader 
historical views. A final important legacy of Millar is the connection of Dio’s history to his 
own time: “In Dio we can see not only the perspective of Roman history available to a man 
who was born in the reign of Marcus Aurelius and lived into that of Severus Alexander, 
but also, not in his contemporary history alone, the reactions of a conservative observer 
to an age full of stress and change.”23 Millar here argues that Dio’s own time is 
                                                 
18
 Millar (1964) 42-45 and e.g. Berrigan (1966) 59; Piatowski (1974); Wirth (1985) 35-37; Gowing (1992) 289. 
19
 Millar (1964) 85. 
20
 Millar (1964) VIII. 
21
 Millar (1964) 118. 
22
 Millar (1964) 46. 
23
 Millar (1964) VII (my emphasis). 
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fundamental to understanding his history in general. Millar’s main assertions, namely that 
Dio had no framework, that he was unoriginal and that his history was significantly 
influenced by his own time, have been ever present in subsequent works on Dio’s Late 
Republic
24
 of which the most critical is perhaps the acidic article by Lintott from 1997.
25
 
However, Millar’s rejection of Quellenforschung has been less influential as many of these 
works, especially those concerned with the Gallic Wars, have focused on this area. One 
work in particular has stood out in the decades after Millar, namely Fechner’s from 1986 
on Dio’s Republic. It includes only scant attention to the Late Republic but Fechner 
presents the novel assertion that Dio was in fact a supporter of an ideal Republic and far 
more critical of the move to the Principate than previously acknowledged.
26
  
In the 2010s Dio and his Late Republic have come under increased revision.
27
 This is 
clearly seen in Rees’ PhD from 2011 which argues that Dio has a historical framework 
centred on human nature. This is a development of the psychological and moral 
perspective started by Hose in 1994 and subsequently championed by both Sion-Jenkis 
(2000) and Kuhn-Chen (2002), in which a static human nature was argued to be central to 
Dio’s work.28 However, in contrast to these authors, Rees argues that human nature in Dio 
changes according to external influences and is the prime cause for the downfall of the 
Republic.
29
 Yet, Millar’s arguments still influence the account as Rees asserts that Dio’s 
Caesar is conventional
30
 and that Dio differs from the parallel sources, “if he differs at all, 
only in the intensity of his account. […] he might have struggled to make his mark on a 
well-worn period.”31 This is a clear continuation of Millar’s assertion that Dio was 
unoriginal. Furthermore, Rees mirrors Millar’s focus on Dio’s own times as he argues that 
Dio presents “detailed recommendations for the kind of man the emperor needs to engage, 
                                                 
24
 Most recently Kemezis (2014). Scholarship is often focused on speeches: e.g. Stekelenburg (1976); Steidle 
(1988); Martinelli (1989); Claassen (1996); Gowing (1998) or the Gallic Wars: e.g. Sordi (1971); Zecchini 
(1978); Cipriani (1978); McDougall (1991). See also the general work of Harrington (1970) that has attracted 
little attention but also offers negligible new perspectives. 
25
 Lintott (1997). 
26
 Fechner (1986) 98-107, 130-131. 
27
 See also the new commentaries of Lachenaud and Coudry with sensible introductions: (2011); (2014). 
28
 Hose (1994) 436; Sion-Jenkis (2000) 184-185; Kuhn-Chen (2002) 243-246. The latter asserts that human 
nature could be tempered by education. Sion-Jenkis (2000) 96-101 additionally sees the involvement of the 
people in government as a central problem for Dio.  
29
 Rees (2011) 6-7. 
30
 Rees (2011) 186-189. 
31
 Rees (2011) 4. 
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which derive from his explanation of the rise, fall and rebirth of the Roman state”.32 Dio’s 
work was thus again formed by his own time according to Rees. 
This argument is further seen in Kemezis’ important work whose whole premise rests 
on this position.
33
 Kemezis argues: “Readers would naturally have asked what was new or 
original, what Dio was adding to the existing record. Dio might have given many answers, 
but the most interesting from our point of view relates to the Severan context.”34 Dio’s own 
time is again of central importance but Millar’s argument that Dio was unoriginal is also 
evident. Kemezis is generally positive towards Dio but simultaneously, in a further 
continuation of Millar, includes criticisms of Dio’s lack of skill and historical framework: 
“Dio seldom if ever applies to any one incident the analytical acumen of a Polybius or a 
Thucydides, and he does not show the talent those historians do for condensing complex 
stretches of history into a compelling framework of causal explanation. At the detail level, 
Dio can indeed be conventional and sometimes downright banal”.35 As shown above, 
Millar’s work is clearly still highly influential in general and forms the foundation on 
which Dio is evaluated in even the most recent scholarly works. Only a single work 
appears to have rejected Millar more categorically, namely Burden-Strevens’ from 2015. 
He argues that Dio had an interpretative framework focused on both political and moral 
aspects, which was innovatively incorporated in speeches and that this framework was 
concerned with the Late Republic rather than with Dio’s own times.36 Forthcoming 
volumes of articles on Dio promise to continue this firmer revision of the historian,
37
 but 
Burden-Strevens’ work so far stands alone. 
1.1: Methodological considerations 
However, before the chapters can commence, a brief explanation of key terms is 
necessary in order to create clarity throughout the thesis. The “overarching interpretative 
framework” is central here: by this term, I mean a premeditated perspective formed during 
reading and notetaking but before writing, governing the interpretation of long-term 
periods of Roman history. More specifically, Dio thought competition to be the most 
                                                 
32
 Rees (2011) 255. 
33
 Kemezis (2014) 11-14. 
34
 Kemezis (2014) 103. 
35
 Kemezis (2014) 93. 
36
 Burden-Strevens (2015) 85, 167-174, 254-258. 
37
 See e.g. Kemezis (forthcoming 2016); Burden-Strevens (forthcoming 2016); Coudry (forthcoming 2016). 
13 
 
 
  
destructive institutional factor in the Late Republic, which therefore constitutes a 
framework in which this period as a whole is conceived. This is central as the assertion that 
Dio had an overarching interpretative framework stands in sharp contrast to previous 
scholarship.  
 Competition in itself also deserves clarification
38
 as this is, I shall argue, the central 
problem in Dio’s interpretation of the decline of the Republic. Since Dio’s history is 
essentially politically focused, this competition also becomes political in nature: 
individuals struggle for different types of political resources such as prestige, offices, 
military victories, commands, alliances, money and other elements that can be used to 
further the political goals of one’s political group, family or oneself. This political 
competition in the Late Republic can often be identified by its egoistic aspect as the good 
of the state is frequently disregarded and the political advancement of the individual or his 
group is prioritised instead. This egoism is regularly highlighted through linguistic markers 
of which the most prominent are φιλοτιμία and φθόνος. It should be noted that φιλοτιμία is 
typical of classical Greek philosophy where it in fact also had a positive meaning. 
Dio’s history, and therefore the competition therein, is essentially split into an internal 
and an external sphere: internally, the competition revolves around the political world of 
elections, laws and decrees, and is essentially organised around Rome. Externally, on the 
other hand, the competition is fundamentally focused on wars and the attainment of 
prestige, alliances and monetary resources through military victories. It is important at this 
point to note that Dio himself never includes an explicit definition of competition and one 
should therefore be careful not to construct an overly rigid or categorical definition. I have 
therefore chosen to operate with a broad definition where acts based on political ambition 
and attempts to attain political goals, both internally in Rome and externally among the 
generals, as well as efforts to hinder the attainment of these by others, are seen as 
competition. More specifically, competition most often, but not always, manifests itself in 
the pursuit of offices and foreign commands.  
However, this definition is not merely conjured up for argumentative convenience but is 
instead rooted in the Republican institutional composition itself and in Dio’s own 
perception of political competition in the Late Republic. Firstly, the Republican 
governmental form with a limited number of offices naturally meant that a large number of 
                                                 
38
 See also Lindholmer (forthcoming 2017). 
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politicians strove for the same goals and any act by an individual to obtain these therefore 
affected numerous other actors who would oppose and compete with this individual and 
each other.
39
 Secondly, in this period Dio in fact describes political competition as a zero-
sum game where all attempts to further one’s own interest impinge upon other political 
actors. This is clear in Dio’s interpretation of the reasons for Pompey’s desire for the 
consulship: 
“The fact, however, that Caesar’s influence was increasing […] was a cruel 
thorn in Pompey’s side (δεινῶς αὐτὸν ἠνία). So ambitious was he (φιλοτιμίᾳ 
ἐχρῆτο) that he undertook to disparage and undo all that he himself had helped 
to gain for Caesar, and that he was displeased with him both because he was 
greatly praised and because he was overshadowing his own exploits, and he 
blamed the people because they slighted him and were excessively enthusiastic 
over Caesar. Especially was he vexed to see that they remembered the former 
achievements of a man just so long as nothing new occurred, that they rushed 
with the greatest haste to each new achievement, even if it were inferior to that 
which had preceded, because they became tired of the usual and liked the 
novel, and that, actuated by envy (ὑπὸ τοῦ φθόνου), they overthrew everyone 
who had once been in high repute, but, urged on by their hopes, helped to exalt 
one who was just emerging. Because of this he was vexed (δι᾽ οὖν ταῦτα 
δυσχεραίνων)”.40  
The power and influence of Pompey is here clearly linked to Caesar in an inverse 
relationship where every success of the latter undermines the former.
41
 However, Dio also 
underlines that this interrelation between the influence and achievements of different 
politicians is a general aspect of Roman politics that is not merely confined to Caesar and 
Pompey, which accords with the actual form of Republican government. Roman politics is 
thus described as a zero-sum game, which justifies my broad definition where all attempts 
to secure political advancement or hinder others in this respect are seen as political 
competition. This clear correlation between Dio’s view of competition and my definition 
of it is important as the definition hereby also points to Dio’s main interpretative interest, 
namely the process and mechanisms of competition in the Late Republic rather than the 
ambition of individuals, as I will show. The above definitions are necessary as they will 
create a foundation on which subsequent reasoning can be built and will make the 
conclusions of the thesis sharper and more focused. 
                                                 
39
 See e.g. Steel (2013) 49-53; Lintott (1968). 
40
 Cass. Dio 39.25.1-26.1. Adapted from Cary (1914-1927). All translations of Dio are from Cary (1914-1927), 
and for other quoted authors, I have likewise used the Loeb Classical Library. Any adaptations of the 
translations have been noted, as here. 
41
 See also Kuhn-Chen (2002) 179 on φθόνος. 
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Furthermore, Dio’s notion of political competition also demonstrates his resistance to 
traditional interpretations based on moral decline. It is not, in contrast to other ancient 
writers, the character of Caesar or Pompey that is at fault in the above quote, but rather the 
process of competition. The “process of competition” in this thesis signifies the tools and 
mechanisms through which competition was performed. As an example, in Book 39, Dio 
demonstrates the destructive process of competition in the Late Republic as violence, 
bribery and political manipulation are rife, which stands in sharp contrast to the traditional, 
peaceful ideal process of competition based on public speaking and constitutional acts.
42
 
The process of competition has in short degenerated markedly. This destructive and 
institutionally generated competition in the Late Republic constitutes an “institutional 
problem” for Dio: institutional competition, for example for offices or commands, is part 
of the very foundations of the Republic but has degenerated and turned destructive in itself, 
a transformation where the dynasts become manifestations rather than causes. Dio thus 
posits an institutional rather than a character-driven interpretation of the Late Republic, 
centred on the destructively transformed process of institutional competition, the central 
problem of this period according to Dio. Dio does of course accord individuals importance 
and all the parallel sources do not completely disregard political institutions. However, a 
notable difference remains: the parallel sources centre on the individuals set in a political 
world, whereas this political world is Dio’s main area of investigation and the characters 
become tools herein. Essentially, while the Republic in other accounts is driven to 
destruction mainly by the leading characters, Dio posits the institutional makeup of the 
Republic itself and the consequent destructive competition as the central driving force that 
locks the individuals in a certain behavioural pattern as seen in the quotation above.
43
  
The difference between these two types of history writing can also be clearly illustrated 
through the types of turning points focused upon by the different writers. The parallel 
sources centre for instance on the meeting at Luca, Julia’s death or Caesar’s crossing of the 
Rubicon.
44
 Dio by contrast even omits both Luca and Caesar’s crossing, and Julia’s death 
is moved chronologically in order to detract from its importance as I will show later. 
Instead the lex Gabinia is a central turning point for Dio and the consequences and 
problems of this law are inherently institutional in nature: the speeches surrounding the lex 
highlight the shortcomings of the traditional institution of magistracies and the need for a 
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sole commander in a vast empire, while also emphasising the threat this command, itself 
essentially the product of competition, would pose to the Republican constitution.
45
 In 
short, Dio focuses on the lex because it allows him to highlight and interpret central 
institutional problems that were complex and fundamental to the Roman Republic. This 
also illustrates Dio’s reasons for downplaying the common turning points as these were too 
simple and singular to allow the more institutional focus that permeates Dio’s work. In 
relation to the lex Gabinia, the parallel sources, contrastingly, focus on Pompey the 
individual rather than on the wider consequences.
46
 Another fundamental period for Dio is 
the years 57-54,
47
 described in Book 39. As I will show in chapter 5, Dio here presents 
destructive competition most forcefully as a central driving force in the eventual fall of the 
Republic. This focus again permits Dio to articulate and support his institutional 
interpretation and move away from the singular causes seen in other sources. These 
different turning points are emblematic of the types of interpretations of Republican history 
presented by the authors: the parallel sources focus mainly on the individual characters and 
organise their causal explanations and interpretations around them. Dio, on the other hand, 
explains historical change institutionally, primarily through the perspective of destructive 
competition, and detracts from the importance of the usual main players. The difference 
between these two historical approaches is central since it facilitates and supports the 
assertion that Dio was an original historian with an independent scope, as I will show 
throughout the thesis.  
However, this institutional perspective centred on competition is central not only to the 
Late Republic but to the Republic as a whole. Libourel already in 1974
48
 argued that Dio’s 
Early Republic was far less idealised than in other sources and Sion-Jenkis in 2000 briefly 
echoed this idea, which I also develop and expand in a forthcoming article.
49
 This is not 
surprising since Dio himself, in the aftermath of the murder of Caesar, even asserts that “if 
ever there has been a prosperous democracy, it has in any case been at its best for only a 
brief period (γε βραχεῖ χρόνῳ ἤκμασεν), so long, that is, as the people had neither the 
numbers nor the strength sufficient to cause insolence to spring up among them as the 
result of good fortune or jealousy as the result of ambition (φθόνους ἐκ φιλοτιμίας).”50 
This “βραχεῖ χρόνῳ” cannot be held to cover the whole Republic before the fall of 
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Carthage and Dio even underscores the brevity by the emphatic γε. Furthermore, Dio 
asserts that competition, here seen in the shape of φθόνος and φιλοτιμία, is inherently 
linked to the δημοκρατία. 
This assertion also accords with the very inception of Dio’s work where he in relation to 
Romulus and Remus argued that equality necessarily breeds competition: “so, no doubt, it 
is ordered by Nature that whatever is human shall not submit to be ruled by that which is 
like it and familiar to it, partly through jealousy, partly through contempt of it.”51 This is of 
course not merely a comment on the problem of co-regency, which plays a relatively 
limited role in Dio’s work, but also on human nature and on the Republic since this 
governmental form in Dio’s eyes was fundamentally based on equality, especially equality 
of opportunity (ἰσομοιρία) and equality before the law (ἰσονομία).52 According to Dio’s 
above assertion, it is therefore no surprise that competition would particularly proliferate in 
the zero-sum, equality based Republic. Any attempt to increase one’s influence would 
diminish that of others, which would in turn engender jealousy and more competition. This 
notion that equality breeds competition is yet again clearly seen when the Roman king 
Tullius fights the Alban Mettius after he realises that an alliance is impossible “owing to 
the inherent disposition of men to quarrel with their equals (ἐκ τῆς ἐμφύτου τοῖς ἀνθρώποις 
πρός τε τὸ ὅμοιον φιλονεικίας) and to desire to rule others.”53 These examples are of 
course from the regal period but Dio emphasises that the lessons to be learned about the 
problems of power-sharing are universal through his focus on human nature. These 
problems would logically flourish in the Roman Republic since this system was 
fundamentally based on power sharing through the offices and their collegiality. This is 
central as it shows that competition was part of the very fabric of the Republic but then 
proceeded to deteriorate in destructive fashion in the Late Republic. Rome’s deterioration 
in itself is commonplace but its incorporation into an institutional explanation centred on 
competition is, as I will show in chapter 2, original. Dio’s view of δημοκρατία, grounded 
as it is in his philosophical conception of ἰσομοιρία and ἰσονομία, is important as it 
suggests the presence of the rational, overarching principles in Dio’s view on government 
for which this thesis is going to argue. 
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 Competition was certainly present in the Early and Mid-Republic but never became 
inherently destructive as ambitious individuals were unable to break the constitutional 
limits. In the Late Republic, on the other hand, Dio argues that “for a city […] possessing 
many men of great wealth”54 democracy was unworkable. In other words, due to the influx 
of wealth as a result of empire, ambitious politicians and dynasts, that is those who 
exercise δυναστεία, could successfully break the constitutional barriers as they used their 
resources for bribery, political manipulation and violence, often effected through the 
people. These three aspects are the most important tools of internal competition in the Late 
Republic; but they are also symptoms of the transformation of institutional competition as 
they were unavailable to earlier politicians with lower levels of resources. Through these 
tools, Republican competition was further distorted and traditional authority undermined in 
favour of ambitious, egoistic politicians, which among other things caused the thoroughly 
problematic extraordinary commands. This destructive competition is thus both 
institutional in origin and effect; it is of course, at least on some level, individual as well 
but the individuals are incorporated in the institutional explanation and behaviourally 
locked herein. Through his institutional focus, Dio, in short, succeeds in presenting 
individual characters as part of a broader process of political competition which underwent 
a destructive transformation in the Late Republic and ultimately caused the fall of this 
governmental form. 
I have divided the following into four chapters with a number of subchapters each, 
which focus on Books 36-40, that is the years 69-49, since these books survive almost 
intact and the fragmentary earlier books of the Late Republic appear not to contradict the 
conclusions drawn from 36-40. The first of these chapters is a comparison between Dio 
and the parallel sources for the Late Republic, which has never received independent 
study. I intend to show that Dio’s account of this period is highly original and that he uses 
deviations and manipulations of the source material to bring out his institutional 
explanation and to position competition at the heart of it. In the following chapter, I will 
explore Dio’s relationship with the annalistic tradition of history writing. I will here show 
that Dio breaks decisively with the annalistic conventions and merely exploits these when 
it suits his narrative and interpretative purposes. Dio’s use of the annalistic traditions in the 
Late Republic is also an area that has eluded comprehensive and sustained enquiries. This 
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chapter will again suggest that Dio worked according to a premeditated framework 
organised around competition. 
These two chapters will be followed by two case studies of Books 36 and 39 that will 
further support the above conclusions. It should be noted that Dio’s individual Late 
Republican books constitute another area that remains hitherto unexplored. The first case 
study will focus on Book 36. Here I will highlight Dio’s sophisticated structuring that 
aimed at demonstrating the destructive consequences of mainly external institutional 
competition through a focus on the use of commands for ambition, the re-empowered 
tribunes, the problematic extraordinary commands and the ineffective dictatorship. The 
second case study will focus on Book 39 as Dio here most clearly sets out his explanation 
of the fall of the Republic and its intimate connection to internal competition. In this book, 
Dio focuses heavily on the actual mechanisms of competition and the practical tools used 
herein, which are explored in a thematic structuring. Destructive institutionally generated 
competition in the external and internal spheres was thus at the heart of the failure of Dio’s 
Late Republic. 
  
20 
 
 
  
2: Dio and the sources for the Late 
Republic 
2.1: Introduction 
In this chapter I will explore the relationship between Dio and other sources of the Late 
Republic. It is important to underline that this chapter will not focus on traditional 
Quellenforschung as the main objective is not to identify the source(s) that Dio used for his 
narrative but rather to explore what Dio’s deviations and parallels in relation to other 
sources can tell us about his framework for the Late Republic. In contrast to the widely 
held view that Dio was unoriginal,
1
 I will argue that he is distinctive both on a detailed 
level and in his grander interpretation of the Late Republic and that his consistent 
manipulations suggest the presence of an overarching interpretative framework centred on 
competition. Dio’s central distinguishing feature, then, is that he focuses on the 
institutional problems of the Roman political world whereas the parallel sources present a 
character-driven narrative where the individual is at the centre. These institutional 
problems are, as set out in chapter 1, centred on competition.
2
 Through these conclusions I 
will furthermore argue that traditional Quellenforschung and especially the attempts to 
reconstruct lost sources on the basis of Dio are deeply problematic and that firm 
conclusions about this area will be perpetually elusive as indeed they have been so far.  
However, Quellenforschung in fact constitutes a significant part of the research on 
Dio’s Republic so far and dominated almost completely before Millar. The highly 
influential work of Schwartz from 1899 argued that Dio relied substantially on Livy for the 
Republic and Augustan age,
3
 a work that is now only preserved in the summary Periochae. 
This view was supported during most of the twentieth century.
4
 Yet, Manuwald in 1979 
convincingly argued against the sole use of Livy for the Augustan age
5
 and the previous 
consensus on this point does indeed appear surprising in view of the meagre summaries of 
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Livy’s account available for comparison. Dio’s use of the contemporary historians Sallust, 
Cremutius Cordus, Asinius Pollio and Aufidius Bassus has also received scholarly 
attention but no sizeable parts of their work, even in epitomated form, survive and the 
conclusions therefore stand on rather shaky ground.
6
 The Gallic Wars are perhaps the most 
studied part of Dio’s Late Republic and here again Quellenforschung is dominant. Melber 
followed previous German scholars in 1891 when he argued that Dio exclusively relied on 
Caesar and that discrepancies were down to Dio’s incompetence7 but this view was 
gradually challenged and Pollio and Livy among others suggested as additional sources.
8
 
Yet, no consensus has emerged and the soundest article on this subject is McDougall’s 
from 1991 that ends with the judiciously vague conclusion that Dio blended a variety of 
sources.
9
  
The wider reasons behind Dio’s choices are, however, left untouched by the above 
scholars. I, on the other hand, will argue that Dio consciously deviated from the parallel 
sources in order to emphasise the destructiveness of institutional competition and the 
consequent untenability of the Late Republic. These deviations are thus consistently 
employed to bring out the problematic process of competition at the expense of a more 
persistent focus on a few leading individuals as seen in other sources. One might object 
that Dio’s supposed originality is due to a source that is today no longer extant. However, 
Dio insists that he had “read pretty nearly everything (πάντα ὡς εἰπεῖν)”10 written about the 
Romans and that he spent ten years taking notes
11
 which, despite the possibility of 
distortion as part of self-representation, undermines the idea that Dio’s work is the result of 
a single or few unknown sources.  
Furthermore, despite the lack of clarity in our knowledge of ancient working methods,
12
 
Nissen’s Law, that ancient historians followed a single source for stretches of narrative, 
appears decidedly unlikely here since Dio’s deviations are highly consistent and 
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thoroughly informed by his own overall aims, as I will show. This undermines the idea that 
Dio’s originality derives from a single, completely unknown previous source.13 Several 
unknown sources could be another albeit speculative possibility and the sources available 
to Dio were surely far more numerous than today. However, scrolls were too large and 
impractical to allow a historian to work directly from several sources at the same time. 
Lucian, in his work on history writing, suggests instead that writers should compose an 
aide-memoire (ὑπόμνημα) of their material14 and it seems an attractive hypothesis that Dio 
followed this model.
15
 The ὑπόμνημα would thus provide Dio information from a wide 
array of sources without the impracticalities, which would free Dio from the dependence 
on a single or perhaps two sources.  
Moreover, as mentioned previously, Dio’s framework centred on competition appears to 
span the entirety of the Republic
16
 and the idea that a single source furnished Dio with all 
his information for this vast period of time is therefore highly speculative and a complete 
argumentum ex silentio. Moreover, the parallel sources show a surprising unity in the 
themes they choose to emphasise which are decidedly different to Dio’s. This suggests that 
Dio, the latest of these writers, was not working from a hypothetical source tradition that 
was available to his predecessors. Thus the hypothetical source furnishing Dio with his 
deviations would necessarily have been written in the mere half a century between Appian 
and Dio. If such a source had existed, it is also doubtful that Dio would even have chosen 
to write such a full account of the Late Republic since another, newly written work 
fulfilled this niche. In conclusion, Dio’s consistent and calculated deviations cannot be 
explained away by a hypothetical and speculative source, and are instead a manifestation 
of his overarching interpretative framework. 
The areas chosen for analysis are Lucullus’ removal from command, the lex Gabinia 
and the Catilinarian Conspiracy. I have chosen these as they represent both internal and 
external matters and both longer and shorter stretches of narrative. The events thus 
collectively become representative of the narrative of the Late Republic in Dio. 
Furthermore, the events exemplify well the type of deviations centred on competition that 
are characteristic for Dio’s treatment of the period. The main sources chosen for 
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comparison are Appian, Plutarch, Velleius and Sallust and to a lesser extent the Periochae, 
in addition to Suetonius who touches upon the period in his biography of Caesar.  
A brief note is in order here on their different perspectives: Plutarch wrote pairs of 
biographies of significant Greek and Roman figures and consequently his focus is less on 
historical facts than on the personality and morality of his characters. Appian’s history is 
focused on civil wars and the opposition between the desires of the ordinary people and the 
political elite, and the former group is often portrayed quite positively.
17
 Sallust and 
Velleius are both heavily influenced by Cato the Elder and see the Roman republic as 
entering a moral decline after the destruction of Carthage in 146.
18
 Furthermore, Velleius, 
covering all of Roman history in merely two books, frequently favours the so called 
optimates
19
 in contrast to Appian. The Periochae consists of summaries from the writings 
of Livy, whereas Suetonius often focuses on individuals and sensationalism rather than 
politics. It is also important to note the generic differences between authors; Plutarch and 
Suetonius wrote biographies, whereas Velleius’ history is extremely brief while Dio, Livy 
and to a certain extent Appian and Sallust wrote fuller histories. In light of these 
differences, the relative argumentative unity of the parallel sources and Dio’s consistent 
deviation from these, as I will show below, are only more striking. However, the above 
selection also carries with it the exclusion of other authors of which Orosius, Florus, 
Valerius Maximus and Cicero should be mentioned. The former two mainly touch upon the 
foreign wars of Rome, whereas the writings of the latter two are not structured as narrative 
histories and they are consequently ill suited to be compared to Dio at this stage where the 
political narrative of Rome will take centre stage.  
2.2: Lucullus and his command  
The narrative surrounding the removal of Lucullus from his command in the Third 
Mithridatic War is central in Dio’s Book 36 and covers the first 17 chapters. However, 
Appian largely ignores the event and the other sources treat it far more briefly than Dio: in 
one perspective, seen in Velleius, Lucullus is disinclined to end the war because “he was a 
victim to the love of money (pecuniae pellebatur cupidine)”20 and the power-hungry 
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Pompey takes over.
21
 Velleius judges Lucullus harshly as he relinquishes his command: 
“he was the first to set the example for our present lavish extravagance (profusae huius 
[…] luxuriae primus auctor fuit)”.22 This is clearly in line with Velleius’ view of the 
Republic degenerating into luxury as the political world is ignored and only a single 
chapter devoted to the event. In a contrasting perspective, seen in Plutarch and the 
Periochae, Lucullus is a glorious general, robbed of his victory by the immoral and 
mutinying soldiers.
23
 Fortune, Lucullus’ own failings and the envy of the popular leaders 
are all mentioned by Plutarch,
24
 but the most important immediate factor is instead Clodius 
who incites the soldiers to mutiny and who “most of all vitiated (τὸ μάλιστα […] 
διειργασμένον) the undertakings of Lucullus.”25 The Periochae is brief but seems in 
agreement with Plutarch as it argues that “a mutiny of the soldiers […] kept Lucullus from 
[…] obtaining the ultimate victory”.26 Thus, the perspectives of these sources focus on the 
individuals of Lucullus, Clodius and Pompey and the political institutions of Rome are 
mostly ignored.  
Dio’s focus, on the other hand, is clearly on Roman politics, particularly the connection 
between competition and foreign commands. However, he does not neglect the individuals 
and their actions but instead uses these to focalise his interpretation. This is seen in the 
beginning of Dio’s narrative where Lucullus is removed after he failed to follow up a 
victory over Mithridates and Tigranes: “Because of this he was charged by the citizens, as 
well as others, (παρά τε τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ παρὰ τοῖς πολίταις) with refusing to end the war, 
in order that he might retain his command (ἄρχῃ) a longer time.”27 It is noteworthy that the 
alleged object of Lucullus’ desire is not money as in Velleius’ account but rather the 
perpetuation of power which has convincingly been shown by Burden-Strevens to be a 
central problem in the Late Republic.
28
 Lucullus is thus indeed problematic himself in 
Dio’s version but this is not couched in typical Dekadenz rhetoric as seen in Velleius and 
his focus on luxury on money. The narrative centres rather on competition and the 
problems of a political system where Lucullus and other generals, especially Pompey and 
Caesar, cling on to command, which was a central challenge to the authority of the senate 
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in the Late Republic. That the accusation against Lucullus can be made convincingly to a 
broad spectrum, “citizens as well as others”, furthers Dio’s critique of the Late Republic. 
Dio again deviates from the parallel sources in his treatment of Clodius. Dio in fact 
describes two mutinies, the first at Nisibis where he echoes Plutarch and blames Clodius 
and his “innate love of revolution”29 for the mutiny. Dio as the only source emphasises the 
perfidy that Clodius, the mutineer, was in fact married to Lucullus’ sister.30 Dio then 
comments on the second mutiny: “At this time, however (ἄλλως), they became turbulent 
again largely because they heard that Acilius, the consul, who had been sent out to relieve 
Lucullus for the reasons mentioned (δἰ ἅπερ εἶπον), was drawing near, and they 
accordingly regarded Lucullus with contempt”.31 Whereas Plutarch blames Clodius for the 
single mutiny he records, Dio asserts that the political machinations in Rome directed 
against Lucullus are the direct cause and he underlines the importance of this by the 
emphatic particle –περ, attached to the relative pronoun. It is thus the process of constant 
competition, manifested both by Lucullus’ ambition and the rivalrous attack on him from 
Rome, which creates the problems in Dio’s account – a clear contrast to the character-
driven narratives of the parallel sources.  
This institutional focus is again clearly seen in Dio’s detailed description of intense 
egoistic competition within the group of generals sent to relieve Lucullus and it is 
important to note that this narrative element is exclusive to Dio. Lucullus is here undecided 
as to his next step because he is unaided by his rival generals and Dio emphasises the 
perplexity of Lucullus in this situation: “Λούκουλλος ἔκ τε τούτων […] ἐν ἀπόρῳ 
ἐγένετο.”32 Marcius Rex, consul the year before and on his way to Cilicia, refuses 
Lucullus’ request for aid on “the pretext (πρόσχημα)”33 that his soldiers refused. Dio 
underlines the falseness of this by his use of “πρόσχημα” and even tells us that the main 
mutineer, Clodius, after he had fled the army of Lucullus, was welcomed and put in 
command of the fleet by Marcius because of their relation by marriage.
34
 This is an 
important critique from Dio as Marcius here puts family relations and the competition with 
Lucullus above the interests of the Republic. After the soldiers of Lucullus deserted en 
masse, he also desisted from protecting Roman lands as his replacement Acilius was 
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drawing near.
35
 Furthermore, Acilius too is roundly criticised as Dio writes that he delayed 
his arrival after realising that it was now too late to “snatch the victory from underneath 
Lucullus’ feet (ὑφαρπάσων)”.36 The result of this egoistic competition is devastating and 
immediate: “the soldiers of Mithridates won back almost all his domain and caused great 
havoc in Cappadocia”.37 Dio’s narrative is here distinctive as the focus is no longer on the 
incompetence or pyrrhic greatness of Lucullus but instead on the destructiveness of a 
system of aristocratic competition which severely impairs the greatness of Rome. As a 
consequence of this system, Mithridates is given easy successes and the mutineer who set 
it all in motion is rewarded with a command. Here Dio’s narrative of the events breaks off 
and leaves the reader with a forceful reminder of the dangers of excessive competition. 
This unique narrative of competition is far too complex to have been invented and Dio 
thus shows himself to be a careful selector of material as this representation of events 
supports his focus on Rome’s institutional problem of competition, the foundation of Dio’s 
critique. In conclusion, Dio does have similarities with the other sources but his 
institutional focus and criticisms are clearly different from the other authors and he even 
includes unique narrative material to support it. Dio’s account is not bereft of the 
exploration of individuals found in the parallel evidence. However, this factor is not an end 
in itself but rather a means to communicate and strengthen his critique of the political 
system of Rome which is his main area of investigation. 
2.3: The lex Gabinia 
The events surrounding the lex Gabinia are the first treatment of internal politics in 
Rome in Dio’s narrative of Book 36 and the law stands as the central, internal event of the 
book given that fourteen whole chapters are devoted to it. The other sources treat this event 
far more superficially. Appian and the Periochae do not include the enactment of the lex 
Gabinia itself, whereas Velleius continues his focus on the individual: he criticises the 
immense power given to Pompey but asserts that a similar grant of power had been 
accorded Antonius (in 74) which had caused no nervousness in Rome: “sometimes the 
personality (persona) of the recipient of such power, just as it renders the precedent more 
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or less dangerous, increases or diminishes its invidiousness.”38 The importance of the 
individual thus dominates the political institutions. The significant factor here is therefore 
Pompey’s character and the more minor figure of Gabinius is consequently ignored. 
Plutarch echoes Velleius in his focus on Pompey, unsurprisingly given his biographical 
structure, and also merely mentions Gabinius as proposer of the lex. He does note that 
Gabinius is the intimate of Pompey but no collusion is suggested.
39
 However, in contrast to 
Velleius, Plutarch asserts that the populace supports the law and even acts threateningly. 
Dio first of all deviates from the tradition in giving by far the fullest treatment of the 
event, which is also illustrated through three speeches given to Pompey, Gabinius and 
Catulus. This indicates the enormous importance with which Dio invested this event, 
which is a testament to his institutional focus; the significance of the lex Gabinia is 
inherently institutional in nature as it breaks the constitutional limits of Rome and creates a 
dangerous precedent. To Dio, furthermore, the lex is also a product of the problematic 
process of political competition in the Late Republic as an ambitious dynast with the 
support of the people is able to trump the senate and the upright but unavailing Catulus, 
and push through the first of the deeply problematic extraordinary commands. Pompey is 
of course important here but Dio rather focuses on the changing balance of power between 
ambitious individuals and the senate, which is both a cause and a result of the problematic 
institutional competition. The lex Gabinia, in short, stands as a mile-stone in Dio’s 
narrative of the end of the Republic because of its long-term consequences for the political 
system
40
 rather than for Pompey personally. 
This significance of the lex Gabinia to Dio’s work is further supported when compared 
to the comparatively meagre space, merely two chapters, devoted to the later lex Manilia. 
This indicates that Dio had already made his exploration of the problematic extraordinary 
commands in the narrative surrounding the lex Gabinia and another grand exposition 
would be superfluous. Plutarch and Velleius, by contrast, give roughly equal space to the 
laws but never appear interested in the wider political ramifications of Pompey’s great 
power. Dio is thus singularly interested in the institutional and constitutional ramifications 
of the lex,
41
 and presents it as the outcome of political competition. This is clearly seen in 
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Dio’s portrait of an ambitious Pompey craving the command, which stands in contrast to 
Plutarch and Velleius where Pompey is wholly passive and in Plutarch’s narrative even 
withdraws on the day of the vote.
42
 Dio comments:  
“Pompey, who was very eager to command (ἐπιθυμῶν μὲν πάνυ ἄρξαι), and 
because of his own ambition (ὑπό τε τῆς ἑαυτοῦ φιλοτιμίας) and the zeal of the 
populace no longer now so much regarded this commission as an honour as the 
failure to win it a disgrace, when he saw the opposition of the optimates 
(τῶν δυνατῶν), desired to appear forced to accept. He was always in the habit 
of pretending as far as possible not to desire (ἐπιθυμεῖν) the things he really 
wished, and on this occasion did so more than ever, because of the jealousy 
(ἐπίφθονον) that would follow”.43 
Pompey here clearly lusts duplicitously for power. Especially Velleius, seen in the 
subchapter on Lucullus, had also previously attacked Pompey along the same lines
44
 but in 
Dio’s account, the description is rather used to demonstrate the problematic process of 
competition as all actors, both the ambitious (φιλοτιμία) politicians and the δυνατοί,45 
compete egoistically for their own good. Furthermore, the competition itself in fact causes 
further degeneration as Pompey is forced to employ duplicity to avoid the φθόνος of a 
broken system.  
Dio again deviates significantly in his portrayal of Gabinius who was completely 
ignored in Velleius and Plutarch. An example hereof is that Gabinius is given a whole 
speech that is even longer than Pompey’s and the two speeches in fact function in tandem 
as a duplicitous recusatio in order to avoid φθόνος. Moreover, and very importantly, Dio is 
the only source to explicitly suggest the possibility that Pompey had spurred Gabinius on 
to make this proposal, which fits with his picture of the ambitious general.
46
 Dio does also 
mention another possibility, namely that Gabinius was trying to ingratiate himself with 
Pompey, but this still remains unique in the source tradition and functions equally well in 
Dio’s critique of the egoistically ambitious politicians of the Late Republic.47 Furthermore, 
it is also only Dio who criticises Gabinius and he does so forcefully by saying that he was 
“not prompted by any love of the common welfare, for he was a most base fellow 
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(κάκιστος […] ἀνὴρ).”48 This critique appears banal and could feature in any of the other 
sources. However, in Dio’s narrative it becomes a continuation of his focus on egoistic 
competition which is permeating and destroying the Republic as Gabinius in Dio is 
centrally important to the enactment of this deeply problematic law but acts self-
interestedly. Gabinius thus demonstrates that the deteriorated competition was not merely 
due to the dynasts but rather permeated the Roman political world since his personal 
failings are not an individual problem but instead characteristic of Rome as a whole. 
Indeed, Dio comments in Book 37 that only Cato was selflessly involved in politics,
49
 
which again shows Dio’s focus on the degeneration of institutional competition. 
Another important contrast to Velleius and Plutarch is Dio’s view of the senate. 
Velleius writes that the optimates advised against the command “but sane advice 
succumbed to impulse”.50 Plutarch has a similar narrative as the senate vehemently 
opposed the lex since “such unlimited and absolute power, while it was greater than envy 
(μεῖζον μὲν φθόνου), was yet a thing to be feared (φόβου).”51 Dio on the contrary, is far 
more critical of the senate: “that body preferred to suffer anything whatever at the hands of 
the freebooters rather than put so great command into Pompey’s hands; in fact they came 
near slaying Gabinius in the very senate-house (ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ συνεδρίῳ)”.52 Firstly, the 
senate is not opposed to the command in itself, as they are in Plutarch, but rather to the 
increase of Pompey’s power and they self-interestedly put their enmity above the good of 
Rome in stark contrast to the positively described senate in Velleius. The constant egoistic 
competition and a consequently dysfunctional senate thus preclude solutions to the piracy 
problem. Secondly, the senators are uniquely violent in Dio’s narrative53 as he is the only 
one to assert that they almost killed Gabinius, and through αὐτῷ, Dio emphasises that this 
even took place in the senate-house. Dio’s use of violence to create his negative picture of 
Late Republican competition is further seen in his presentation of the violent populace. 
Plutarch also includes this factor but whereas the people in his account come close to 
attacking one senator,
54
 in Dio the people “rush upon them [the senators] as they sat 
assembled; and if the senators had not gotten out of the way, they would certainly have 
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killed them.”55 Dio thus increases the violence as all the senators are at risk here and they 
even have to flee to save their lives. Furthermore, Pompey is highly popular among the 
people and they hereby become a tool used to force the senate’s acceptance of the lex 
Gabinia. This use of the people and their forceful violence by Pompey’s camp against the 
senate exemplifies the new distribution of power in the Late Republic, where individuals 
could in fact overpower the senate through the help of the people, which exacerbates 
institutional competition. Ambitious politicians, here personified by Pompey, have through 
the people and their violence gained sufficient unconstitutional power that the senate is 
overwhelmed and the traditional constitutional constraints broken via the extraordinary 
command.
56
 Dio has thus again through deviations put the process of institutional 
competition at the heart of his account. 
Dio’s account is of course not completely unique or fabricated as most main elements 
and several details are identical in the other sources. However, Dio presents and 
embellishes his material in a wholly different way as both Gabinius and Pompey are self-
serving and mendacious and the latter’s ambition is the central driving force. The 
presentation of the senate is also very different and the whole focus switches away from 
the individual that is so important in Velleius and Plutarch and onto the political 
institutions. Individuals are not neglected, but they are used to communicate and strengthen 
Dio’s critique of the political system and the destructive role of competition in a way that 
is unique in the source tradition. 
In contrast to the events surrounding Lucullus, it seems that at least some of Dio’s 
deviations originate in embellishments because the explanation of the motivations of 
Gabinius, Pompey and the senate appears to be Dio’s own work. It is, on the other hand, 
harder to determine the origins of the unique violence and the suggestion of collusion 
between Gabinius and Pompey. However, given that I am not attempting to identify Dio’s 
source(s), these considerations are of secondary importance. What is important is instead 
the clear picture that Dio has here again manipulated and selected his material to create a 
narrative where the political institutions and the destructiveness of competition take centre 
stage. The focus on institutions and competition is furthermore notably identical to the 
narrative surrounding the removal of Lucullus, which suggests that Dio made his narrative 
choices based on an overarching and premeditated interpretative framework that governed 
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his work. It thus seems that Dio attempted to present an institutional explanation for the 
problems of the Late Republic where competition stood at the centre. This, and the 
consistency of Dio’s approach, will be further supported in the next subchapter on the 
Catilinarian Conspiracy.  
2.4: The Catilinarian Conspiracy 
The Catilinarian Conspiracy of 63 is a central event in the historiography of the Late 
Republic and, not surprisingly, all of our sources treat it to some extent. The narratives are 
often complex and I will not here follow them minutely but instead focus on the main 
aspects and on points where Dio deviates from the other sources. Sallust’s Bellum 
Catilinae is our most thorough treatment and here we are told that it was Catiline’s corrupt 
character, helped by the equally corrupt city, which caused the conspiracy.
57
 This is a 
continuation of the previously mentioned idea of a degenerating Rome in the absence of 
metus hostilis. Sallust’s narrative is riddled with corruption, bribery and immorality and in 
that sense mirrors Dio’s. Indeed immorality in fact creates the conspiracy: “Catiline 
formed the plan of overthrowing the government, both because his own debt was enormous 
in all parts of the world and because the greater number of Sulla’s veterans, who had 
squandered their property and now thought with longing of their former pillage and 
victories, were eager for civil war. There was no army in Italy; […] this was his golden 
opportunity.”58 The individual here again plays a central role as Catiline’s personal 
corruption, underlined in the opening of the work,
59
 is key in the creation of the plot, an 
explanation that is inserted even before the so-called First Catilinarian Conspiracy of 66. 
Cicero is the main hero of the narrative, continuously frustrating Catiline’s designs and the 
people “extolled Cicero to the skies”.60 Velleius’ short work is far briefer but also praises 
Cicero who detected the plot by his “extraordinary courage, firmness, and careful 
vigilance”61 and “Catiline was driven from the city by fear of the authority of the consul 
[i.e. Cicero]”.62 However, the wider political causes or consequences are non-existent in a 
continuation of Velleius’ previously seen focus. In the Periochae, Cicero is again the 
saviour of Rome: “This conspiracy was extirpated by the energy of Marcus Tullius 
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Cicero.”63 Appian gives a fairly full narrative that mirrors Sallust’s as the conspiracy is 
here explained as natural to Catiline and Cicero is the hero: “Catiline was […] a madman 
[…]. He had reduced himself to poverty in order to gratify his ambition, but still he was 
courted by the powerful, both men and women, and he became a candidate for the 
consulship as a step leading to absolute power. […] Cicero, the most eloquent orator and 
rhetorician of the period, was chosen instead.”64 Again, the society is corrupt and Catiline’s 
plans for a conspiracy are inherent to his character. Lastly, this picture is also seen in 
Plutarch who underlines the dire state of affairs: “matters needed only a slight impulse to 
disturb them, and it was in the power of any bold man to overthrow the commonwealth, 
which of itself was in a diseased condition. However, Catiline wished to obtain first a 
strong base of operations”.65 We are again lacking a definite starting point for the idea of a 
conspiracy as this is the first we hear of any plans on the part of Catiline. The biography of 
Cicero is by far the fullest treatment of the Conspiracy by Plutarch, and Cicero is of course 
the central hero. The above general acceptance of Cicero’s heroic role and the idea of 
Catiline’s complete corruption is at least in part the product of the use of Cicero’s speeches 
as source material by Sallust and subsequent historians. In conclusion, all the above 
sources focus persistently on Cicero and Catiline as the two central characters that drive 
the narrative forward. 
Dio gives many of the same details as the parallel sources but deviates in two main 
areas, namely the origins of the conspiracy and the treatment of Cicero. Catiline had been 
described once by Dio before the second conspiracy but Dio here merely calls him “very 
bold (θρασύτατος)”66 in relation to the so-called first conspiracy without elaborating 
through damning accusations. It is instead a surprising acquittal in 63 for his deeds under 
Sulla that spurs Catiline on: “Catiline, who, although charged with the same crimes as the 
others […], was acquitted. And from this very circumstance he became far worse 
(ἐκ τούτου χείρων τε πολὺ ἐγένετο) and even lost his life as a result. For, when Marcus 
Cicero had become consul […] Catiline undertook to set up a new government, and by 
banding together the allies against the state threw the people into fear of a mighty 
conflict.”67 Coming after the corruption of Republican politics and egoistic competition 
described by Dio in Book 36, the surprising result of Catiline’s trial suggests foul play and 
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becomes part of Dio’s institutional critique. Dio hereby has far less focus on the personal 
immorality of Catiline as he in Dio’s narrative is not a madman or inherently destined for 
revolution. Instead, by the inclusion of this acquittal, unattested in the parallel sources, Dio 
gives the impression that it was only from the year 63 that the idea of revolution took hold.  
The above quotation is inserted by Dio as a summary of the conspiracy but in the 
subsequent more detailed narrative he again deviates from the source tradition in telling 
ways: “the senate decreed, chiefly at the instance of Cicero (τοῦ Κικέρωνος ἐς τὰ μάλιστα 
ἐνάγοντος), that banishment for ten years should be added by law to the penalties 
established for bribery. Catiline, accordingly, believed that this decree had been passed on 
his account, as was indeed the case; and so, after collecting a small band, he attempted to 
slay Cicero and some others of the foremost men on the very day of the election, in order 
that he might immediately be chosen as consul.”68 This narrative element is again 
completely unique to Dio and gives the lead-up to the actual conspiracy a different flavour. 
The senate attempts to correct the problematic bribery, part of the destructive process of 
competition, but through this legislation in fact spurs Catiline on to take even more 
extreme measures in his quest to become consul. Dio has hereby again included a deviation 
that allows him to highlight the destructiveness of competition in the Late Republic and he 
even indicates that this problem is unsolvable as the seemingly positive law rather makes 
Catiline’s intended means even more extreme. This whole situation is born out of the 
Republican institutional competition for offices but the competition has here turned 
destructive and uncontrollable. An important reason for this is the weakness of the senate 
and traditional authority, and the excessive power of ambitious individuals as exemplified 
in the above situation where the senate’s attempts are characteristically futile and result in 
the imminent collection of a personal army by Catiline. 
However, before this, Catiline fails miserably in both plots and elections: “new consuls 
were chosen, and Catiline no longer directed his plot in secret or against Cicero and his 
adherents only, but against the whole commonwealth.”69 In Sallust, Plutarch and Appian, 
Catiline is a corrupted madman and his desire for revolution and outrages far precedes the 
actual conspiracy of 63. In Dio, on the other hand, the so-called first conspiracy is 
consciously played down and it is instead institutional problems in the shape of the 
seemingly corrupt courts, the futile attempt to rectify the problematic excessive bribery and 
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the loss in the consular elections that provide the catalyst. Dio does also incorporate 
Catiline’s moral degeneration but he uses it to focalise his critique of the political system 
which provides the concrete cause for the conspiracy rather than an inherent moral failing 
in Catiline, as in the other sources. This seems a difference of prioritisation: especially 
Sallust and Plutarch but also Appian explore the individual, Catiline, as their main theme 
and use the political situation around the Catilinarian Conspiracy to do so. Dio by contrast 
uses the individual as a tool to explore the political problems of Rome. The main 
difference in the two versions of the origins of the conspiracy thus seems to be one of 
priority and perspective. 
The second major area of deviation in Dio’s account is the role played by Cicero. Dio is 
the only source to include an assassination plot on Cicero in 64,
70
 which the latter exposes. 
However, afterwards Cicero is disbelieved in the senate “since his announcement was not 
regarded as credible and he was suspected of having uttered false charges against the men 
because of personal enmity (διὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἔχθραν), [and] Cicero became frightened 
(ἐφοβήθη), now that he had given Catiline additional provocation.”71 This frightened 
Cicero stands in sharp contrast to the hero of the parallel sources and it is significant that 
the suspicion of egoistic rivalry undermines Cicero’s effort to help the state. This suspicion 
is again representative of the institutional problem of constant and pervasive egoistic 
competition for offices in Dio’s Late Republic where no one works for the state, which 
precludes the possibility of assistance or corrections and the alternative depiction of Cicero 
is fundamental in creating this representation of Republican politics. This negative 
description of Cicero is highly consistent as Dio often posits an alternative cause when the 
former achieves a success. An example is Cicero exposing another plot on his life while 
consul: “This plot, too, was divulged, since Cicero, being a man of great influence, and one 
who gained many followers through his speeches, either by conciliation or by intimidation 
(ἐκφοβῶν), had many men to report such occurrences to him”.72 It is not Cicero himself 
but his helpers who uncover the conspiracy, and his great rhetoric extolled by Appian and 
Velleius
73
 is here cast in a decidedly less flattering light as a tool for political competition. 
This portrayal of rhetoric is representative of Dio’s Late Republic as it is exploited by 
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often mendacious dynasts to further their political aims, and degeneration of public debate 
as a result of competition becomes an important institutional problem.
74
 
Furthermore, even Cicero’s grand exploit of thwarting Catiline’s main plot is partly 
undermined: “the statue of Jupiter was set up on the Capitol […] For these seers [the ones 
instructing the statue to be set up] had decided that some conspiracy would be brought to 
light by the erection of the statue, and […] its setting up coincided with the discovery of 
the conspirators”.75 Dio here uses annalistic conventions to undermine Cicero’s claim to 
have protected the city. In the parallel sources by contrast, Cicero is extolled as the saviour 
of Rome
76
 and even called “father of his country”77 by the people in Appian and Plutarch. 
Dio, on the other hand, mentions several times the anger of the populace towards Cicero 
since he had the conspirators killed unlawfully
78
 and because of his boastfulness: “[Cicero] 
certainly did take great pleasure not only in being praised by others but also in extolling 
himself […]. [Cicero] added to his oath the statement that he had saved the city; and for 
this he incurred much greater hatred.”79 Cicero is hereby transformed in Dio from the 
masterful rhetorician and “father of his country” to a boastful and hated figure. This is not 
as Millar would have it “a failure, perhaps the most complete of his History.”80 Rather it 
furthers Dio’s overall picture of the thoroughly corrupted process of Republican 
competition where rhetoric becomes a political weapon and no one, except Cato, works for 
the common good. Essentially, the portrayal of Cicero demonstrates Dio’s skilful and 
selective use of the then-available source material, and perhaps imperial anti-Ciceronian 
literature,
81
 in order to support his interpretation of the Republic, which has no space for a 
heroic Cicero. Just as in the case of the origins of the conspiracy, Dio here emerges as a 
careful selector and manipulator of sources, who had an overarching framework, with 
competition at its centre, which informed his approach to Roman history. In conclusion, 
Dio’s institutional perspective on the Catilinarian Conspiracy stands in stark contrast to the 
parallel sources where the central focal point is the individual moral degeneracy of Catiline 
himself. 
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2.5: Conclusion 
I have thus shown how Dio deviates significantly from the parallel sources in his 
treatment of the above important but also representative events of Dio’s Late Republic. 
One notable aspect here is the consistency with which Dio deviates from the parallel 
source material, achieved at least partly by embellishments. The consistent narrative 
differences between Dio and the parallel sources clearly show that Dio was neither 
thoroughly following any of the today extant sources nor the lost portion of Livy, as 
indicated by the Periochae. However, the narrative elements unique to Dio are too 
complicated to be explained away by embellishments or invention alone. This supports 
Dio’s claim to wide knowledge of sources and ample notetaking but also illustrates a 
careful selection process of the available material in order to communicate and strengthen 
main arguments. Furthermore, the institutionally founded framework illustrated above 
supports the idea that Dio followed Lucian in the use of a ὑπόμνημα. This would free Dio 
from the dependence on a single or perhaps two sources, which the consistent deviations 
from the parallel evidence, as part of his interpretative framework, suggest was 
necessary.
82
 This independent framework makes Dio’s work impractical for reconstructing 
older sources and undermines the Quellenforschung that still constitutes a central part of 
scholarly work
83
 – arguably an important factor in the reluctance to ascribe such a 
framework to the historian. 
This undermining of Quellenforschung is further exacerbated by the comparisons above 
that show Dio’s politically focused framework to be very different in scope from the other 
sources where the individual is the main area of interest and driver of the narrative. Dio by 
contrast uses the individual as a tool in his critique of the political system of the Late 
Republic which is his most important arena of investigation. The above also shows how 
Dio consistently and in a sophisticated manner highlights the destructive process of 
competition in his narrative of the Late Republic by presenting an alternative portrait of 
events compared to other authors. The parallel sources occasionally deal with political 
problems as well but fail to invest them with the broader political significance of Dio’s 
narrative. The dissimilarities can of course partly be explained by a variation in the 
available source material or by generic differences between the authors. However, this 
explanation cannot account for the fact that Dio’s narrative is so consistently different and 
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constantly furthers the same institutional explanation. Instead, the consistency of Dio’s 
deviations suggests the presence of an overarching interpretative framework focused on 
institutional competition, which undermines the position of Millar and Lintott
84
 while also 
weakening Kuhn-Chen’s argument that Dio’s account was primarily created through a 
moralising perspective.
85
 Furthermore, it also challenges the widespread view that Dio was 
unoriginal
86
 which has recently been restated by both Rees and Kemezis.
87
 In short, Dio’s 
distinctive account appears premeditated and governed by an overarching framework, in 
contrast to the majority of scholarly work, which will be supported in the following chapter 
on Dio and the annalistic method.  
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3: Dio and the annalistic method 
3.1: Introduction 
Dio’s structuring of his narrative has received scant scholarly attention, which mostly 
consists of uncorroborated claims that Dio was a traditional annalist.
1
 However, in the 
following I will show that Dio instead was a competent manipulator who exploited the 
annalistic conventions in order to communicate and strengthen his overall interpretative 
framework, namely that institutional competition was the main destructive factor of the 
Late Republic. Dio thus suborned the annalistic conventions seen in Livy to the broader 
goal of political interpretation. 
This dominant view of Dio’s use of the annalistic tradition is especially problematic 
because the term “annalist” generally lacks strict definitions and often simply uses Livy as 
a model. The use of Livy is clearly seen in Swan’s definition where the year, generally 
organised around the consuls, is divided in three sections of events on the model of 
internal-external-internal but mostly focused on the internal:  
“The character of urban annalistic material is amply illustrated in Livy and 
Tacitus and is not a topic of scholarly debate. It consists above all else of the 
annual record of public transactions: elections, proceedings in the Senate, 
legislation, trials, the business of magistrates and priests, festivals, shows, 
governmental largess, and the like […]. The account of each year in Roman 
annals contains one or two “constellations” or “clusters” of such material […] 
and it is these more than anything else that are the hallmark of the annalistic 
genre.”2  
This is arguably the fullest definition of the annalistic tradition, clearly based on traditional 
views of mostly Livy but also Tacitus, and according to the vast majority of scholars, it is 
on this Livian model that Dio straightforwardly bases himself. 
However, this widespread view appears surprising since in any case the use of the 
annalistic method by the traditionally categorised annalistic historians Tacitus and even 
Livy has been complexified in recent years. McDonald, in 1957, articulated the traditional 
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view that Livy worked in a strictly annalistic fashion throughout the work and this 
assertion has been widespread.
3
 However, Rich in 2011 argued that Livy’s use of the 
annalistic method is more varied than generally thought as the latter for example 
rearranges strict chronology in Books 31-45 to create an interconnectivity between eastern 
and Roman events.
4
 Regarding Tacitus, Ginsburg in 1981 convincingly showed that the 
historian exploits the annalistic conventions for his own interpretative ends.
5
 Deviations 
from the annalistic conventions have thus been identified for Livy and Tacitus but never 
considered for Dio. 
In short, Dio has in the past almost exclusively been termed an annalist without further 
investigation. Schwartz did in fact in 1899 argue that Dio interspersed his annalistic 
organisation around the consuls with a more “pragmatisch-geographischen” structure.6 
However, this is used as an argument in Schwartz’s severe critique that Dio’s narrative 
lacks clarity due to the absence of a clear organisational structure and Dio remains an 
annalist to Schwartz. Swan in 1987 also acknowledged that Dio occasionally reworked 
parts of the annalistic material, here for the Augustan age, in order to create a more fluent 
narrative, but Dio’s overall use of the annalistic method is not questioned.7 This 
perspective is also seen in Swan’s article from 1997 which includes the Late Republic: 
“Roman annalistic structure is visible throughout the single long stretch from 69 B.C. to 
A.D. 46 (Books 36-60).”8 Some reworking is again admitted for the Augustan age but not 
the Late Republic. Lachenaud in 2011 and 2014 echoed Schwartz’s assertion that Dio used 
both annalistic and thematic structuring,
9
 and Fotheringham in 2015 built on this by 
arguing that Dio, in anticipation of the fall of the Republic, partly abandoned the annalistic 
chronology in Book 40 for a geographical organisation. However, Fotheringham still 
asserted that Books 36-39 were organised annalistically.
10
 Rich in a forthcoming article 
reasserts the conclusion that Dio, despite some flexibility to create a fluent narrative, 
worked annalistically for the extant part of the Late Republic and uses this to argue that all 
the preceding 33 fragmentary Republican books were organised in similar fashion.
11
 Thus, 
a scholarly consensus exists which asserts that Dio’s Late Republic, in spite of moments of 
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flexibility, is indeed annalistic, conforming largely to the Livian model and Swan’s above 
definition.
12
 This is clearly mirrored in general works on Dio where he is commonly 
termed “annalistic” without further investigation,13 as exemplified by Fechner who argues 
that Dio writes “im wesentlichen nach annalistischen Schema”14 but fails to elaborate or 
support his assertion. Only Burden-Strevens has argued for a more complex use of the 
annalistic structure by Dio which furthers the latter’s interpretation: “Dio manipulates the 
annalistic structure […] to implicate the disaster of Crassus’ Parthian campaign, presented 
in terms of ἐπιθυμία, within the chaos in the city in 53 BCE.”15 However, the area is not 
explored further. 
The above consensus on Dio could stem from the impression that the Livian annalistic 
method was widespread and the only logical choice for Dio. Yet, in view of Ginsburg’s 
arguments, no historian between Livy and Dio can be identified to work on the same 
pattern as the former. Furthermore, the tradition before Livy is far less homogenous than 
often argued,
16
 as even Pictor, often seen as the first annalist,
17
 seems to have treated a 
large part of his work much more summarily than we see in Livy. This is supported by 
Dionysius who asserts that Pictor, and his contemporary Cincius Alimentus, “touched only 
in a summary way (κεφαλαιωδῶς) upon the early events”.18 Cato, moreover, clearly 
arranged his material in a thematic way
19
 and the Greek Polybius used a chronological 
system based on the Olympic years. Furthermore, most of the historians prior to Livy 
wrote too few books to cover all of the chosen period in the methodical way that Livy 
did.
20
 It thus seems that the historians before Livy generally bore only a superficial 
resemblance to him and the latter was therefore perhaps far more innovative than is 
commonly asserted.
21
 This heterogeneous precedent, and the calculated structuring by 
Tacitus, would allow Dio far greater flexibility in relation to the annalistic structure than 
has so far been admitted.  
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The above overview clearly asserts a gap in the research on the annalistic method in Dio 
since important variations have been identified in both Livy and Tacitus, and the idea of a 
set annalistic method imposed by tradition appears untenable. In the following, I shall 
therefore focus on Dio’s handling of the traditionally asserted core annalistic themes of 
elections, omens and legislation in addition to a briefer overview of a range of other 
annalistic aspects. 
3.2: Elections  
The annalistic method is fundamentally organised around the consuls, and the elections 
of these, and of magistrates generally, therefore take on singular importance and are rarely 
omitted. Against this background, it is striking that Dio completely omits the consular 
elections of 69-65 and only includes these in 64 (Book 37) in relation to the Catilinarian 
Conspiracy.
22
 Catiline’s defeat in the consular elections is an important cause: “new 
consuls were chosen, and Catiline no longer directed his plot in secret or against Cicero 
and his adherents only, but against the whole commonwealth.”23 This is, as shown above, 
in contrast to the other sources, which thought the plot inherent to Catiline, and Dio 
therefore appears to have tapped into the annalistic tradition at exactly this moment in 
order to emphasise that it is the political system and its constant competition for offices 
which create the conspiracy. 
The narrative around the formation of the triumvirate is another case in point as Dio 
notes that Pompey “had Lucius Afranius and Metellus Celer appointed consuls (ὑπάτους 
ἀποδειχθῆναι ἐποίησεν), vainly (μάτην) hoping that through them he could effect whatever 
he desired.”24 Here Dio shows how the excessive power of Pompey has effectively 
undermined the political system since he appears to control the consular elections. 
However, Pompey still attempts to use the traditional institutions for influence, which is 
clearly a mistake as Dio already through μάτην singles out this plan as a priori futile and 
quickly hereafter underlines Pompey’s actual failure as the δυνατοί block any progress 
because of their personal dislike of and rivalry with Pompey.
25
 This is also facilitated by 
the indifference of Afranius and the active opposition to Pompey by the supposed ally 
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Metellus, because “Pompey had divorced his sister”.26 These egoistic acts, predicated on 
internal, factional competition, are representative of the process of Roman politics in 
general and the annalistic convention of focusing on consular elections has been exploited 
to facilitate this presentation. 
Pompey realises that he has no real power and the so-called first triumvirate is formed 
as a consequence, which sets the stage for the next included consular elections (for 59) in 
which Caesar is elected. The δυνατοί, led by Cato, attempt to block Caesar too but with the 
support of the triumvirate he “was unanimously elected by them all.”27 Dio here uses the 
consular elections to reveal that the triumvirate of the dynasts is far more powerful than the 
δυνατοί and the senators, and the alliance easily dominates politics.28 The strength of the 
triumvirate also later explains Caesar’s successes during his consulship.29 However, while 
exploiting the annalistic conventions, Dio also subverts them as the focus is never on the 
elections themselves but rather on the dynasts controlling them. Through this narrative 
prioritisation Dio again emphasises that it is Caesar, Pompey and Crassus who are the main 
holders of power, whereas the consular elections themselves are unimportant since they are 
controlled by these players and the consuls alone have no real power, as Pompey too 
realised. The traditional Republican institutions have thus been completely undermined by 
the ambition of the dynasts. 
The involvement of Crassus and Pompey could then also explain why the consular 
elections of 56 are the only instance in the Late Republic where the election itself is in 
focus. Other consular elections are of course described, such as the tumult surrounding the 
elections for 53,
30
 but only in 56 does Dio delve into the actual election process and 
competition between candidates. The general omission or relegation of consular elections 
could appear surprising for a historian focused on institutional competition. However, 
these omissions are part of Dio’s rejection of the annalistic framework as a viable method 
to describe Late Republican politics. To Dio, essentially, power was (as mentioned) no 
longer centred on the consuls but rather on the dynasts, which rendered the consular 
elections unimportant in themselves. The annalistic method, whose main focus was exactly 
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on the consuls and their election,
31
 could therefore not describe Late Republican politics 
satisfyingly. Dio consequently rejected the annalistic convention of mechanically including 
consular elections, and in his use of these, instead prioritised the dynasts and the 
surrounding institutional competition. This is demonstrated as the consular elections of 56, 
the most extensively described, do involve two dynasts and the narrative is firmly focused 
on them and the accompanying competition rather than on other candidates. Likewise, the 
unrest of for example 53 exemplifies the problematic process of competition for offices 
and is part of the lead-up to Pompey’s sole consulship. Dio’s use of the consular elections 
is thus highly calculated as he carefully selects the cases which best exemplify his 
interpretative point about destructive competition. Furthermore, Dio’s selective inclusions 
in fact also constitute a rejection of the annalistic method and a statement about the actual 
distribution of power in the Late Republic.  
Dio’s narrative of the consular elections of 56 has an instructive background: the 
triumvirate had secured an extraordinary command for Caesar who consequently attained 
great military success which in turn spurred Pompey on to seek the consulship. Dio 
comments: “the fact, however, that Caesar’s influence was increasing […], was a cruel 
thorn in Pompey’s side.”32 As set out in chapter 1,33 Dio here presents Late Republican 
competition as a destructive zero-sum game and the typical annalistic element of consular 
elections is essential in this presentation. Dio then turns to one of the central problems of 
destructive political competition, namely violence, seen in the events surrounding 
Pompey’s ally Clodius during the lead-up to the elections: the senators attempted to sway 
the populace but Clodius, who had favoured the populace consistently, quickly won them 
over and only when the senators employed violence against Clodius did they gain the 
upper hand. However, the populace quickly overpowered the senators attacking Clodius by 
escalating the violence: “many ran to the scene bringing fire and threatening to burn his 
oppressors along with the senate-house if they should do him any violence”.34 These highly 
violent scenes are unique to Dio in the source tradition and are incorporated in the only 
extensive and sustained treatment of consular elections in the whole Late Republic, and 
indeed the account teaches the reader several important lessons: firstly, the senate will 
never be able to gain a firm hold on the fickle populace which follows whoever favours 
them; and, secondly, violence decidedly trumps speeches and mere words but the popular 
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leaders and dynasts will always have the upper hand in this escalation as the threat of the 
populace so clearly showed.  
This second point is further seen as Pompey and Crassus terrify their opponents into 
submission: “To be sure, Lucius Domitius, who canvassed for the office up to the very last 
day of the year, set out from his house for the assembly just after dark, but when the slave 
who carried the torch in front of him was slain, he became frightened and went no 
farther. Hence, since no one at all opposed them, and furthermore since Publius Crassus, 
who was a son of Marcus and at that time lieutenant under Caesar, brought soldiers to 
Rome for this very purpose (ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸ τοῦτο), they were easily chosen.”35 Here, Lucius 
Domitius Ahenobarbus, who seemingly refrained from violence, is terrified into standing 
down and soldiers are even brought to Rome in order to stifle opposition. Dio’s narrative is 
a forceful reminder that the speeches of the senators are no match for the determined 
violence of the dynasts especially when supported by the army as well. Dio has thus here 
employed a typical element of the annalistic structure but manipulated it to present his 
interpretation of a political system in Rome which has broken down in the face of 
competition that has turned violent. This is, furthermore, the most extensively treated 
consular elections, which only supports their communicative value and suggests that the 
inclusion is deliberate and premeditated. The consular elections following 56 are mostly 
ignored except when Dio uses them to emphasise the chaos in Rome that prevented the 
magistrates from being chosen for several months in 53 and 52.
36
 This use again supports 
Dio’s presentation of the Republic as broken due to competition and shows how Dio 
consistently omits annalistic material unless it serves his overall aims. 
Another highly instructive area of annalistic exploitation in Dio is the priestly elections. 
Rich has argued that Livy does occasionally vary the positioning of priestly affairs 
according to narrative aims, but he also notes that “Livy gives a nearly complete record of 
changes to the pontifical college”.37 Dio by contrast only mentions two priestly elections in 
the whole of his Late Republic and both serve clear interpretative aims. The first is 
Caesar’s election to Pontifex Maximus which is curiously inserted in the middle of the 
narrative of the Catilinarian Conspiracy. Dio emphasises Caesar’s youth and lack of 
experience but “basing his hopes of it upon the multitude […] he accomplished his purpose 
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and was elected Pontifex Maximus, in spite of the fact that many others, and Catulus in 
particular, were his rivals for the honour. This was because he showed himself perfectly 
ready to serve and flatter everybody, even ordinary persons, and shrank from no speech or 
action in order to get possession of the objects for which he strove.”38 In relation to the lex 
Gabinia, Catulus had, as one of the few politicians in the Late Republic, been portrayed 
positively and Caesar’s victory is hereby the mark of a thoroughly broken system of 
problematic competition. Furthermore, it is clear here that success depends on unbridled 
ambition and a ruthless disposition where no act is too low. Dio thus again uses the 
annalistic tradition, which allows him to incorporate this seemingly trivial detail, but then 
presents the material in order to support his presentation of the Late Republic as wholly 
corrupted. 
This is further seen in the second of the priestly elections incorporated where Cornelius 
Spinther transfers his son to another gens to evade a law barring two people from the same 
gens from simultaneously being augur, and Spinther hereby secures this position for his 
son. Dio underlines that this story “has some bearing upon our history”39 and concludes: 
“thus, though the letter of the law was observed, its spirit was broken (ὁ νόμος ἐν τοῖς 
ἑαυτοῦ ῥήμασι μείνας ἔργῳ κατελύθη).”40 Dio here uses the election to emphasise the 
problem of political manipulation and this inclusion, as I will show in chapter 5,
41
 heralds a 
whole phase of focus upon this specific problematic manifestation of political competition. 
This is part of Dio’s wider exposition in Book 39 of the internal factors, connected to 
competition, which destroy the Republic and he has here used the annalistic conventions to 
justify his inclusion of another seemingly trivial detail. However, this detail supports and 
communicates Dio’s overall interpretation, namely that the Late Republic was thoroughly 
corrupted and that competition, and in this case (family) ambition, was at the heart of this 
corruption. Furthermore, these examples are the only inclusions of priestly elections, which 
shows Dio’s selective and calculated use of the annalistic tradition to support his overall 
framework. 
The elections of other magistrates are only sparsely treated, arguably since they had but 
little relevance to the overall portrayal that Dio sought. The elections of quaestors are 
ignored, whereas the aedilitian elections are only incorporated twice. The first instance is 
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when the important figure Clodius exploits the office to gain immunity.
42
 The second 
mention is coupled with the only reference to the elections for praetor, namely when 
Pompey and Crassus, newly elected consuls, opposed Cato’s attempt for the praetorship: 
“The election of the praetors, now, was made in peace, for Cato did not see fit to offer any 
violence; in the matter of the curule aediles, however, there was some bloodshed, so that 
even Pompey was much bespattered with blood.”43 Through his uprightness and refusal to 
use violence, Cato is rendered politically impotent, as indeed he is generally in Dio’s 
narrative. This is a conscious contrast to the violent aedilitian elections and the previous 
consular elections, which emphasises how violence and unbridled ambition are highly 
effective in the political competition in Rome. The upright characters are instead rendered 
powerless through this very quality. 
Through the few, but carefully selected, inclusions of elections for magistracies and 
priesthoods, Dio has succeeded in presenting Roman political competition as highly 
destructive, thereby both communicating and supporting his interpretation. This amounts to 
a careful manipulation, visible throughout the narrative, of the annalistic tradition as its 
content is frequently disregarded and instead selectively employed only when it supports 
Dio’s overall aims. Dio’s structuring of his narrative is thus far more sophisticated and 
consistent than modern scholars have admitted and again suggests the presence of an 
overarching interpretative framework with competition at its centre.  
3.3: Omens  
The use of omens in Dio’s account has clear parallels to the above described elections. 
Levene has shown how even Livy uses the omens as narrative devices,
44
 but Dio’s 
inclusion of these has met with general criticism instead. Millar argued that Dio’s use is 
“harmless and trivial”45 and Lintott critically connected the interest in omens to 
antiquarianism.
46
 Wirth asserted that Dio’s interest in omens showed that he viewed 
“Fakten und Ereignissen als manifestierten Willen der Gottheit”47 and Gowing mirrors this 
view as he calls the omens “a convenient substitute for actual analysis”.48 Only Burden-
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Strevens has briefly counterargued this position.
49
 Scholars in general thus see Dio’s 
omens as trivial and unimportant or as an alternative to historical interpretation. However, 
I will argue that Dio’s use of these, seen most clearly in Books 39 and 40, in fact has 
important narrative and interpretative functions.  
This is clearly seen in connection with the severe bribery problems during the 
controversy regarding whether to reinstate the Egyptian king Ptolemy: “While mortals 
were acting thus under the influence of money, Heaven at the very beginning of the next 
year struck with a thunderbolt the statue of Jupiter erected on the Alban Mount, and so 
delayed the return of Ptolemy for some time.”50 Firstly, the omens are here the direct cause 
for delaying the return of Ptolemy and are therefore neither harmless nor trivial. Secondly, 
Dio uses these omens to comment on the wider problem of bribery; as I will show in 
chapter 5, Book 39 sets out the internal factors that caused the fall of the Republic and in 
this section of the narrative, bribery is the main theme.
51
 Dio therefore includes the omens 
of this year as they provide the opportunity to emphasise, in his authorial voice, the deeply 
problematic process of institutional competition where bribery was rife. Furthermore, this 
inclusion adds divine backing to Dio’s criticisms as even the gods are angry with Rome. 
However, an important aspect here is that the threatening omens have no immediate effect 
on the Romans as no one is punished for the bribes and connected assassinations, and 
Pompey even continues to support Ptolemy. Immediately hereafter, Cato forces the 
unlawful publication of the Sibylline Verses that seemingly warned against helping 
Ptolemy, and Rome descends into internal wrangling where the political decisions are 
dominated by the rivalry between the senators and Pompey.
52
 Dio thus clearly uses the 
omens both to support his interpretation of the Late Republic and as a stepping stone to 
communicate this further.  
The next set of omens, separated by merely four chapters from the omens above, serves 
a similar purpose. In the preceding narrative, another theme of Book 39, political 
manipulation, has been in focus as Clodius for example used a trial against Milo to attack 
Pompey.
53
 The omens now function as the cause for Clodius changing his target:  
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“about this time some portents occurred [long list of portents is inserted]; and 
the soothsayers, being anxious to find a remedy, said that some divinity was 
angry with them because some temples or consecrated sites were being used 
for residence. Then Clodius substituted Cicero for Milo and not only attacked 
him vigorously in a speech because the site of the house he had built upon was 
dedicated to Liberty, but even went to it once, with the intention of razing it to 
the ground; but he did not do so, as he was prevented by Milo.”54 
The portents are here again an important part of the causal chain as they ultimately prompt 
Clodius to attack Cicero and these are therefore not included merely to satisfy the 
annalistic conventions. Furthermore, omens were in fact politically significant in ancient 
Rome where they were both used in political competition, as above, and had important 
functions for the proper workings of society.
55
 The inclusion of omens is thus, despite 
modern prejudices, legitimate and unsurprising in a Roman history. Moreover, the portents 
are placed in the midst of the egoistic struggles and competition between Pompey’s group 
and Clodius’, and thereby emphasise the problematic nature of this rivalry. Cicero and 
Clodius constantly try to undermine each other’s authority by manipulating the legal 
underpinnings, a continuation of the general theme of this narrative part, and the omens 
play a crucial role in presenting this picture. Furthermore, it is striking that the Romans are 
again unable to heed the warnings of the omens as the political situation in fact deteriorates 
in the wake of the threatening portents. Dio again uses typically annalistic material, here in 
the form of omens, and then exploits it to communicate and strengthen his interpretation of 
the Late Republic as undermined by internal competition and rivalry. 
Another use of omens is seen in the last example of Book 39,
56
 inserted in the narrative 
preceding Crassus’ departure for his ill-fated campaign in the east: “The tribunes, then, 
seeing that their boldness, unsupported by arms, was too weak to hinder any of his 
[Crassus’] undertakings, held their peace for the most part, but they uttered many dire 
imprecations against him, as if, indeed, they were not cursing the state through him. At one 
time as he was offering on the Capitol the customary prayers for his campaign, they spread 
a report of omens and portents”.57 Dio thus uses the occasion to assert that traditional 
political authority, personified by the tribunes, has little power without arms, whereas the 
dynast Crassus, who had used violence precisely to become consul, succeeds in departing 
for his province. This deeply problematic political situation furthermore results in an 
                                                 
54
 Cass. Dio 39.20. 
55
 See Rasmussen (2003); Driediger-Murphy (forthcoming 2016). Beard (1998), however, emphasises that the 
Romans also had sincere respect for their religion. 
56
 As 39.61 is a punishment rather than an omen. 
57
 Cass. Dio 39.39.5-6. 
49 
 
 
  
exploitation of religion by the tribunes as they attempt to use omens to disrupt Crassus. 
The tribunes, moreover, continue the Romans’ previously seen lack of understanding for 
religious matters since they overlook or disregard that their religious attacks on Crassus 
ultimately harm the state. Through this seemingly trivial mention of the use of omens, Dio 
thus succeeds in painting a complex picture of the self-destructive politics of Rome: 
traditional political power has been undermined, here leading to the corruption of religion, 
and the ambitious dynasts have become excessively powerful yet problematic to attack 
since they are deeply imbedded in the Roman political world itself. 
The omens become even more significant in Book 40 as they play a key role in the 
disaster that befalls Crassus: “The occurrences [previously described omens] were such 
that anyone, even the most indifferent and uninstructed, would interpret them to mean that 
they would fare badly and not return; hence there was great fear and dejection in the 
army.”58 Dio spends three entire chapters on omens here, unprecedented in the Late 
Republic, and this functions as a rhetorical device to enhance the importance of the coming 
disaster. It should be noted that Obsequens through Livy has many of the same portents for 
Crassus,
59
 which shows that these are not Dio’s inventions. Rather, Dio chose to include 
the omens of this particular year as they suited his interpretative purpose, which is a clear 
example of Dio’s selectiveness in his inclusion of urban annalistic material. This is further 
supported as the omens are in fact also a causal factor by completely demoralising the 
soldiers. Crassus in his ambition disregards these omens, like the Romans do in general in 
Book 39, and furthermore attempts to manipulate the bad omens to his own advantage. 
However, he clumsily adds to the severity of the portents and the soldiers consequently 
“fell into greater discouragement”.60 The omens are here an important factor in Crassus’ 
problems and his own inability to heed the warnings affords a clear parallel to Rome more 
generally in Book 39. Dio thus again exploits the annalistic convention of including 
omens, here in order to show the deeply problematic consequences of the excessive power 
of ambitious individuals. 
The above examples show that Dio’s omens are far more than trivial inclusions but 
instead amount to a sophisticated exploitation of the annalistic convention for his own 
narrative purposes as both Crassus and the Romans in general are portrayed as blinded by 
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ambition and competition through their disregard of the portents. The omens are 
multifaceted tools as they also function as causal factors in Dio’s history. Importantly, Dio 
is also highly selective in his use of omens as they consistently serve significant functions 
in his Late Republican narrative, often connected to competition, which in turn suggests 
the presence of an overarching interpretative framework, guiding the selection process. 
3.4: Legislation 
Legislation is another typical annalistic area, at least according to the above definition 
by Swan,
61
 and here too Dio’s selective use is evident. Dio in fact highlights this selectivity 
in his authorial voice when he rejects the inclusion of a large number of Caesarian laws: 
“As these laws, now, are very numerous and contribute nothing to this history, I will omit 
them”.62 Dio here demonstrates that he had a copious amount of annalistic material which, 
however, was mostly omitted since it was not interpretatively useful. Instead, he mainly 
included legislation which communicated and supported his interpretation of a Republic 
undermined by institutional competition. 
This is clearly seen as Dio fully exploits the inclusion of Caesar’s agrarian law, the most 
extensively narrated piece of legislation in Dio’s Late Republic, which is treated far more 
fully than in other sources.
63
 Dio asserts that Caesar proposed the law to win over the 
multitude but that it was highly beneficial to the state: “The swollen population of the 
city, which was chiefly responsible for the frequent rioting (ἐστασίαζον), would thus be 
turned toward labour and agriculture; and the great part of Italy, now desolate, would be 
colonized afresh, so that not only those who had toiled in the campaigns, but all the rest as 
well, would have ample subsistence. And this would be accomplished without any expense 
on the part of the city itself or any loss to the optimates (δυνατῶν); on the contrary, many 
of them would gain both rank and office.”64 Even the nature of the connected land 
commission is given and this whole detailed description, which takes up a lengthy chapter, 
is thus in keeping with the annalistic tradition. However, this degree of legislative detail is 
unequalled elsewhere in the narrative of Dio’s Late Republic, which shows that the above 
is included with a specific narrative aim, namely to emphasise the advantageous nature of 
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the law – an element unparalleled in other sources.65 The senate’s egoistic opposition is 
through the detailed, positive description of the law put in an even sharper negative light 
and Dio adds that their disapproval was motivated by political competition: “For they 
suspected that by this measure he [Caesar] would attach the multitude to him and gain 
fame and power over all men; and this was, in fact, his very purpose.”66 Through Dio’s use 
of the annalistic tradition, a picture is created of a wholly untenable political system where 
any progress is opposed because of political rivalry. However, the senate’s opposition 
through the consul Bibulus is futile and Caesar, with the help of violence and his fellow 
triumvirs, succeeds in enacting the law and several others. These other laws are given far 
less attention,
67
 which indicates that Dio had made his interpretative point in relation to the 
agrarian law and therefore considered further detailed descriptions pointless. 
The full account of the agrarian laws thus allows Dio to assert several key points as he 
for example shows the weakness of traditional political authority in the face of violent 
dynasts. Dio also succeeds in highlighting the constant problems of internal competition 
since it is Caesar’s ambition that makes him propose the law and the senate’s opposition as 
well is due to factional competition which in turn inhibits beneficial change and causes 
internal struggles. Furthermore, Caesar in fact attains a position comparable to sole rule as 
the opposers retreat while Crassus and Pompey support him: “In most matters Caesar 
himself proposed, advised, and arranged everything in the city once for all as if he were its 
sole ruler (ὡς καὶ μόνος αὐτῆς ἄρχων)”.68 Caesar now proposes laws that, among other 
things, conciliate the equestrians regarding tax problems and ratify the long-postponed acts 
of Pompey which had also been opposed by the δυνατοί. Thus, only with the advent of 
μόνος ἄρχων could the institutional problems of the Roman political system be solved – a 
clear foreshadowing of the redeeming reign of Augustus. Dio here exploits the annalistic 
structure not only to criticise the Republic but to indicate the cure. 
A contrastingly unsuccessful piece of proposed legislation is Crassus’ and Pompey’s 
attempt during their consulship to remedy the problematic situation in Rome by curtailing 
personal expenditures “although they themselves went to every length of luxury and 
indulgence; but they were prevented by this very circumstance from enacting the law. For 
Hortensius, […] making use of their own mode of life to support his arguments, persuaded 
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them to give up their intention.”69 This could appear an odd insertion as the law comes to 
naught, but this annalistic narrative element succeeds in supporting Dio’s interpretation of 
a Republic where progress is impossible; the consuls are caught in a web of internal 
corruption where every attempt to break the pattern through one’s position is hindered by 
the corruption used to obtain it. Furthermore, it is notable that this attempt, made by two 
consuls within the legal and constitutional limits, is unsuccessful, whereas Caesar’s 
legislation, backed up by extra-legal influences such as violence and the triumvirate, is 
successful. This is another forceful indictment of the Republican system as only a state 
approximating sole rule succeeds in bringing the needed change while constitutional 
attempts are ineffectual. The exploitation of annalistic conventions is here again 
fundamental in supporting Dio’s chain of arguments. 
Dio’s instrumental use of legislation is also seen in several minor laws, often unattested 
in other sources. An example hereof is the abovementioned law against bribery directed at 
Catiline which plays a pivotal role in the prelude to the Catilinarian Conspiracy:
70
 
“Catiline, accordingly, believed that this decree had been passed on his account, as was 
indeed the case; and so, after collecting a small band, he attempted to slay Cicero and some 
others of the foremost men on the very day of the election, in order that he might 
immediately be chosen as consul.”71 The annalistic conventions are followed in the 
inclusion of this element but it then becomes a central narrative tool in Dio’s alternative 
version of the conspiracy, outlined in chapter 2.
72
 Dio thus uses this element to underline 
the institutional problems of the political system as the attempt to correct the destructive 
bribery rather causes a short-lived civil war. Dio has hereby again put internal political 
competition at the heart of Rome’s problems and the manipulation of the annalistic 
tradition is a central tool herein. 
Another noteworthy law is mentioned in an oddly placed notice in Book 37, here given 
in full: “Since the taxes were proving oppressive to the city and the rest of Italy, the law 
that abolished them was acceptable to all. The senators, however, were angry at the praetor 
who proposed it (Metellus Nepos) and wished to erase his name from the law, entering 
another one instead. And although this plan was not carried out, it was still made clear to 
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all that they received not even benefits gladly from base men.”73 Dio gives no historical 
context or apparent narrative ties to the surrounding material and the notice could appear to 
have been included merely on the basis of annalistic conventions. However, it supports 
Dio’s overall narrative as the senate is portrayed as egoistic and problematic but also weak 
through its futile attacks on a beneficial law, merely out of personal dislike for the 
proposer. The inclusion of this law therefore both communicates and strengthens Dio’s 
presentation of traditional political authority as weakened, and, importantly, internal 
rivalry is again central to the problems of the state. 
Several other examples of legislation conform to the same pattern of highlighting the 
institutional problems of the Republic, especially competition: Clodius outlaws the 
observation of heavenly signs since these were exploited by his competitors, which shows 
how the workings of the state were suborned to political competition.
74
 Another example is 
the reinstatement of censorial powers in Book 40 as due to the general corruption of 
society, the office had become unworkable, which again underlines the impossibility of 
reform within the Republic.
75
 A final example is Pompey’s legislation during his sole 
consulship: the legislation is successful as it secures the conviction of a large number of 
people for especially bribery, a central competitive tool, who had before avoided 
conviction and Pompey also confirms the decree that five years must pass between holding 
office and holding command, which was important in order to lessen problematic 
competition.
76
 Pompey is of course also portrayed as hypocritical, manipulative and self-
interested during his consulship
77
 in a further critique of the institutional competition of the 
Republic. However, the above successes, during a consulship where he nominally chose a 
colleague but in Dio’s narrative acted and held power completely independently,78 also 
support the need for sole rule as only a situation approximating monarchy could solve 
central problems of the institutional competition. 
All these examples of legislation are included using the annalistic conventions as 
foundation but are then, as the elections and omens, manipulated into supporting and 
communicating Dio’s overall arguments where monarchy was needed as a response to the 
destructively excessive competition of the Late Republic. Dio’s consistency in this respect 
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again supports the idea of an overarching interpretative framework. Thus Dio used the 
annalistic conventions but only when it suited his narrative and interpretative aims, and he 
thereby reveals himself to be a careful and consistent exploiter of the tradition. 
3.5: Other annalistic elements 
In this subchapter I will provide a brief overview of Dio’s use of other important 
annalistic elements to show that the above manipulations were indeed widespread in Dio’s 
narrative. One area where this is clearly seen is aedilitian actions as these are only 
mentioned once in the whole Late Republican narrative, namely in connection with Caesar. 
He received praise during his term in office “because he exhibited both the Ludi Romani 
and the Megalenses on the most expensive scale and furthermore arranged gladiatorial 
contests in his father’s honour in the most magnificent manner.”79 Dio’s purpose here is to 
show the origins of Caesar’s popularis tactics and to foreshadow his future actions. Dio 
later explicitly claims that Caesar had sought the sole rule of Rome all along
80
 and this 
passage gives weight to the assertion as we here see Caesar ingratiating himself with the 
people ever since his time as aedile. Furthermore, his successes in this respect, both here 
and later, show the problematic process of internal competition in Rome where great power 
could be obtained through popularity with the people. That this is the only mention of 
aedilitian activities in the Late Republican narrative strongly suggests that the inclusion of 
this typically annalistic notice had interpretative functions. 
Another instance of a sparingly included annalistic element is religious matters. Dio for 
example once includes the augurium salutis, held only in times of complete peace, and it is 
positioned in the prelude to the Catilinarian Conspiracy. Dio here emphasises the absurdity 
of holding this augurium when the Romans were “causing one another unspeakable woes 
through party strife (στάσεσιν) […]. Nevertheless, it was in some way possible at that time 
for the divination to be held; but it did not prove to be regular”.81 Dio then narrates 
revolutionary measures brought by tribunes and the consul Antonius and comments: 
“Hence there arose turbulent factions and contentions (σπουδαί τε οὖν ταραχώδεις καὶ 
φιλονεικίαι)”.82 By emphasising the absurdity of holding the augurium during civil strife 
and rivalry, and then immediately hereafter narrating the internal troubles created by 
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Antonius and the tribunes, Dio has here created a contrast between the needed 
circumstances for the augurium and the actual corrupt state of the Republic. Dio has thus 
clearly utilised the augurium, a standard annalistic element, to support his picture of a 
Roman Republic undermined by competition and civil strife. 
This use of religious matters can further be seen in Book 39 where the internal 
competition during Crassus’ and Pompey’s quest for the consulship have effectively 
paralysed the senate as they did “not change back to their usual attire nor attend the games 
nor celebrate the feast of Jupiter on the Capitol nor go out to the Alban Mount for the 
Feriae Latinae, held there for the second time by reason of something not rightly done.”83 
The religious elements mentioned are only included here in the entire Late Republic and 
Dio uses them to emphasise the destructive effect of the internal competition in relation to 
that year’s consular elections, further explored in chapter 5.84 It is, furthermore, striking 
that all the abovementioned elements are typical annalistic material and Dio underlines that 
the influence of the dynasts has effectively disrupted them. This could thus be a conscious 
emphasis of the inability of the annalistic method to independently describe the Late 
Republic as its typical elements and traditional Republican authority are undermined and 
dominated by the dynasts. This is further supported as Dio concludes the chapter: “Instead, 
they [the senators] spent the rest of the year exactly as if they were enslaved (ὥσπερ 
δεδουλωμένοι)”.85 The dynasts and their violent competition have here effectively 
enslaved the senators and Dio underscores this effect by the emphatic suffix -περ on the 
conjunction. The urban annalistic material that Swan so emphatically called the “hallmark” 
of the annalistic structure is essentially senatorial business, but the senate has here been 
completely paralysed and the dynasts are the true holders of power. Dio has thus presented 
a picture of the Roman Republic where the annalistic method is simply unable to describe 
the nature of its politics, which supports Dio’s selective use of the tradition. 
Pompey is at the centre of another rare annalistic inclusion, namely the construction of 
public buildings. Dio inserts the aside after relating a spectacle in the new theatre built by 
Pompey during his consulship but also includes a rumour that it was in fact a freedman of 
Pompey’s called Demetrius rather than Pompey himself who had paid for the theatre “with 
the money he had gained while making campaigns with the general. Most justly, therefore, 
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did he give his master’s name to the structure, so that Pompey might not incur needless 
reproach because of the fact that his freedman had collected money enough for so huge an 
expenditure.”86 The reference in the quote to Pompey’s previously closely narrated 
campaigns and the money accrued as a consequence highlights the problematic nature of 
imperialism that furnished individuals with huge sums that could then be used for personal 
ambition and competition.
87
 This problem is emphasised by the fact that even a freedman 
is allegedly able to construct a theatre. The role of the freedman could also be a comment 
on the excessive influence of freedmen in Dio’s own time although this contemporary 
influence on the representation of Dio’s Late Republic ought not to be exaggerated.88 Dio 
shortly hereafter asserts that Pompey used the theatre as a tool in the competition for the 
people’s favour as he staged games and thereby “afforded the populace no little delight”.89 
Dio has here created a causal chain where Pompey’s extraordinary commands gave him 
military successes and funds which in turn allowed the construction of a theatre that is then 
used to intensify and stimulate the destructive internal competition. Through the inclusion 
of the construction of a theatre and the staging of games, both typically annalistic elements, 
Dio has shown the interconnectivity between selfish imperialism, partly a consequence of 
the problematic extraordinary commands, and the increase in destructive internal 
competition. 
A further annalistic aspect that is also used in calculated fashion is the allotment of 
provinces. Lucius Lucullus was chosen to serve as governor of Sardinia but “declined the 
province, detesting the business because of the many whose administration of affairs in 
foreign lands was anything but honest. That he was of a mild disposition he had given the 
fullest proof.”90 Both the provision of a first name and the positive description show that 
this Lucullus is not the general fighting Mithridates but a relatively minor figure who is 
only mentioned here. Furthermore, this is the only time Dio records the allotment of 
provinces when not connected directly to a leading political figure and it could appear 
superfluous. However, it allows Dio to criticise the corruption of Roman politics as the 
governing of the provinces has turned so corrupt that one of the few good men of the Late 
Republic refuses the governorship and leaves it to the selfish politicians using the 
provinces for their own ambitious competition. This contextually detached narrative aside, 
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typical of the annalistic tradition, thus serves to strengthen Dio’s criticisms of the Late 
Republic as the traditional governing of provinces has turned unworkable due to the 
corruption connected to political competition.  
We should resist the temptation to ascribe ulterior motives to all Dio’s narrative choices 
as some elements, such as the oddly placed mention of the construction of the Fabrician 
Bridge,
91
 were no doubt included merely for the sake of recording them, especially when 
they add nothing to Dio’s narrative and interpretative aims. However, the above clearly 
shows that Dio still exhibits a consistent exploitation of the annalistic tradition, which an 
analysis of further factors would only support.
92
 The overview supports the previous 
conclusions, namely that Dio used the annalistic conventions consistently to support his 
own communicative and interpretative aims, which in turn suggests the presence of an 
overarching interpretative framework.  
3.6: Conclusion 
In the above I have shown how Dio selectively includes annalistic material and exploits 
the annalistic tradition in order to strengthen and communicate his interpretation centred on 
competition, which constitutes a clear deviation from the largely Livian method asserted 
by Swan and Rich. The focus on the dynasts at the expense of the consuls and general 
annalistic material is of course also encouraged by the historical nature of the Late 
Republic. However, Dio’s conscious manipulations and frequent omission of annalistic 
material are so careful and consistent that the historical aspects of the period can only be 
part of the explanation and Dio’s own narrative and interpretative aims are instead a more 
significant factor.  
Another objection to my conclusions could be that Dio’s sporadic inclusion of annalistic 
elements is simply a reflection of the poverty of his source material as argued by Millar 
and Manuwald for the Augustan period.
93
 Yet Dio spent most of his adult life as a senator 
and at the Roman court, and was the amicus of both Severus and Caracalla while he was 
arguably also involved in the intellectual life around Julia Domna.
94
 Furthermore, he spent 
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a winter in Nicomedia in 214 AD
95
 and became curator of Pergamum and Smyrna in 218 
AD for a number of years.
96
 These major intellectual centres would have offered Dio prime 
access to libraries and other resources for his history. In short, Dio was one of the best 
placed ancient writers to make use of written material and he does assert himself that he 
read widely.
97
 Furthermore, Dio mentions Livy
98
 and has frequent close overlaps regarding 
omens with Obsequens
99
 who used the writings of Livy in some form for his work, which 
suggests that the latter continued the incorporation of annalistic material in the now lost 
Late Republic. This indicates that Dio knew and used Livy which would have furnished 
him with a wealth of annalistic material. Accordingly, Dio’s sporadic inclusion of 
annalistic elements was not dictated by a lack of material but is rather testament to a high 
degree of selectivity in order to support his interpretative framework. Thus the general, 
incautious branding of Dio as an annalist appears problematic since it connects him to the 
far more consistent and at times mechanic annalistic model found in Livy.  
This also highlights the need for a clearer definition of the annalistic method that is not 
merely based on the singular case of Livy. Moreover, the previous assertions of Swan and 
Rich that Dio follows the annalistic model in a relatively simplistic way are untenable as 
they in Dio see only an occasional flexibility with the annalistic method, which is 
attributed to mere narrative convenience. They fail to realise that Dio’s Late Republic is 
not primarily governed by an annalistic structure but rather by Dio’s own interpretative 
framework, while the annalistic conventions are a tool in the support and presentation of 
this framework. It could even be argued that Dio’s highly selective use of annalistic 
conventions is a conscious rejection of the Livian mode of history writing: as far as we 
know from the surviving material, Dio was the first writer since Livy to attempt a long-
term narrative of the Late Republic and Livy would therefore be a natural point of 
comparison.
100
 However, this rejection is not merely historiographical in nature but also 
closely tied to Dio’s interpretation: in Dio’s narrative, the organisation of the Republic is 
severely distorted and starts falling apart, and the annalistic tradition, which bases itself 
exactly on the notion of a regular and traditional Republic, therefore ceases to be a viable 
method of narration. Consular elections are for example an absolutely fundamental part of 
the annalistic tradition and it is therefore highly problematic for this tradition when new 
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consuls are simply not elected as in the second half of the 50s. Moreover, in Dio’s Late 
Republic, dynasts can simply have the consuls elected according to their wishes, 
exemplified by Pompey in the elections for 60 (ὑπάτους ἀποδειχθῆναι ἐποίησεν),101 which 
undermines the importance of the elections since the dynasts, here Pompey, essentially 
control them. Furthermore, the annalistic method is essentially based on the consuls 
because these are the prime historical drivers given their occupation of the most powerful 
office in Rome. However, in Dio’s Late Republic, the dynasts hold the actual power 
instead and therefore often occupy the narrative centre and frequently function as tools in 
the historian’s exploration of institutional competition rather than the consuls. 
Consequently, Dio’s interpretation and view of the Late Republic can simply not be 
conveyed through the Livian annalistic model. Dio’s conscious rejection of the strict 
annalistic method of Livy is, then, part of an attempt at not only historiographic but also 
interpretative distinctiveness.  
This is not to argue that Dio completely rejected the annalistic tradition but rather that 
his use of it was far more calculated and selective than previously asserted. Dio thus 
evinces a striking freedom in the structuring of his narrative, which has been 
acknowledged for Livy and Tacitus but explained away as incompetence or ignored in the 
case of Dio. Contrastingly, I have shown in the above that Dio’s highly selective use of the 
annalistic tradition has important functions in his narrative, which demonstrates a 
sophisticated and premeditated approach to the Late Republic that revolves around 
political competition. This chapter in short leads to the same important overall conclusion 
as chapter 2, namely that Dio did indeed have an overarching interpretative framework, 
which further counters the mainly critical view of Dio in modern scholarship.  
Remarkably, manipulation of the annalistic tradition is increasingly acknowledged for 
Livy and even more for Tacitus.
102
 Dio’s connection with this tradition is far more diffuse 
than that of these authors and the structuring in Dio could therefore be seen as building on 
the manipulation of Tacitus and taking it a step further. Furthermore, it has been argued 
that Livy’s annalistic method mirrors his historical interpretation where the stable 
institutions and workings of the state overshadow individual events and the office of 
consul is singularly important.
103
 On the other hand, Tacitus’ more thorough manipulative 
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use of the annalistic structure has been seen as a parallel to the use and manipulation of 
vestiges of the Republic by the emperors in his history.
104
 This line of argument could be 
extended to Dio whose use of the annalistic tradition can be viewed as a parallel to the 
mendacious exploitation and manipulation of the Republican institutions employed to great 
effect by Dio’s leading characters. Furthermore, Dio’s frequent omissions of annalistic 
material signify a narrative shift away from the consuls and the basic workings of the 
Republic and onto the dynasts. This in turn demonstrates Dio’s view of the decreasing 
importance of the former and increasing significance of the latter whose constant 
institutional competition do indeed drive the Republic towards civil war because the state 
is unable to contain it. Thus Dio’s consciously selective and manipulative use of the 
annalistic tradition arguably becomes part of and mirrors the overarching interpretative 
framework of the Historia Romana.   
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4: A diachronic analysis of Book 36 
4.1: Introduction 
Scholars have traditionally looked at Dio’s work in isolated fragments according to their 
specific needs for information. Furthermore, even the more recent scholarship on Dio has 
focused on particular aspects rather than on the continuous narrative. I here propose to 
explore Book 36 diachronically from beginning to end in the fashion that Dio intended. It 
should be noted that the book divisions are Dio’s own,1 which indicates that the historian 
saw these as meaningful narrative organisers, yet Dio’s books have never been individually 
studied except in commentaries
2
 which by their more linguistic, detail-oriented nature 
eschew the sustained, comprehensive interpretation I propose here.  
I, by contrast, will show how Dio through skilful manipulation of the organisation and 
presentation of his material, created a sophisticated cumulative interrelation between 
individual parts of Book 36. This cumulative effect cannot be uncovered only by 
synchronic or thematic studies but is absolutely central to Dio as it facilitated the 
presentation of important political problems. Chief of these, as seen in the preceding 
chapters, is the destructive effects of political competition which was the central problem 
in Dio’s Late Republic. I have chosen to focus on Book 36 since this is Dio’s main 
exploration of external competition, as only four chapters are strictly detached from this 
topic. In Book 36, Dio clearly shows how the constant competition is undermining foreign 
policy but the political competition also manifests itself in more specific ways that are 
central to Dio’s interpretation: firstly, it causes the first extraordinary command which has 
irreparable consequences for the Roman Republican system as it places increasing power 
in the hands of the dynasts and undermines traditional offices and authority. Secondly, the 
extraordinary commands are described as quasi-monarchical but also presented as 
unavoidable in order to solve Republican problems. By inference, Dio suggests that 
monarchy is the only cure for the Republican ills. The book is therefore central to Dio’s 
overall narrative of the Late Republic and is also a manifestation of his institutional focus 
that, as seen in chapter 2, stands in contrast to the parallel sources. 
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Both older and newer scholarly works highlight the need for a diachronic approach to 
Dio’s work. The scholarly tradition started by Millar, and followed widely even today, 
included damning judgements of Dio’s lack of narrative aim3 but never actually conducted 
a close reading of the narrative to support this claim. Furthermore, recent studies that have 
attempted, often successfully, in countering this view have in fact followed a similar 
synchronic or thematic approach as Rees and especially Burden-Strevens focus on 
speeches, while Kemezis’ work is concerned with so-called narrative modes. These are 
indeed important works but none of them approach the narrative in the sustained 
diachronic fashion that I propose and there is therefore a clear gap in today’s scholarship.  
I have divided this chapter into four subchapters. The first focuses on Lucullus and his 
deposition; the second incorporates the Cretan War and the description of the pirates; the 
third explores the lex Gabinia and its speeches and the fourth concentrates on the lex 
Manilia and the surrounding events in addition to Pompey’s campaigns in the east that 
close the book.  
4.2: Lucullus and the Mithridatic War 
The first chapter of Book 36 is only available in Xiphilinus’ epitome which Fromentin 
and Mallan, however, have recently argued to be generally faithful to Dio.
4
 It is instructive 
that already this first chapter deals with Roman foreign policy as Hortensius, the consul of 
69, relinquished his command in Crete to his colleague because he preferred the luxury of 
Rome. Luxury hereby undermined foreign policy as a potential general preferred 
indulgence over the Cretan battlefields. This moral aspect is problematic but not central to 
Dio who focused less on the supposedly excessive luxury than other sources, such as 
Sallust or Velleius. Dio therefore quickly moves on to the process of external competition 
regarding the command of Lucullus and inserts a criticism in the mouths of Rome’s 
enemies: “For every victorious force was inherently insatiate of success and set no bound 
to its greed (πλεονεξίας); and the Romans, who had won the mastery over many, would not 
choose to leave him [Arsaces] alone.”5 This criticism of Roman imperialism through 
Rome’s enemies is commonplace6 but Dio incorporates it in order to prime the reader to 
see the subsequently described external competition in a more negative light. This is 
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facilitated by the credibility of the critique since πλεονεξία is a central and recurring 
problem of political competition in this period
7
 and the corrupting influence of success is a 
mainstay of Dio’s narrative, as exemplified by for example Sulla or Caesar. 
This priming is further supported as Lucullus is immediately hereafter revealed as a 
self-serving general who, despite the negative effects on Rome, was averse to relinquish 
his command: Lucullus refrained from following up his victories and allowed the 
Armenian king Tigranes “to reach safety quite at his leisure (σχολήν).”8 Consequently, 
Lucullus was accused of prolonging the war in order to stay in command, and Acilius, 
consul in 67, was sent to relieve him when he was judged to have done this again. 
However, in spite of these accusations and his imminent deposition, Lucullus continued 
fighting. This is a clear example of the problematic external competition, which is 
facilitated by the excessively powerful generals in the Late Republic and exacerbated by 
the prolonged commands, as Lucullus uses his position to gain personal power and keeps 
hold of a generalship even though the Roman desire for ending the war is hereby 
undermined. 
Through the criticism of Lucullus and Roman imperialism in these first two chapters, 
Dio has primed his readers to understand the following wars and successes of this Roman 
general, covering twelve whole chapters, as proof of the uncontrollability of the 
institutional external competition of powerful generals. This priming allows Dio more 
fluency without disruptive authorial comments throughout the narrative and he also attains 
both the communication and support of his interpretation. The chronological manipulation 
where both accusations against Lucullus are presented at the same time is fundamental in 
this context. 
Dio’s emphasis on the problems of external competition is further seen as he now 
presents the thoroughly negative portrait of Roman foreign policy pervaded and 
completely undermined by institutional competition, outlined in chapter 2:
9
 The soldiers 
mutiny because Acilius was sent to relieve Lucullus and Marcius Rex disingenuously 
pretends to be unable to help. All the generals are criticised as none of them defend the 
Roman territory which has swift consequences: “Mithridates won back almost all his 
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domain and caused great havoc in Cappadocia”.10 This is a clear example of the thoroughly 
destructive effects of the political competition that the first half of this thesis has 
highlighted. The competition is not merely individual as it includes every single general 
described here and the above situation is therefore instead a consequence both of the 
process of imperialism and especially of the general process of aristocratic competition 
where a command was a tool and an opportunity to gain advantages.  
After the above successes of Mithridates, Dio critiques Lucullus as a general and the 
narrative changes focus to Crete. The deeply negative description and interpretation of the 
selfish competition and its consequences thus become the coda of an otherwise long row of 
positive military results of Lucullus. Dio hereby succeeds in bookending Lucullus’ 
successes with clear criticisms of the use of commands for political competition, which 
causes this at least partly successful generalship to become part of a larger institutional 
problem rather than just a string of battles. Dio hereby invests this intervening, largely 
descriptive narrative with far more interpretative meaning than it has on its own, which 
underscores the importance of a diachronic analysis. 
This bookending and narrative construction rest fundamentally on a rejection of the 
annalistic internal-external-internal model: from chapter one in the year 69 until the year 
67 the narrative stays continually in the east, and the internal matters of Rome, so central to 
the annalistic structure, have been completely eliminated bar the unelaborated notices of 
displeasure in Rome which are essentially given from an eastern perspective. This 
structuring avoids the annalistic fragmentation but more importantly it, facilitates the clear 
communication of Dio’s interpretation of the overall problems of external competition 
which Lucullus’ command exemplifies eminently. 
In conclusion, the narrative surrounding Lucullus’ command is carefully arranged by 
Dio as he bookends the campaigns with severe criticisms of the process of Rome’s foreign 
wars; Dio argues that the prolonged commands fostered ambition and reluctance to 
relinquish power, which is part of the constant institutional competition that undermined 
Roman imperialism. In order to communicate this, Dio manipulates the chronology slightly 
when he groups together the two accusations of prolonging the war, hereby seeking to 
thoroughly prime the reader to understand the following narrative according to Dio’s 
perspective. Furthermore, the above shows that in order to fully understand the narrative 
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surrounding the command of Lucullus and Dio’s connected interpretation, a close and 
diachronic reading is fundamental.  
4.3: The Cretan War and the pirates  
Dio’s exploration of the problems of the corrupted Roman imperialism continues as the 
narrative moves to the war in Crete which started already in 69 but Dio focuses on the 
rivalry in 67 between Metellus, to whom the war was entrusted, and Pompey who, by 
virtue of the as yet unexplained lex Gabinia, had vast powers in the Mediterranean. The 
only other sources describing this event, Plutarch and Velleius, both narrate the lex before 
the rivalry between Pompey and Metellus. Through this, they present Metellus in a positive 
light as the victim of the power-hungry Pompey.
11
 Dio’s narrative is slightly fragmented 
here but Xiphilinus’ epitome does show that Dio briefly described Pompey’s command and 
its powers
12
 given by the lex Gabinia, in connection with the war in Crete. However, Dio 
still decisively manipulates the ordering of events as the rivalry between the two men, 
predicated on the lex Gabinia, is narrated before the passing of the actual lex, yet this is no 
blunder. Rather, it facilitates the negative presentation of both men as exceedingly 
ambitious and locked in destructive competition. In Dio’s account there are no heroes and 
he hereby succeeds in presenting institutional, external competition as a central problem in 
the Late Republic, which is undermining foreign policy. 
This institutional problem of competition is clearly exemplified in Dio’s description of 
the Roman commanders on Crete, starting with the explicit critique of Metellus: “In his 
eagerness for power (δυναστείας τε ἐρῶν) he attacked even the Cretans who had come to 
terms with the other [Pompey], and heedless of their claim that there was a truce, hastened 
to do them injury before Pompey should come up.”13 Metellus here attacks cities that have 
made peace with the Romans in a selfish quest for personal δυναστεία, a highly negative 
term in Dio’s Late Republic.14 Furthermore, this sets the scene for Dio’s unflattering 
portrayal of Metellus’ following actions as he maltreated many captured towns 
(ἄλλοις τε οὖν πολλοῖς ἐκεῖνος ἐλυμήνατο)15 and Octavius is even portrayed as helping 
                                                 
11
 Plut. Pomp. 29; Vell. Pat. 34.1-2. 
12
 Cass. Dio (Xiph.) 36.17a. Xiphilinus is, according to Mallan (2013) 737-738 and Fromentin (2013) 23-26, 
reasonably faithful. 
13
 Cass. Dio 36.18.1. 
14
 Freyburger-Galland (1996); Kemezis (2014) 107-112; Coudry (forthcoming 2016) 8-9. 
15
 Cass. Dio 36.18.2. 
66 
 
 
  
“those who were being wronged (τοῖς κακουμένοις)”16 by Metellus. However, Octavius is 
no saint as he only acts after one of his own towns is attacked: “Octavius, incensed at this, 
no longer remained quiet, but first used the army of Sisenna (that general had fallen sick 
and died) to aid here and there those who were being wronged, and then, when these troops 
had retired, proceeded to Aristion at Hierapydna and aided him in fighting.”17 Octavius 
here supports the Cretans against the Roman general Metellus, to whom the war was 
entrusted, merely out of personal dislike. Another general, Sisenna, who was the governor 
of Greece, is also portrayed negatively: “Cornelius Sisenna, the governor of Greece, did, to 
be sure, when he heard the news, come to Crete and advise Metellus to spare the towns, but 
on failing to persuade him offered no active opposition.”18 Sisenna is hereby yet another 
general who chiefly prioritises his own good and Dio here also succeeds in emphasising 
the lack of options in the face of a determined general with loyal soldiers as the timid 
efforts at persuasion are futile. Metellus is thus another example of the problem of 
ambitious generals as his lengthy war, partly because of the competition of Pompey, has 
turned destructive and tools to oppose him are lacking. Furthermore, Dio succeeds in 
presenting every single commander as self-interested and they are generally locked in a 
competition to gain influence on the island, which severely undermines the interests of 
Rome. This is, then, yet another manifestation of the destructive process of external 
competition  
Upon the defeat of the Cretans, Dio becomes even more damning in his critique: “In 
this way the Cretans, who had been free (ἐλεύθεροί) through all preceding ages and had 
never had a foreign master, became enslaved (κατεδουλώθησαν); and from their 
subjugation Metellus obtained his title.”19 Dio quite clearly attempts to paint a sympathetic 
picture of the Cretans by his use of “ἐλεύθεροί” and “κατεδουλώθησαν”, the latter 
intriguingly bringing Tacitus’ criticism of Roman expansion to mind.20 This casting of 
Roman imperialism as slavery is a fierce critique and is repeated several times throughout 
the Late Republic.
21
 However, the depth of this critique is only perceptible against the 
background of the previous narrative of Book 36. 
                                                 
16
 Cass. Dio 36.19.1. Adapted from Cary (1914-1927). 
17
 Cass. Dio 36.19.1. 
18
 Cass. Dio 36.18.1. 
19
 Cass. Dio 36.19.3. 
20
 E.g. Tac. Agr. 21. 
21
 Cass. Dio 39.54; 40.14.4; 41.13.3. 
67 
 
 
  
Moreover, Dio furthers his critique as the negatively portrayed victory over the Cretans, 
born out of selfish competition, is immediately followed by a resultant honorary 
cognomen, Creticus, for Metellus and a triumph. This triumph, furthermore, is also used to 
criticise the last remaining actor in the Cretan narrative, Pompey: “He [Metellus] was, 
however, unable to have Panares and Lasthenes, whom he had also captured, march in his 
triumph; for Pompey got them away beforehand by persuading (ἀναπείσας) one of the 
tribunes that it was to him that they had submitted in the settlement and not to Metellus.”22 
It should be noted that ἀναπείσας, besides the translation given above, can also mean 
“seduce”, “mislead” or even “bribe”,23 which adds another layer of criticism. Dio could 
appear oddly lenient in his critique of Pompey; however, from Plutarch we learn that 
Octavius was in fact a general sent by Pompey,
24
 which would serve to shift the criticism 
more heavily towards the latter as Dio has a habit of criticising leaders through the act of 
their underlings.
25
 We are thus here, as in the case of Lucullus, presented with an 
incredibly negative picture of Roman imperialism where there are no heroes and all players 
act self-interestedly, locked in destructive competition. Through this, Dio is singularly 
negative in his portrayal, which is a clear continuation of his previous narrative of 
Lucullus. It is striking that the narrative has still not moved back to Rome and Dio hereby 
succeeds in making an uninterrupted chain of imperialism that is corrupted and 
undermined by competition.  
Dio now turns his attention to the pirates and attributes their rise to the above described 
wars: “at this time, ever since war had been carried on continuously in many different 
places at once, and many cities had been overthrown, while sentences hung over the heads 
of all the fugitives, and there was no freedom from fear for anyone anywhere, large 
numbers had turned to plundering.”26 Dio here creates a causal link between the pirates and 
the uncontrollable external competition which is exemplified by the narratives surrounding 
Metellus and Lucullus: as part of the constant competition, they had continuously 
provoked war and undermined peace in order to retain commands and gain influence, 
which had created disorder and ideal conditions for piracy. This is further supported as the 
connection between excessive imperialism and piracy is given in direct continuation of the 
narratives of these two generals. 
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Surprisingly, however, the pirates menacing Italy are described rather positively and 
thereby furnish a notable contrast to the selfish and competitive Roman imperialism of the 
previous narrative: “For while the Romans were occupied leading wars (πρὸς τοὺς 
ἀντιπολέμους ἀσχολίαν ἀγόντων), the pirates had gained great headway, sailing about to 
many quarters, and adding to their band all of like condition, to such an extent that some of 
them, after the manner of allies, assisted many others.”27 Rome’s foreign wars are again 
given as an important cause and the pirates are even portrayed as successful by helping 
each other as allies, a stark contrast to the Romans whose constant egoistic competition is a 
central reason for the setbacks against Mithridates and in Crete. However, it should be 
noted that the contrast is only created through more of the chronological manipulation 
analysed at the beginning of this subchapter since Dio, uniquely, gives the description of 
the pirates after the Cretan War in which Pompey used the command given against them. 
The contrast created by Dio is thus no accident but rather the product of skilful 
organisation and manipulation of his material in order to highlight the central problem of 
political competition.  
Furthermore, the pirates are described very positively in their dealings with each other: 
“they nevertheless showed such friendship one for another as to send money and assistance 
even to those entirely unknown, as if to their nearest of kin. In fact, this was one of the 
chief sources of their strength that those who paid court to any of them were honoured by 
all, and those who came into collision with any of them were despoiled by all.”28 The 
pirates here arguably exemplify the ideal that the Romans are failing to achieve: Rome has 
been undermined by constant external competition and is therefore unable to defend itself, 
whereas the pirates achieve great strength from doing the opposite. This is further 
underlined immediately hereafter as the Romans are passive towards the piratical threat 
and thereby “caused their allies all the greater distress”.29 Through this emphasis of the 
distress caused to the allies, the Romans are thus in direct contrast to the solidary pirates. 
This is the conclusion of Dio’s narrative of the pirates, and the lex Gabinia comes into 
focus. Dio has thus created a relatively positive picture of the pirates which is unique in the 
source tradition as for example Plutarch focuses on the typical topos of cruelty,
30
 whereas 
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the remaining sources concentrate on the threat they posed.
31
 Yet, it is the preceding 
narrative that adds the interpretatively significant contrast to the pirates; Dio has spent the 
first 19 chapters of Book 36 creating a thoroughly damning picture of Roman imperialism 
where competition rules with destructive consequences for both the Romans and the allies 
alike, which, as shown in chapter 2,
32
 is unique in the source tradition. Via this narrative, 
Dio creates an elaborate and lengthy contrast to the solidary and militarily successful 
pirates, which can only be perceived through a diachronic approach to the narrative. That 
even pirates are morally and militarily superior to Rome in the Late Republic functions as 
a forceful criticism of the destructive effects of institutional competition, which sets the 
scene for the centre piece of Book 36: the lex Gabinia.  
4.4: The lex Gabinia 
Dio now moves back to Rome but the narrative surrounding the lex Gabinia is in 
essence still concerned with competition and imperialism. Dio has in the previous narrative 
presented a clear problem in the shape of destructive external competition and both Rome 
and its allies have suffered as a consequence. It is noteworthy that several of the previously 
narrated events in fact occur after or even as a consequence of the lex Gabinia of 67 and 
Dio has thus purposefully attempted to create an unbroken narrative of corrupted, 
competitive imperialism as a prelude.  
The external competition was, as seen above, key to foster the pirate threat which in 
turn created the need for extraordinary measures. Dio now turns to the internal competition 
to show how it played a crucial part in creating a law that Coudry has shown to be a 
milestone in Dio’s Late Republic as it severely distorts the traditional Republican workings 
of imperialism.
33
 This narrative part has also been treated in chapter 2 but it is important 
here to rehearse the main points; in chapter 2, a comparison with other sources was the 
focus, whereas the analysis in this chapter is needed to continue the diachronic approach 
and to demonstrate the cumulative effect of Dio’s narrative. The presentation of the lex 
Gabinia by Dio continues the previous focus on competition and problematic commands, 
clearly seen in Dio’s description of Pompey’s desire for the command:  
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“Pompey, who was very eager to command (ἐπιθυμῶν μὲν πάνυ ἄρξαι), and 
because of his own ambition (ὑπό τε τῆς ἑαυτοῦ φιλοτιμίας) and the zeal of the 
populace no longer now so much regarded this commission as an honour as the 
failure to win it a disgrace, when he saw the opposition of the optimates 
(τῶν δυνατῶν), desired to appear forced to accept. He was always in the habit 
of pretending as far as possible not to desire (ἐπιθυμεῖν) the things he really 
wished, and on this occasion did so more than ever, because of the jealousy 
(ἐπίφθονον) that would follow”.34 
The opposition of the optimates and the general climate of jealousy connected to 
competition are important as they force Pompey to be duplicitous and thereby the process 
of competition degenerates further. However, Pompey also lusts for power and his 
ambition is key to forcing through the lex Gabinia. Furthermore, according to Dio, 
Gabinius proposed the law either at Pompey’s instigation or out of his own self-interest.35 
In either case Gabinius is attempting to gain personal advantages and in the process creates 
the lex Gabinia. The internal process of aristocratic competition and the connected 
ambition of both major and minor characters thus here play a central role in bringing about 
the law. 
This picture of destructive internal rivalry is completed by Dio’s description of the 
senate which is not opposed to the law itself but rather to the increase in Pompey’s power: 
“that body preferred to suffer anything whatever at the hands of the freebooters rather than 
put so great command into Pompey’s hands; in fact they came near slaying Gabinius in the 
very senate-house (ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ συνεδρίῳ)”.36 The senate is here clearly involved in the 
destructive competition as their rivalry with Pompey trumps the good of Rome. Ultimately 
the people terrify the opposition into passivity as they “rush upon them [the senators] as 
they sat assembled; and if the senators had not gotten out of the way, they would certainly 
have killed them.”37 Dio here underlines the futility of the senate’s attempts to oppose 
Pompey and thereby highlights the problem of successful generals who achieved 
popularity with the people as these in effect undermined traditional authority. Dio hereby 
also demonstrates the problematic process of institutional competition in this period as the 
dynasts have become excessively dominant through their popularity with the people and 
consequent access to violence.  
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Through the above prelude, Dio has primed the reader to understand the following 
speeches of Gabinius and Pompey as disingenuous and connected to their own ambitious 
aims.
38
 This is seen in the first speech, that of Pompey, where the speaker is purposefully 
mendacious: “Nevertheless, I do not think it fitting either that you should be so insatiable 
to my services or that I myself should continually be in some position of command. For 
I have toiled since boyhood”.39 Pompey then proceeds to enumerate the patriotic services 
he has performed and hereafter disingenuously rejects the command.
40
 Pompey here 
clearly hides his desire for the command and casts his previous services in an excessively 
patriotic light.
41
 The time of Pompey’s early career is highly fragmentary but we do have 
one fragment that is the first mention of him: “Pompey was the son of Strabo, […]. Being 
angry with those who held the city, he proceeded on his own account to Picenum before he 
had quite yet come to man’s estate, and thanks to his father’s former rule there he gathered 
from the inhabitants a small band and set up a sovereignty of his own (δυναστείαν ἰδίαν), 
thinking to perform some famous exploit by himself; then he joined Sulla.”42 Here 
Pompey’s acts are certainly not patriotic but rather from the outset self-serving and he is 
even connected to the thoroughly negative term δυναστεία. The evidence is of course thin, 
but Burden-Strevens has rightly suggested that Dio’s Pompey would hereafter have 
continued his “quest for δυναστεία”43 which is also characteristic of him in the extant 
books. The earlier career of Pompey would have been on the reader’s mind and thus 
exposed the claims in Pompey’s speech as mendacious.44  
Another important contrast to Pompey’s claims is the preceding narrative of egoistic 
competition undermining Roman expansion, as seen elsewhere in the speech: “allow me to 
remain undisturbed and to attend to my own business, so that now at last I may bestow 
some care upon my private affairs and may not perish from exhaustion. Against the pirates 
elect somebody else. […] Surely I am not the only one who loves you”.45 Firstly, Dio’s 
Pompey is purposefully illogical here as he asks to be allowed to attend to his private 
business by not being general when the previous narrative has shown how generalships 
were exactly used for private purposes. This highlights how the distinction between the 
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private (τά ἰδία) and the public (τά κοινά) has broken down,46 which is a consequence of 
the excessive competition and an important problem in the Late Republic. Furthermore, 
Pompey is not only disingenuous in claiming to love the senate himself as his argument 
that others do so as well flies directly in the face of the previous narrative of Book 36 
where every single player has acted self-interestedly. This underlines the institutional 
nature of egoistic competition as it is not confined merely to a few individuals but is a 
permeating feature of Dio’s Late Republic. Dio has thus fashioned a clear contrast to 
Pompey’s words in the preceding narrative which, in connection with the abovementioned 
description of Pompey, plays a fundamental role in revealing Pompey’s speech as an 
elaborate sham. Yet again, we can only appreciate this sophisticated structuring by 
analysing Dio’s narrative in a diachronic fashion. Furthermore, the revelation of Pompey 
as disingenuous is significant as it shows another central problem of the institutional 
competition, namely the corruption of public speech which is absolutely central to 
Republican government but has become a tool for ambitious dynasts in their constant 
competition.
47
 
Gabinius’ subsequent speech also creates clear contrasts between the Republic 
described and the actual version seen in the previous narrative: “Pompey’s behaviour in 
this very matter, Quirites, is worthy of his character: he does not seek the leadership, nor 
does he accept it off-hand when offered to him. For a good man has no business, in any 
case, to desire to hold office and to manage public affairs”.48 This is of course plainly 
dissimilar to Pompey himself but also to the generals of the previous narrative and Dio 
thereby criticises both Pompey and Roman institutional competition in general. This two-
layered approach, focusing partly on Pompey and partly on the broader context, is clearly 
seen throughout the speech: “heed me and your country. For her you [Pompey] were born, 
for her you were reared. You must serve her interests”49. The contrast to the earlier 
narrative is almost comical as not a single player has so far served the interests of Rome 
but rather those of themselves. The preceding narrative thus interacts with the speech as it 
undermines Gabinius’ credibility while the speech in turn highlights the previous criticism 
of excessive institutional competition in relation to commands.
50
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Gabinius’ speech is followed by a short narrative interlude where the opposition of the 
senate is futile in the face of a violently threatening populace that supported Pompey. Dio 
hereby underlines the senate’s helplessness in the face of the mendacious rhetoric of 
Gabinius and Pompey, and Catulus’ speech thus becomes the last possible opposition to 
the lex Gabinia. Catulus himself is introduced very positively: “all respected and honoured 
him as one who at all times spoke and acted for their advantage”.51 This clearly heightens 
Catulus’ credibility as everybody else, except Cato, is described as egoistic.52 Dio uses 
Catulus to emphasise the deeply problematic nature of the extraordinary command 
proposed to Pompey: 
“it is not proper to entrust to any one man so many positions of command one 
after another. This has not only been forbidden by the laws, but has also been 
found by experience to be most perilous. What made Marius what he became 
was practically nothing else than being entrusted with so many wars in the 
shortest space of time and being made consul six times in the briefest period; 
and similarly Sulla became what he was because he held command of the 
armies so many years in succession, and later was appointed dictator, then 
consul. For it does not lie in human nature for a person […] after holding 
positions of authority for a long period to be willing to abide by ancestral 
customs.”53 
Catulus is here presenting a clear explanation of the problems of prolonged commands, 
which in this particular case is Dio’s own. This is further supported in the fragments 
describing Sulla: “as he drew nearer to his dream of absolute power, he […] reposed his 
trust rather in the basest men”.54 This is a clear condemnation of prolonged and repeated 
command, and the previous narrative of Book 36 supports this assertion as all the generals 
worked for their own benefit. 
Catulus underlines the importance of not transgressing the Roman traditions and then 
proceeds to suggest the office of dictator as a solution. He himself notes the severe 
opposition to this office after Sulla and also emphasises the importance of upholding the 
traditional limitations: “However, because this official held such power, our fathers did not 
appoint one on all occasions nor for a longer period than six months. Accordingly, if you 
require any such official, you may, without either transgressing the laws or forming plans 
in disregard of the common welfare, elect Pompey himself or anyone else as dictator – on 
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condition that he shall not hold office longer than the appointed time nor outside of 
Italy.”55 Catulus thus insists on respecting the geographical and temporal limits of the 
dictatorship, which completely undermines the usefulness of the proposal in this context. 
Dio has previously described how the pirates were highly widespread and Catulus 
immediately after his suggestion goes on to restate this aspect. Furthermore, just before 
this point, Catulus noted the hostility towards the dictatorship and his proposal is therefore 
in total thoroughly unworkable and illogical. Through Catulus, Dio presents a forceful 
demonstration of the inadequacy of Republican tools available to solve the piratical 
problem which was itself the product of the Republican process of competition and 
imperialism. This undermines Saylor Rodgers’ criticisms that Dio’s choice of Catulus as a 
speaker is mainly due to his “moralising or philosophical agenda”.56 Furthermore, 
Pompey’s proposed command is even cast in a monarchical light according to a fragment 
that is arguably from the speech of Catulus:
57
 “Nor will his task as monarch over all your 
possessions be free from envy.”58 That Dio viewed the command as partly monarchical is 
further supported by his comments regarding the grain supply in Book 39: “So now in the 
case of the grain supply, as previously in the case of the pirates, he was once more to hold 
sway over the entire world then under Roman power.”59 This is intriguing as Pompey 
achieves great success during his quasi-monarchical command, which, supported by the 
preceding narrative, suggests that Dio is presenting the Republic as inherently unworkable 
and monarchy as the only viable cure for the Republican problems.  
Catulus’ lack of appreciation of the Republican realities is continued in his suggestion 
that the senate should choose Pompey’s lieutenants as “there will be keener rivalry among 
them (φιλοτιμήσονται) because they are independent and will themselves get the glory for 
whatever they achieve.”60 One could argue that Catulus is advising a return to the virtues 
of an ideal earlier Republic, which could solve the problems without breaching Republican 
constitutional limitations. However, this is untenable since both Libourel and newer 
research have shown that the Early and Mid-Republic in Dio’s narrative in fact represent a 
break with the idealisation of other authors and that competition had been part of the 
Republic since its very inception.
61
 Furthermore, only in speeches given by the defenders 
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of the Republic is φιλοτιμία used in this positive sense during the Late Republic62 and the 
preceding narrative clearly shows that rivalry and competition connected to Roman foreign 
matters are a thoroughly destructive force. The preceding narrative, both of Book 36 and 
the work more widely, thus plays a key role in unveiling Catulus’ arguments as 
nonsensical and the diachronic mode of analysis is again fundamental in understanding this 
interrelation. Moreover, Dio is here drawing on Classical Greek thinking about φιλοτιμία 
but also rejecting it, both through Catulus’ naïve and unrealistic usage and via the Late 
Republic in general where φιλοτιμία’s positive part is excluded and it is instead 
consistently and entirely negative in practice. 
The lex Gabinia is of course ultimately enacted with subsequent great military 
successes and this is an emphasis of the problematic process of Republican competition as 
mendacious and self-interested politicians prevail over the positively described and 
unselfish Catulus. An important reason for this is the mendacious use of public speech 
which here degenerates in pursuit of foreign commands.
63
 Furthermore, the narrative 
preceding the lex Gabinia gives additional depth to the failure of Catulus since Dio in this 
narrative had presented Roman imperialism as completely corrupted by competition. The 
defeat of the Republican proposal of Catulus and the enactment of the quasi-monarchical 
lex Gabinia is hereby not just the start of a narrative centred on extraordinary commands as 
Coudry has argued.
64
 It is also the culmination of a shorter, more focused narrative in Book 
36, where the lex Gabinia is the problematic result of the uncontrollable external 
competition of the Republic. Essentially, Dio presents a problem in the first part of the 
narrative but then underlines the impossibility of solving it within Republican 
constitutional limits since only the lex Gabinia offers a viable solution. Furthermore, 
Pompey’s successful command is cast in a monarchical light by Dio and monarchy is 
hence implicitly represented as the solution to the Republican problems, thereby 
foreshadowing the redeeming regime of Augustus. This elaborate argument, brought out 
by the structuring and ordering of the narrative, is only perceivable through a diachronic 
analysis. 
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4.5: The lex Manilia and the end of Book 36 
The narrative after the lex Gabinia creates an important prelude to the lex Manilia of 66 
through its negative portrayal of politics and further explores the internal reasons for the 
creation of the problematic extraordinary commands. Furthermore, the narrative also 
confirms and illustrates several key points made in relation to the lex Gabinia.
65
 This is 
clearly seen in the chapter immediately after the law where Pompey has great successes 
against the pirates: “For not alone was the force that he directed vast both in point of fleet 
and infantry, so that he was irresistible both on sea and on land, but his leniency 
(φιλανθρωπίᾳ) toward those who made terms with him was equally great, so that he won 
over large numbers by such a course”.66 Φιλανθρωπία has been identified as a key 
component of the successful new regime of Dio’s idealised Augustus which overcame and 
solved the Republican problems.
67
 Pompey’s accomplishments through exactly this tool 
thus reemphasise the need for monarchy as the pirates had grown strong during the 
passivity and excessive competition of the Republic but are then brought under control 
through Pompey’s quasi-monarchical powers and φιλανθρωπία. 
This focus on the untenability of the Republic is continued as Dio for the first time 
narrates internal matters in Rome with no apparent connections to foreign affairs or 
potential commands. Dio paints a decidedly negative portrait dominated by bribery and the 
tribunes are heavily criticised: “For now that the power of the tribunes (τῶν δημάρχων 
δυναστεία) had been restored to its ancient status, and many of those whose names had 
been stricken off the list by the censors were aspiring to regain the rank of senator by one 
means or another, a great many factions (συστάσεις) and cliques were being formed 
aiming at all the offices.”68 In his first mention of the tribunes, Dio had already warned 
against their destructive power
69
 which is again underlined here as they are connected to 
δυναστεία, στάσις and increased destructive competition. We are singularly badly 
informed about Dio’s Book 34 and 35 as only a single diminutive fragment has survived 
and the sources in general for this period, the 70s, are also sparse. However, we do know 
that the end of this decade marked the reversal of Sulla’s conservative reforms. This 
reached a climax when Crassus and Pompey reinstituted the traditional tribuneship and 
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named censors, for the first time since 86, who conducted a strict census and expelled 
many senators from the order.
70
 It is on this background striking that exactly these two 
elements are singled out in the quote above as the main causes for competition in the first 
actual treatment of internal affairs in Book 36. To engage in some healthy speculation, it 
could be that Dio here seeks to accentuate the inherent institutional untenability of the 
Republic by emphasising that it is exactly two reinstituted, essentially Republican 
institutions that create the above problems. 
Furthermore, it is also noteworthy that the increase in popular power is so clearly 
connected to an upsurge in the destructive political competition that was the central 
problem of the Late Republic. This is only supported in the preceding narrative as Pompey 
had exactly allied himself with a tribune, Gabinius, and been supported by the people, 
through which he attained the lex Gabinia. The below described lex Manilia and the later 
lex Trebonia are likewise products of tribunician legislation and the above notice regarding 
the tribunes could thus be a way of accentuating the destructive effects of their newly 
reinstituted powers that are indeed instrumental in the creation of three extraordinary 
commands and the furthering of the dynasts’ ambition. According to Dio, then, the return 
of popular power is key to the further degeneration of political competition.  
Moreover, this focus on institutional competition and its connection to tribunes is 
continued immediately hereafter as Cornelius, a tribune, and the senate support competing 
laws to counter rampant bribery: “When a great uproar arose at this, since Piso and 
a number of the senators opposed him [Cornelius], the crowd broke the consul’s fasces to 
pieces and threatened to tear him limb from limb.”71 Cornelius hereby secures the passage 
of the law in a manner with clear parallels to the threatening people immediately before the 
speech of Catulus. The situation thus rehearses the senate’s lack of power in the face of the 
determined use of violence by a politician supported by the people and also reemphasises 
the problematic nature of the tribunes. The institutional competition has transformed 
decisively in favour of the senate’s enemies who both here and regarding the lex Gabinia 
dominate the law-making through threats of violence. 
Another important aspect of the Republican system is also undermined through 
competition, namely the courts which the praetors exploit for their own benefits: “they […] 
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did not observe the rules as written, but often made changes in them, many of which were 
introduced out of favour or out of hatred of someone.”72 Yet again, this problem is not 
addressed through the formal channels of Republican power but instead forcibly solved by 
Cornelius and the violent populace. Essentially, Dio here presents an internally deeply 
dysfunctional Republic right after the long narrative exploration of external competition, 
which had already shown that the Republic was not functioning, and competition is in both 
spheres at the heart of the problems. The problem of competition is again highlighted as 
Dio now includes the narrative aside regarding Lucullus rejecting his province, analysed in 
chapter 3,
73
 which emphasises how institutional competition has undermined the governing 
of provinces. Dio has thus included a range of mainly internal negative effects of the 
excessive institutional competition in these few chapters. 
These internal criticisms could appear out of place as the narrative before the lex 
Gabinia had primarily been concerned with problems of external competition. However, 
Dio uses this short internal narrative to explore the internal factors of egoistic competition 
which ultimately spawn the lex Manilia, a new extraordinary command: Manilius had 
proposed a highly unpopular law and he “then, in fear because the plebs were terribly 
angry, […] paid court to Pompey even in the latter’s absence, especially because he knew 
that Gabinius had the greatest influence with him. He went so far as to offer him command 
of the war against Tigranes and that against Mithridates, and the governorship of Bithynia 
and Cilicia at the same time.”74 Through the preceding chapters, Manilius’ desperate 
attempt to save himself becomes a continuation of the larger problem of egoistic political 
competition, here connected to the problematic effects of the newly empowered 
tribuneship. Political competition is thus again presented as a central cause for another 
deeply problematic extraordinary command. 
The lex Manilia is voted upon and accepted by the people but due to the lack of 
narrative elaboration in the form of for example speeches by Dio, one could argue that the 
lex Manilia was far less important than its predecessor. However, through the mention of 
Gabinius in the above quote, Dio creates a powerful allusion which brings to mind the 
previous criticisms from Catulus. This is further supported in Dio’s description of Pompey 
receiving the news as he “pretended to be annoyed as before, and charged the members of 
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the opposite faction (ἀντιστασιώταις) with always loading tasks upon him so that he might 
meet with some reverse. In reality he received the news with the greatest joy”.75 Dio here 
clearly evokes the previous law by the parallel in Pompey’s mendacious behaviour and his 
complaints of being overburdened. The lex Manilia was certainly significant but another 
grand exposition was now unnecessary and would disrupt the narrative. Dio solves this 
problem by the use of allusions which invest the lex Manilia with central importance
76
 that 
is, however, only perceivable through a diachronic approach. 
The aftermath of the proposal of the law highlights the connection between internal 
competition and the problematic transformation of military commands as Caesar supported 
the measure and hereby “not only courted the good-will of the multitude, observing how 
much stronger they were than the senate, but also at the same time paved the way for a 
similar vote to be passed some day in his own interest.”77 Dio here explicitly highlights the 
problematic precedents that the extraordinary commands set and Caesar will indeed exploit 
these to the ruin of the Republic. Furthermore, Dio also explicitly notes that the senate is 
powerless in the face of the people, who are allied to the dynasts. This is a clear 
demonstration of how the internal competition, where the dynasts use the people, has 
completely undermined the traditional authority of the senate. 
A short notice of the so-called first Catilinarian Conspiracy is inserted at this point, 
which continues several of the previous problematic aspects: bribery is rife and the 
attempts to stop it by convicting the perpetrators in fact foster the conspiracy which is, 
however, revealed. Yet, the tribunes again come into focus as they hinder the prosecution 
and the senate is instead forced to send one of the perpetrators to Spain: “and when Piso 
even then continued to display his audacity, the senate, fearing he would cause some riot, 
sent him at once to Spain, ostensibly to hold some command or other”.78 Dio thus 
reemphasises the problematic institutional competition, the consequent weakness of the 
senate in the face of the tribunes and the dire consequences for foreign policy as Piso is 
given a command rather than convicted. These themes have been so consistently explored 
by Dio in the previous narrative that the mentions here become part of a larger institutional 
problem rather than constituting merely a momentary issue. This cumulative effect is again 
only perceivable through a diachronic reading of the narrative.  
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The narrative now moves away from Rome and focuses on Pompey’s campaigns in the 
east, attained through the lex Manilia, for the remainder of the book. However, this new 
command in fact undermines Pompey’s completion of other military tasks: “no longer 
regarding as of any importance Crete or the other maritime points where things had been 
left unsettled (ἀδιοίκητον), he [Pompey] made preparations for the war with the 
barbarians.”79 This indifference to Rome’s military problems due to ambition is a clear 
parallel to the previously narrated destructive effects of competition on foreign policy and 
imperialism seen in relation to Lucullus and Metellus. Furthermore, the mention of other 
“unsettled maritime points” is intriguing. This could be a reference to the pirates as Dio, in 
contrast to all other sources,
80
 asserts that Pompey did not finish the job: “he subdued the 
greater part of it [the sea] (τὰ πλείω) that very year.”81 Moreover, of the year 57 in Book 
39, Dio writes that the pirates “were flourishing even then (καὶ τότε ἤκμαζε).”82 This is of 
course several years after the lex Manilia but it still indicates that the pirates were not 
eradicated and Dio indeed never mentions a complete victory for Pompey. 
Notwithstanding, the narrative plainly shows that Pompey only focused on his own 
benefits and disregarded the problems of the state. 
Furthermore, Pompey’s initial egoistic actions and the negative description of the lex 
Manilia put the Roman general’s subsequent heroics in the east in a more unflattering 
light. This is further supported as Lucullus maligns Pompey upon his arrival: “Lucullus 
turned to abuse, stigmatizing him as officious, greedy for war, greedy for office 
(πολυπράγμονα καὶ φιλοπόλεμον καὶ φιλαρχοῦντα), and so on.”83 These accusations of 
Pompey certainly ring true based on the previous narrative but they also deliberately reflect 
back on Lucullus, who is guilty of exactly the same charges, and the general political 
competition where these features were widespread. Pompey’s command is, then, here 
portrayed as part of the general problem of external competition where generals used 
commands for their own ambition. However, through the prelude to the lex Manilia, Dio 
has also succeeded in presenting the command as the result of internal destructive political 
competition, thereby investing Pompey’s campaigns in the east with even greater 
significance. In short, through the previous narrative, both the immediately preceding 
chapters and the book in general, Pompey’s command is intricately connected to the 
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problem of political competition and thereby becomes more than a mere description of 
battles and army movements. This last part of Book 36 thus stands in close interrelation 
with the previous narrative, which shows Dio’s sophisticated crafting of a highly cohesive 
book and underlines the importance of a diachronic reading of Dio. 
4.6: Conclusion 
In the above, I have shown how Dio structures his narrative to bring out specific 
interpretative points and demonstrated how central the diachronic approach is to fully 
understand these. Essentially, Dio constructs a long narrative of external competition that 
creates a need for the lex Gabinia where Catulus instructively fails to offer any viable 
solutions. The lex Gabinia hereby functions as a landmark where only a non-Republican 
measure can solve the problems of the Republic. Dio’s attention then switches more 
markedly to internal politics and he gives another perspective on how competition 
decisively undermines Republican institutions as it is now internal competition that fosters 
an extraordinary command. Book 36 is, then, essentially focused on institutional 
competition and its consequences for Roman imperialism, and gives mostly external but 
also internal reasons for the highly destructive extraordinary commands that emerge from 
this competition and which are ultimately paramount in destroying the Republic.  
The constant, institutional competition of the political class, both externally as generals 
and internally in Rome, thus severely undermines foreign policy and sets Rome on a fatal 
course. This focus is clearly in line with the conclusions of chapters 2 and 3 which 
suggested that Dio employed skilful manipulation of his sources and the annalistic 
conventions respectively in order to emphasise the problem of competition in Roman 
politics. Corrupt competition is of course canonical in the ancient historiography of the 
Late Republic but Dio’s incorporation of this in an institutional interpretation is, as shown 
in chapter 2, distinctive. This approach is further seen as Dio via Book 36, argues that 
institutionally generated political competition had so severely undermined the Republican 
system that only quasi-monarchical powers, such as those of Pompey, could remedy the 
problems. Dio’s treatment of the lex Gabinia is, then, not merely a comment on the 
specific piratical issue but rather a general assertion that monarchical rule was needed to 
save Rome from the negative results of destructive competition in a degenerated Republic. 
Furthermore, these interpretative points are presented clearly and cumulatively 
82 
 
 
  
strengthened through Dio’s skilful structuring of his narrative, where chronological 
manipulation plays a significant role.  
Earlier studies have suggested that the decad was used as a structuring device by Dio as 
he attempted to end each one with monumental events,
84
 but no scholarly work has hitherto 
concentrated on a specific book. However, this study has shown that also individual books, 
as the next chapter will support, were used as important self-contained narratives of 
problematic aspects of the Republic, as Book 36 centred on the extraordinary command as 
an especially problematic consequence of the institutional competition. Yet, we should of 
course not look at the books in complete isolation. Book 36, through its strong focus on the 
problematic effects of the newly re-empowered tribunes, appears for example at least in 
part to be a destructive sequel to the restoration of the power of the tribuneship in 70, 
almost certainly narrated in Book 35 given that Dio since its inception had exhibited a keen 
interest in this office.
85
 Book 36 also plays an important part in the grander evolution of the 
Historia Romana: Pompey, upon his return from the extraordinary command against 
Mithridates, is opposed by the senate in Book 37, driving him into the triumvirate that in 
turn ensures more extraordinary commands, such as the lex Trebonia of Book 39, which 
play an important part in the eventual downfall of the Republic. This whole development 
started with the corrupted, competitive imperialism that led to the pirates causing the lex 
Gabinia and with the degraded internal politics that resulted in the lex Manilia. We should 
of course be wary of assigning ulterior motives to all of Dio’s choices as his simple duty as 
a historian of recording facts was no doubt important as can be seen in his lengthy 
campaign narratives at the beginning and end of Book 36. However, through skilful 
manipulation of the narrative, Dio primes the reader to understand these campaigns as 
negative manifestations of the institutional problem of competition and thereby adds 
additional meaning to seemingly descriptive narrative parts while also presenting and 
strengthening his own interpretation of the Late Republic.  
In conclusion, Dio appears to have an overarching interpretative framework centred on 
institutional competition, governing both Book 36 and the Late Republic. This undermines 
both older views and the more cautious criticisms that Dio was essentially writing history 
from a third century AD perspective and offered little innovation in his narrative of the 
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Late Republic.
86
 Book 36 is wholly focused on the destructiveness of aristocratic 
competition and consequently ambitious dynasts, as well as the very Republican problems 
of accommodating these two aspects. Dio’s explanation of the problems of the Republic is 
thoroughly focused on Republican institutions such as the inadequateness of the 
dictatorship, the problems of the tribunate and the issue of prolonged and especially 
extraordinary commands. All these aspects are essentially manifestations of Dio’s focus on 
Republican institutional competition, which challenges both the argument that Dio was 
overly influenced by his own time and that he was an unoriginal historian. Dio thus offers 
an interpretation of the Republic on its own terms, focused on institutional problems, 
which clearly stands apart from the source tradition and undermines the dominant critical 
views of this Greek historian.  
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5: Book 39 and competition in practice 
5.1: Introduction 
The narrative of the Late Republic in Dio is essentially a narrative of why this 
governmental form was unworkable and institutional competition is, as I have shown in the 
preceding chapters, the central problem. I will argue that Book 39 is absolutely 
fundamental in understanding the failure of Roman δημοκρατία; Dio here presents the 
three most important tools and manifestations of internal institutional competition, namely 
violence, bribery and political manipulation. These tools, especially violence and bribery, 
are a consequence of the transformed institutional competition as ambitious politicians in 
the Late Republic, due to the influx of resources as a result of empire, had vast resources 
available for bribery and for buying the allegiance of the people, who could be incited to 
violence. The tools are liberally used for political competition and politicians who refuse to 
utilise them are perpetually futile, exemplified most consistently by Cato. It is thus only 
self-interested politicians who use these thoroughly destructive tools who are successful 
and the Republic is hereby inevitably at the mercy of its enemies and bound for civil war 
and its own destruction. Dio purposefully manipulates his narrative to bring the 
institutional problem of competition to the fore and posit it as key for the breakdown of 
Republican politics and the ensuing civil war. For this purpose, Dio incorporates an 
exposition of the three abovementioned tools in the first half of the book whereafter he 
demonstrates how they were used to devastating effect in the second half. This again 
demonstrates how Dio, as in Book 36, utilised the structuring of individual books as an 
important narrative and interpretative tool.  
A brief overview of the causes for civil war in Dio and the parallel sources is helpful 
here in order to more clearly understand the importance of Book 39. The Periochae is too 
brief to offer a cohesive interpretation but Velleius invests the first triumvirate and Julia’s 
death with great significance and the corrupt Curio is central as well.
1
 Plutarch asserts that 
the creation of the triumvirate was the main reason for civil war and Luca is consequently 
important,
2
 as are the deaths of Julia and especially Crassus.
3
 Appian, likewise, is focused 
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on the triumvirate and the meeting at Luca.
4
 Crassus’ death is not given significance but 
the death of Julia certainly is.
5
 Suetonius, lastly, sees Caesar’s ambition, exacerbated by 
prolonged command, almost exclusively as the main cause.
6
  
Dio also invests the triumvirate with some significance but omits the meeting at Luca, 
which severely undermines the importance of the triumvirs, as I will argue in this chapter.
7
 
Moreover, the importance of the death of Julia is significantly downplayed as Dio’s brief 
explanation of the implications is only inserted in 50 when civil war was already on 
Rome’s doorstep. Crassus’ death, likewise, is mentioned outside the battle narrative for the 
first time only in 50 where Dio merely notes that “Crassus was dead”.8 Even the scene of 
Caesar’s infamous crossing of the Rubicon that would thrust responsibility for the civil 
wars on him is also omitted by Dio – uniquely in the source tradition.9 We are hereby left 
without important singular events with which to explain the outbreak of the civil war and it 
is instead the institutional problems of the Late Republic, centred on competition, which 
are presented as the main cause of its downfall. Pompey’s sole consulship of Book 40 is of 
course important as a last nail in the coffin of peace, but it is in fact the unavoidable 
product of the internal unrest of the time which has its narrative roots firmly in Book 39. 
Furthermore, this unrest is created by the internal destructive competition explored in the 
same book. The fundamental reasons for the civil war and the downfall of the Republic are 
thus to be found in Dio’s exploration of institutional competition in Book 39. 
Against this background, it is striking that Book 39 is sparsely treated in some of the 
newer attempts to explain the fall of Dio’s Republic. Rees only touches briefly on the book 
in connection with the consulship of Crassus and Pompey but besides this, mainly 
concentrates on the preceding narrative and speeches. One reason for this could be that 
Rees’ numerous aspects of human nature undermining the Republic are sparse in Book 39, 
which reveals a problematic hole in his arguments.
10
 Kemezis, likewise, writes of the 60s 
but then moves directly to Pharsalus and the subsequent Augustan settlement.
11
 Burden-
Strevens’ work from 2015, furthermore, largely ignores Book 39 since it includes no 
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speeches and Coudry focuses primarily on the lex Gabinia. These works all offer 
interesting explanations but also demonstrate a gap in the research tradition as Book 39 has 
been largely ignored. This overview emphasises the need to complement the current 
research by a focused, in-depth analysis of Book 39 which, I argue, will yield an 
alternative explanation of the fall of the Republic, centred on institutional competition. 
Through its focus on internal matters, the chapter will be more thematic than chapter 4 but 
still keep the overall diachronic structure that has, as shown in the previous chapter, 
hitherto been disregarded by scholars. I have divided the following into two subchapters: 
the first deals with Dio’s thematic presentation of the three main internal destructive tools 
and thereby lays the foundation for the second subchapter which explores the use of these 
tools in relation to the consular elections of 56 and the events surrounding the restoration 
of Ptolemy. 
Caesar’s campaigns also feature in Book 39 but these are part of a broad exploration, 
spanning several books, of how Caesar used commands for competition, largely similar to 
the utilisation by other commanders seen and analysed in chapter 4. As this issue has 
already been examined, chapter 5 will omit Caesar’s campaigns and instead focus on the 
rest of Book 39 which constitutes a sustained and concentrated investigation of mainly 
internal competition and how this was executed in practice. 
5.2: Violence, bribery and political manipulation 
5.2.1: Violence 
The first destructive tool, violence, is initially presented in the first part of the internal 
narrative, dealing with the return of Cicero and the ensuing conflict with Clodius. The 
descriptions of the groups of combatants are instructive as we are told that the consul 
Spinther “aided Cicero’s cause in the senate, partly as a favour to Pompey and partly to 
avenge himself upon Clodius, by reason of a private enmity (ἰδίας ἔχθρας) which had led 
him as a juror to vote to condemn Clodius for adultery.”12 The state is here disregarded and 
only private benefits prioritised, and the supporters of Clodius are similarly described as he 
“was supported by various magistrates, including Appius Claudius, his brother, who was 
praetor, and Nepos, the consul, who had a private grudge (οἰκείας τινὸς ἔχθρας) against 
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Cicero.”13 This line-up of combatants shows again that there are no heroes in Dio’s Late 
Republic as Dio primes the reader to understand the ensuing events as essentially self-
interested. 
Significantly, the involvement of both consuls is explicitly linked to an increase in 
violent competition in Rome: “These men, accordingly, now that they had [ἔχοντες] the 
consuls as leaders (ἡγεμόνας), made more disturbance than before, and the same was true 
of the others in the city […]. Many disorderly proceedings were the result”.14 The 
involvement of the consuls in destructive competition is, as Dio notes, a new development 
and this he connects through the participle (ἔχοντες) to increased competition, which 
manifests itself in Clodius’ attempt to disrupt the vote on Cicero’s return: “during the very 
taking of the vote (ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ διαψηφίσει) on the measure Clodius, knowing that the 
multitude would be on Cicero’s side, took the gladiators that his brother held in readiness 
for the funeral games in honour of Marcus, his relative, and rushing (ἐσεπήδησεν) into the 
assemblage, wounded many and killed many others. Consequently (οὖν) the measure was 
not passed”.15 The use of gladiators to even kill senators is a completely new development 
in Late Republican politics and Dio goes to some length to stress the outrage of Clodius’ 
acts; he emphasises Clodius’ disregard for due political process through the demonstrative 
pronoun in predicate position (ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ), he notes that Clodius took the gladiators from 
the funeral games of his own relative and he adds drama by the use of ἐσεπήδησεν. 
However, Dio also emphasises the effectiveness of this increase in violence as he creates a 
clear link between the use of this tool in rivalry and political success, here in the form of 
disrupting the measure to recall Cicero. 
Milo then attempts to indict Clodius by lawful means but fails utterly, which 
demonstrates the powerlessness of constitutional avenues and traditional authority in Late 
Republican competition. Clodius’ highly successful use of violence is only countered when 
Milo, after the futility of the lawful attempts, gathers his own gladiators “and kept 
continually coming to blows with Clodius, so that bloodshed occurred throughout 
practically the whole city.”16 This new strategy results in immediate success: “Nepos, 
accordingly, inspired with fear […], changed his attitude; and thus (οὕτως) the senate 
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decreed […] that Cicero should be restored”.17 Through οὕτως, Dio creates a direct causal 
link between the violence and the resultant fear on the one side and the political success of 
Cicero’s recall on the other. Dio hereby highlights the importance of violence in Late 
Republican competition but also reveals an important problem: violence creates serious 
unrest in the city but is unavoidable if one desires political success. The Late Republic is 
therefore bound for increasingly violent and destructive institutional competition.  
This violent victory, however, breeds further problems as Cicero upon his return 
convinces the senate to give Pompey an extraordinary command as commissioner of the 
grain supply: “So now in the case of the grain supply, as previously in the case of the 
pirates, he was once more to hold sway (ἄρξειν) over the entire world then under Roman 
power.”18 Through his allusion to the lex Gabinia, Dio cleverly conjures up Catulus’ 
criticisms and marks this extraordinary command too as deeply problematic. Furthermore, 
the cause of this command is in fact to be found in violence: “A sore famine had arisen in 
the city and the entire populace rushed into the theatre […] and afterwards to the Capitol 
where the senators were in session, threatening at first to slay them with their own hands, 
and later to burn them alive, temples and all.”19 The explicit evocation of the lex Gabinia 
invites the reader to compare the two situations: regarding the lex in Book 36, the people 
merely “gave a great threatening shout”20 and although they had exhibited violence earlier 
it was never on the same level as the threat of burning both temples and senators. It is here 
clear that the violence of the populace has increased and intensified greatly. This extreme 
use of violence is thus an important feature of Book 39 and is here the sole reason for the 
need of another problematic extraordinary command. Furthermore, the violence is again 
imminently effective as a tool to gain objectives as the traditional authority of the senate is 
powerless and forced to accept Cicero’s proposal. 
Dio has in short here created a highly focused narrative where every chapter is 
concentrated on the intensified problem of competition manifested in violence and he 
hereby achieves an effective communication of important interpretative points. Dio 
presents violence as an absolutely essential tool used both by individual politicians and the 
people as a group in order to gain political advances. Constitutional attempts and 
traditional authority, on the other hand, are clearly connected to political impotence and 
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failure. Consequently, only egoistic and destructive politicians can achieve success, 
whereas the senate or less problematic politicians are consistently defeated, which clearly 
demonstrates the institutional nature of the problem of competition in Dio’s Late Republic.  
5.2.2: Bribery 
Bribery, the second central competitive tool, is explored in the account of King 
Ptolemy’s request for Roman help that follows the return of Cicero. In a parallel to the case 
of violence, the problem of bribery receives intense focus in the next handful of chapters 
and has severely increased compared to earlier books. However, Dio sums up the previous 
events relating to Ptolemy to show that bribery had permeated Roman relations with him 
even before his accession: “He had spent large amounts upon some of the Romans, part of 
it out of his own purse and part borrowed, in order to have his rule confirmed and to 
receive the name of friend and ally”.21 Bribery is thus at the very heart of Ptolemy’s 
success and Rome is shown to be highly susceptible to this tool. 
Ptolemy proceeds to collect money forcibly from the Egyptians, is forced to flee to 
Rome and here claims to have been deposed. The Egyptian people send a hundred men to 
Rome to bring counter-complaints but most are assassinated by Ptolemy “and others he 
either terrified by what had happened or by administering bribes persuaded them neither to 
consult the magistrates touching the matters for which they had been sent nor to make any 
mention at all of those who had been killed.”22 Ptolemy uses bribes to great effect and is 
again successful, which demonstrates the importance of this tool. Dio then proceeds to 
emphasise that the problem of bribery was not limited to the Ptolemy affair: “The affair, 
however, became so noised abroad that even the senate was mightily displeased; it was 
urged to action chiefly by Marcus Favonius, on the double ground that many envoys sent 
by their allies had perished by violence and that numerous Romans had again on this 
occasion taken bribes.”23 This shows that bribery in political competition was in fact a 
general problem, as “numerous Romans had again” accepted bribes, and also demonstrates 
the importance of this tool. 
Yet again, the attempts of traditional authority in the shape of the senate to solve the 
problem are completely futile as “they summoned Dio, the leader of the envoys, who 
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survived, in order to learn the truth from him. But this time, too, Ptolemy had such 
influence with his money that not only did Dio fail to enter the senate-house, but there was 
not even any mention made of the murder of the dead men, so long at least as Ptolemy was 
there.”24 Dio, furthermore, emphasises at the conclusion of the account that no one was 
punished for taking bribes at this time and that Pompey even supported Ptolemy,
25
 which 
collectively constitutes an increase and intensification of the problem of bribery compared 
to earlier books. Thus, the constitutional and legal measures taken, first by the Egyptians in 
sending envoys and later by the senate in summoning the envoy Dio, are thoroughly 
ineffectual in the face of the influence of Ptolemy’s money and selfish competition. Dio 
clearly goes to great lengths here to emphasise this problem as he highlights the affair as 
outrageous through the assertion that a full hundred men were sent but the dead were not 
even mentioned and no one punished. Ptolemy’s complete success through bribes against 
the senate and his opposers here exemplifies the workings of institutional competition in 
Roman politics, which is further supported as Dio asserted the problem of bribery to be a 
general one. Thus the narrative shows yet again that egoistic politicians who use 
destructive tools are consistently successful against traditional authority. Furthermore, it is 
striking that the Periochae asserts that Ptolemy was the wronged part as he “left his 
kingdom and came to Rome because of the wrongs he had suffered at the hands of his 
people”,26 while Plutarch states that Pompey’s “ambition was not of such a mean and base 
order”27 as to manipulate Roman politics to obtain another command. In Dio’s account by 
contrast, Ptolemy is a ruthless oppressor and Pompey is selfishly colluding with him. Dio 
hereby appears to have either manipulated his sources or chosen them very carefully in 
order to degrade Ptolemy and inculpate Pompey, which supports the portrayal of Roman 
politics as problematic and rife with bribery but also as lacking heroes and permeated by 
egoistic competition.  
That Dio’s purpose is indeed to focus on bribery is clearly seen in the omens that follow 
the Ptolemy affair: “While mortals were acting thus under the influence of money, Heaven 
at the very beginning of the next year struck with a thunderbolt the statue of Jupiter erected 
on the Alban Mount”.28 Dio has here clearly exploited the annalistic tradition of including 
omens in order to criticise the bribery in his authorial voice and the omens add divine 
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backing to his criticisms. Even the Sibylline verses were found to warn against aiding 
Ptolemy “with any great force”.29 However, the Romans are unable to correct their 
behaviour as Gaius Cato, a tribune, forces the priests to announce the verses even though 
“it was unlawful to announce to the populace any of the Sibylline Verses, unless the senate 
voted it”.30 The Romans here respond to divine anger by violating more religious laws and 
the selfish rivalry also continues unabated when it is suggested that Pompey should escort 
Ptolemy home: “But the senators, fearing that Pompey would by this means obtain still 
greater power, opposed it, using his connection with the corn-supply as an excuse 
(προφάσει).”31 Dio here, through προφάσει, portrays the senate as disingenuous and part of 
the constant selfish competition. Even in the face of divine warnings, the Romans thus fail 
to correct themselves and in fact become more corrupted in the process, all of which is 
rooted in the problematic competitive tool of bribery.  
In conclusion, Dio uses the account of Ptolemy to deliver a damning exploration of the 
excessive and increased use of bribes in Roman politics. Dio’s approach is strikingly 
thematic here as bribes had been almost absent in Book 39 before this point. Furthermore, 
from the above it appears clear that Dio structured his narrative carefully in order to bring 
out these points as the cura annonae, for example, is invested with importance but treated 
only briefly, whereas the bribery of King Ptolemy is explored and exploited to full effect in 
order to highlight the problem of bribery. Thus Dio, as in the case of violence, shows how 
bribery is used as a central tool of institutional competition, which is intimately connected 
to political success and decisively thwarts traditional authority. 
5.2.3: Political manipulation 
Through bribery and violence, the Roman politicians broke the rules of the Late 
Republic. However, Dio now turns to the manipulation of these rules where they, though 
kept intact, were exploited to further political aims and Dio again incorporates an intense 
focus on this subject in the next handful of chapters. In fact, Dio exploits the annalistic 
conventions to make the transition to this third destructive aspect as he includes the 
generally ignored priestly elections for this purpose:  
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“The year before there had occurred an incident of a private nature which, 
however, has some bearing upon our history. It was this. Although the law 
expressly forbade any two persons of the same gens to hold the same 
priesthood at the same time, Spinther, the consul, was anxious to place his son 
Cornelius Spinther among the augurs, and since Faustus, the son of Sulla, of 
the Cornelian gens, had been enrolled before him, he transferred his son to 
the gens of Manlius Torquatus; thus, though the letter of the law (νόμος) was 
observed, its spirit (ἔργῳ) was broken.”32 
Dio very rarely marks an episode out for special attention in his authorial voice, which 
indicates the story’s significance. Spinther here thoroughly manipulates the religious rules 
as part of the constant competition and this political manipulation is no less problematic 
than bribery or violence as Dio notes that the “ἔργον” of the laws was still broken. 
Furthermore, it seems that Dio has purposefully included the above annalistic notice and 
moved it from “the year before” in order to make an abrupt transition that allows him to 
highlight the new topic in a clear fashion. Had he merely continued with the narrative of 
Clodius, which follows the above quote, the new focus on political manipulation might 
have escaped the reader. 
This theme of political manipulation is clearly continued in the following chapter where 
Clodius attains the aedileship, not to serve Rome but “being anxious to avoid the lawsuit, 
he had got himself elected by a political combination.”33 Clodius here exploits the 
sacrosanctity of magistracies for his own personal benefit and as part of the general 
competition. Moreover, Clodius then “instituted proceedings against Milo for providing 
himself with gladiators, hereby charging him with the very thing he was doing himself and 
for which he was likely to be brought to trial. He did this, not in the expectation of 
convicting Milo […] but in order that under this pretext (ἐπὶ τῇ προφάσει) he might not 
only carry on a campaign (προσπολεμοίη) against Milo but also insult his backers.”34 
Clodius here purposefully exploits the laws as he manipulates the justice system to attack 
Pompey rather than Milo and even charged the latter for using gladiators which he himself 
had been the first to do. Clodius thereby again uses political manipulation as part of the 
constant competition. Furthermore, Dio’s wording here is illustrative of his view of the 
Late Republic as Clodius is successful through mendacity, πρόφασις, and politics have 
turned into an actual war as seen in the word προσπολεμοίη. 
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Dio then elaborates on the political manipulation: “Now Pompey could not control 
himself and keep quiet, nor would he stoop to a trick like that of Clodius […]; thus 
nominally Milo was the defendant, but in reality Pompey was being convicted without 
even offering a defence. For Clodius, in order to embarrass him the more, would not allow 
the lex curiata to be introduced; and until that was enacted no other serious business could 
be transacted in the state or any suit instituted.”35 Strikingly, as in the case of the 
gladiators, Clodius is highly successful because he is willing to use methods too corrupted 
for his enemies and Dio emphasises Pompey’s inability to oppose Clodius because of the 
former’s relative uprightness. This feature of Clodius is also seen as he even paralyses the 
state through his obstruction of the lex curiata in order to embarrass Pompey, and he 
seemingly disregards completely the adverse effects on the state. Political advances are 
thus again connected to egoistic political manipulation in a clear parallel to violence and 
bribery, and Dio hereby creates a consistent picture of a Republic where the politicians 
who most consistently use these three tools achieve the highest degree of success. Dio has 
here included an unprecedented concentration of manipulations where the letter of the law 
is observed but the spirit broken, exactly as in the case of Spinther’s son. 
Comparable to the previous omens regarding bribery, Dio now writes that threatening 
and destructive omens occurred “and the soothsayers, being anxious to find a remedy, said 
that some divinity was angry with them because some temples or consecrated sites were 
being used for residence. Then Clodius substituted Cicero for Milo and not only attacked 
him vigorously in a speech because the site of the house he had built upon was dedicated to 
Liberty, but even went to it once, with the intention of razing it to the ground”.36 The 
omens can again be seen as divine anger, here due to the corrupted political manipulation, 
and the Romans are also now unable to correct themselves as Clodius exploits the 
soothsayers’ explanation for his own ends in another manipulation. The political rivalry 
now even deteriorates as “no quarter was shown on either side, but they [Clodius and 
Cicero] abused and slandered each other as much as they could, without refraining from 
the basest means. The one declared that the tribuneship of Clodius had been contrary to the 
laws and that therefore his official acts were invalid, and the other that Cicero’s exile had 
been justly decreed and his return unlawfully voted.”37 Both parties here attempt to 
manipulate and undermine the laws in order to weaken each other and political 
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manipulation has thereby again been used as a tool in political competition. However, 
Clodius’ transfer to the plebeian order had indeed been contrary to the laws38 and Cicero’s 
return had only been effected through Milo’s use of gladiators. The political system is thus 
now so corrupt that the validity of laws is completely undermined and they hereby become 
ripe for manipulation. 
Dio ends his exploration of political manipulation by positing Cato as a positive 
contrast: “the consuls proposed in the senate that he [Cato] be given the praetorship, 
although by law he could not yet hold it. And though he was not appointed, for he spoke 
against the measure himself, yet he obtained greater renown from this very 
circumstance.”39 Cato here refuses manipulation of the law and through this puts the 
preceding egoistic manipulations in an even sharper negative light. However, despite 
winning great renown, Cato gains nothing concrete and instead quickly attracts Clodius’ 
hostility.
40
 The upright but unsuccessful Cato hereby functions to support Dio’s portrayal 
of politics throughout Book 39 where self-serving and destructive acts were depicted as 
highly effective. This is a central institutional problem in Dio’s Late Republic as 
consequently only egoistic politicians can gain success whereas the upright are a priori 
unsuccessful. 
In conclusion, Dio has presented three main tools of the corrupted political competition 
of the Late Republic, namely bribery, violence and political manipulation. Furthermore, 
these problems have here been presented in their most extreme forms, achieved through a 
thematic treatment of each in turn and by largely eschewing the common narrative focus 
on the dynasts. Moreover, Dio has clearly shown that these tools were absolutely essential 
for political success and that constitutional opposition and traditional authority were 
powerless in the face of egoistic politicians who availed themselves of them. Strikingly, 
Book 39 has so far not been intensely focused on the leading characters even though 
Pompey was present in Rome. Rather, Dio has concentrated his criticism on the destructive 
process of political competition and the myriad problematic politicians that were involved 
in it. Through this narrative prioritisation, Dio relieves the leading dynasts in the 
triumvirate of part of the responsibility for the downfall of the Republic and shifts it onto 
the institutional competition in the Late Republic instead.  
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5.3: The main themes in practice 
5.3.1: The consulship of Pompey and Crassus 
Dio now turns to the application of the main tools of violence, bribery and political 
manipulation by the dynasts during central events of Book 39, firstly the consular elections 
of 56. As mentioned previously, Caesar’s success is a prime mover in Pompey’s desire for 
the consulship this year as it elicits φιλοτιμία in the latter.41 It is noteworthy that this 
situation is the only place in Book 39 where φιλοτιμία is mentioned,42 especially in view of 
the importance of this book for the outbreak of the civil war. The scarcity of φιλοτιμία in 
this crucial book is problematic for Rees’ psychological or moral perspective and for his 
assertion that φιλοτιμία is “the dominant and most destructive vice in Dio’s history.”43 
Pompey’s φιλοτιμία here is important as it spurs him on to seek the consulship but it 
clearly grows out of the political competition of the Republic as set out in chapter 1.
44
 This 
is thus a prime example of the political nature of seemingly moral aspects in Dio’s Late 
Republic which is essentially focused on institutional competition. 
This focus is clearly seen, as the tool of political manipulation is immediately in focus 
as the narrative moves to the consular elections of 56 themselves and the involvement of 
Crassus and Pompey herein: “When they began to canvass for the office outside of the 
period specified by law, and, among others the consuls themselves […] made it plain that 
they would not allow them to be elected, they tried to bring it about, through the agency of 
Gaius Cato and others, that the elections should not be held that year, in order that 
an interrex might be chosen and they might then seek and secure the office in accordance 
with the laws.”45 Dio here shows the importance of political manipulation in Late 
Republican politics as it crucially enables Pompey and Crassus to stand for the consulship. 
Furthermore, Gaius Cato continues the manipulation of the laws as he attempts to stop 
the senators from undertaking measures opposing Pompey and Crassus: “[Cato] rushed out 
of the gathering [and called in any one he met in the market-place (?)] in order that no 
decision might be reached; for, if any person not a senator were inside, they might not give 
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their vote.”46 The senators then attempt to counter this by constitutional means as they 
changed their dress in order to frighten Cato and addressed the people, hereby bringing 
them “to a state of extreme sorrow”.47 These acts by the senate are of course traditional and 
constitutional Republican aspects. However, Clodius likewise addressed the people and the 
senate now resorted to violence to counter this: “the senate confronted him […], while at 
that moment he was surrounded by the knights and would have been torn limb from limb, 
had he not raised an outcry, calling upon the people for aid; whereupon many ran to the 
scene bringing fire and threatening to burn his oppressors along with the senate-house if 
they should do him any violence. Thus Clodius was saved after coming so near 
perishing.”48 Essentially, this part of the narrative exemplifies the constantly escalating use 
of different tools in order to gain political aims in the Late Republic. The senate attempts 
to act in a constitutional fashion and appeal to the people but the popularis politicians, here 
in the figure of Clodius, have far more influence with them, as was made clear in chapter 
4.
49
 This causes the senators to resort to violence but their opponents are, predictably, 
vastly more powerful in this respect as they are supported by the people, whose threats of 
burning the senate-house and the senators exemplify the intensification of violence that is 
occurring in Book 39. Through these consular elections, by far the most detailed described 
in Dio’s Late Republic, Dio shows the importance and practical use of the political 
manipulation and violence by major dynasts and their supporters. However, these dynasts 
are not the main focus; rather it is the problematic process of political competition which 
they exemplify that is Dio’s central arena of investigation. 
Notably, Pompey is “not alarmed at all by this”50 and instead he and Crassus terrify the 
senators into passivity whereafter they spend the rest of the year without further official 
business “exactly as if they were enslaved (ὥσπερ δεδουλωμένοι)”.51 Through 
δεδουλωμένοι and the emphatic suffix on the conjunction, the corruption of the political 
system through violent competition is clearly emphasised and taken to an extreme as it has 
completely paralysed the state. However, the use of this strategy by Pompey and Crassus 
has immediate advantages for themselves: “Crassus and Pompey were appointed consuls 
after an interregnum as no one else of the earlier candidates opposed them. To be sure, 
Lucius Domitius […] set out from his house for the assembly just after dark, but when the 
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slave who carried the torch in front of him was slain, he became frightened and went no 
farther. Hence, since no one at all opposed them, and furthermore since Publius Crassus 
[…] brought soldiers to Rome for this very purpose, they were easily chosen.”52 This 
shows that violence backed up by sufficient force is key to unlocking political success, 
whereas the seemingly law-abiding Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus or the previous 
constitutional measures of the senate are completely ineffective; the senators’ change of 
garments for example seems almost comically futile in the face of determined violence.
53
 
This is restated later as Dio even asserts explicitly that Crassus and Pompey “had 
secured their office by violence (βίᾳ)”,54 which forcefully highlights the importance of 
violence for political success. Cato illustrates this point by contrast as Pompey and Crassus 
bar him from becoming a praetor “for Cato did not see fit to offer any violence (βίαιον)”.55 
Dio here creates a clear contrast between the consuls, who obtained their office through βία 
and Cato, who is rendered politically impotent and unsuccessful by his refusal to use the 
selfsame tool. The importance of violence as a political tool again comes into focus when 
Cato and Favonius oppose the consuls’ measures: “their outspokenness (ἐπαρρησιάζοντο) 
was of no avail”56 and Cato “well understood that even if he employed the whole day, he 
could not persuade them to vote anything that he wished.”57 Their opponents instead resort 
to forceful measures: “the attendants of the tribunes drove them both out, wounded the rest 
who were with them, and actually killed a few. After the law [the lex Trebonia] had been 
passed in this way […]”.58 Cato and Favonius here use the time-honoured constitutional 
tactic of public speaking, despite Dio’s emphasis of the awareness of Cato that this tactic 
was bound to be ineffectual. Pompey’s use of the decidedly unconstitutional tool of 
violence is, on the other hand, strikingly successful. This contrast between the a priori 
futility of παρρησία and constitutional measures, and the perpetual success of violence is a 
shrewd presentation of the institutional problems of the Republic. 
Dio’s focus on violence as a political tool is again evident later in the consulship of 55 
as the tribunes opposed Crassus’ levies for his campaign in the east but “Crassus, however, 
[…] looked to the force of arms (τῶν ὅπλων ἰσχὺν). The tribunes, then, seeing that their 
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outspokenness, unsupported by arms, (παρρησία αὐτῶν ἄοπλος) was too weak to hinder 
any of his undertakings, held their peace for the most part”.59 Dio here explicitly states that 
the παρρησία of the tribunes, a traditional, constitutional Republican tool, was powerless 
without access to armed force and the consequent threat of violence. Strikingly, the 
successful tribunes of the previous narrative, such as Gabinius and Cornelius, did in fact 
back up their παρρησία with violence, achieved through the people.60 Via the feeble 
opposition of the peaceful tribunes against Crassus and its contrast to earlier, violently 
successful tribunes, Dio here shows that the achievement of political goals is closely linked 
to the use of the important tool of violence. This is further supported as Crassus is highly 
successful exactly through this tool. In this situation, Dio thus again emphasises the 
weakness of traditional Republican authority in the face of the violent dynasts, which is a 
manifestation of the problematic process of political competition.  
Bribery is only mentioned briefly in relation to the consulship of Crassus and Pompey
61
 
but political manipulation and especially violence receive intense focus both before and 
during. Furthermore, the use of these brings great success as Crassus, Pompey and Caesar 
are all rewarded with new extraordinary commands, despite enmity between especially 
Pompey and Caesar.
62
 However, Dio in fact omits the meeting in Luca in 56 where the 
triumvirs formed this plan, whereas Appian and Plutarch, as mentioned in the introduction 
to this chapter, invest the event with noteworthy importance.
63
 Lintott calls it “the most 
striking error of omission”64 but the omission in fact plays a key role in Dio’s narrative as 
it detracts from the importance of the triumvirate. This is a continuation of Dio’s narrative 
and interpretative shift away from the leading men and onto the institutional problems of 
the Republic, seen previously in Book 39. The omission thus diminishes an important 
factor in the outbreak of the civil wars as the triumvirate in Dio’s account is hereby 
portrayed as having basically disintegrated at 56, supported by the abovementioned enmity 
between Caesar and Pompey. Through this, the explicit political influence of the 
triumvirate is in fact confined merely to the years 60 and 59. The absence of the meeting at 
Luca is therefore not an error but a conscious omission
65
 that enhances the importance of 
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institutional competition as a cause for the downfall of the Republic. However, Dio needed 
to explain why Caesar was also given an extraordinary command if the triumvirate had 
broken down. According to Dio, the consuls feared that Caesar would obstruct their 
measures and therefore included him in the extraordinary commands given through the lex 
Trebonia. Intriguingly, Dio here adds: “to state the actual fact (ὥς γε τἀληθὲς 
εὑρίσκεται).”66 It seems that Dio was aware of his omission of Luca and wanted to 
emphasise the accuracy of his own alternative explanation centring on the lex Trebonia, 
further seen by the addition of the emphatic γε and the use of τἀληθὲς.  
Dio thus in the narrative of Crassus’ and Pompey’s consulship explores how especially 
political manipulation and violence were used to great effect in Late Republican political 
competition and through this also emphasises the ineffectualness of traditional authority 
and constitutional methods. Furthermore, through the omission of Luca and the alternative 
explanation centring on the lex Trebonia, Dio puts the institutional competition and its 
destructiveness at the centre of his explanation of the degenerating Republic. It is also 
instructive that the lex Trebonia, like the lex Gabinia and the lex Manilia, is another piece 
of tribunician legislation used by dynasts to achieve their goals, which shows how the 
restoration of the power of the tribunes furthered the problem of competition. However, 
this whole part of the narrative is set against the background of Dio’s thematic treatment of 
the main themes in the first half of the book. Through this interconnection, only 
perceivable through a diachronic reading, Dio shows that the use of violence and political 
manipulation by Crassus and Pompey is not a singular moral problem related to these two 
dynasts. Rather, these tools are part of the grander institutional problem of competition. 
Dio’s close treatment of Pompey and Crassus here is, then, not due to a preoccupation with 
these individuals as seen in other sources, further supported by their relative absence in the 
first half of the book. They are instead used in Dio’s exploration of the destructive process 
of institutional competition. Book 39 thus shows great narrative sophistication and 
premeditation on the part of Dio and again suggests the presence of an overarching 
interpretative framework centred on political competition. 
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5.3.2: The restoration of Ptolemy 
The last part of the narrative of Book 39 is concerned with the restoration of Ptolemy, 
and bribery is the main focus point. In fact, Dio starts with a summary of events which 
explicitly underlines the problem of bribery that will be in focus:  
About this time Ptolemy, although the Romans had voted not to assist him and 
were even now highly indignant at the bribery he had employed, was 
nevertheless restored and got back his kingdom. Pompey and Gabinius 
accomplished this. So much power had domination and abundant wealth as 
against the decrees of both the people and the senate (αἵ τε δυναστεῖαι καὶ αἱ 
τῶν χρημάτων περιουσίαι καὶ παρὰ τὰ ψηφίσματα τά τετοῦ δήμου καὶ τὰ τῆς 
βουλῆς ἴσχυσαν), that when Pompey sent orders to Gabinius, then governor of 
Syria, and the latter made a campaign […] as the result of a bribe, they restored 
the king contrary to the wish of the state, paying no heed either to it or to the 
oracles of the Sibyl.”67 
This use of a summary is a highly efficient strategy as it primes the reader to focus on the 
problem of bribery in the ensuing narrative. Dio alludes to the earlier description of 
Ptolemy’s extreme use of bribery and also assassinations in order to further criticise his 
restoration and to emphasise the impotence of the opposing senate. This is further 
supported as Dio in the above quotation, through the structuring of his sentence and the 
comparative preposition παρὰ, has created an explicit contrast between δυναστεία and 
money on the one side and official authority on the other, in which the latter is clearly 
inferior. This contrast informs the treatment of Ptolemy’s restoration and is a continuation 
of Dio’s focus on the weakness of official authority. Dio here also emphasises that not 
even religious scruples stood in the way of Gabinius and Pompey, which adds a further 
layer of criticism and continues the assertion seen in chapter 3
68
 that the Romans, due to 
excessive competition, were unable to correct themselves when confronted with divine 
warnings. 
Dio has thus in the summary highlighted the external problems that competition through 
bribery will cause but then turns the attention of the summary to internal matters: 
“Gabinius was later brought to trial for this [the restoration of Ptolemy], but on account of 
Pompey’s influence and the money at his command was not convicted. To such a state of 
confusion had affairs come with the Romans of that day, that when some of the magistrates 
and jurymen received from him but a very small part of the large bribes that he had 
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received, they took no thought for their duty, and furthermore taught others to commit 
crimes for money, showing them that they could easily buy immunity from punishment.”69 
Dio here again primes the reader to focus on bribes and to understand the following trial of 
Gabinius according to Dio’s perspective. In this perspective, Gabinius, and others, could 
act with impunity due to the competitive tool of bribes and Dio also emphasises the 
destructive precedence created here, which further corrupted society and taught others to 
follow Gabinius’ problematic example. Bribery is, then, presented as a main tool of 
destructive competition and as highly effective. Dio does note that Gabinius was 
eventually convicted. However, “this was a matter of great surprise to him [and] also a 
surprise to Pompey”.70 Here Dio uses even the acquittal to underscore the problematic 
process of Late Republican competition as the incident is portrayed as an abnormal and 
surprising incident. Through the condensed and easily communicable form of a summary, 
Dio thus succeeds in presenting destructive competition as the main problem and bribery 
as a central tool that forces further degeneration. 
Dio now turns to the narrative itself and relates how Ptolemy paid a huge sum to 
Gabinius who consequently went on campaign against Egypt “notwithstanding the law 
forbade governors to enter territory outside their own borders or to begin wars on their own 
responsibility, and although the people and the Sibyl had declared that the man should not 
be restored. But the only restraint these considerations imposed was to lead him to sell his 
assistance for a higher price. He left in Syria his son Sisenna”.71 Dio is here highly 
consistent as the theme of bribery is kept centre stage but also intensified as the traditions 
and laws of Rome function not as restraints but rather to increase the amount Gabinius 
demands. Furthermore, Gabinius seemingly attempts to keep the province of Syria within 
his own family as he even places his own son at the helm. This extreme disregard for 
Rome and its laws is yet again part of the destructive competition in which bribes remain a 
central tool. 
Gabinius continues his corrupted search for increased bribes as he in fact purposefully 
releases Archelaus, a strong enemy leader captured earlier, since “he hoped that he could 
exact even a larger amount in view of the cleverness and renown of Archelaus; moreover 
he received much money besides from the prisoner himself, and so voluntarily released 
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him, pretending that he had escaped.”72 Gabinius here acts in direct contravention of 
military interests by releasing Archelaus solely to obtain further bribes, which is 
unprecedented in Dio’s earlier narrative. Gabinius succeeds in restoring Ptolemy but has 
meanwhile inflicted great damage on Roman territories: “the Syrians cried out loudly 
against Gabinius, especially since in his absence they had been terribly abused by the 
pirates, and the tax-gatherers, being unable to collect the taxes on account of the 
marauders, were owing numerous sums.”73 In short, Gabinius has, through his own 
personal quest for riches and fuelled by the widespread use of bribes, significantly 
undermined Roman interests. However, yet again this is set against the background of the 
earlier thematic treatment of the main competitive tools, which places Gabinius’ behaviour 
within the larger problem of bribery in institutional competition. Furthermore, the above 
continues the demonstration of the incredible importance of these main tools in 
competition as bribery is the central narrative driving force and highly effective. 
This focus on bribes continues as the narrative moves back to Rome and the impending 
trial of Gabinius. Crassus is here won over because of a bribe and the following consul, 
Claudius “expected to get bribes from Gabinius, if he should cause any disturbance.”74 Dio 
is here highly consistent as he posits bribery as a central cause of action for several 
individuals and as a fundamental and highly effective tool of Roman politics. The Tiber 
now rose and wreaked havoc in Rome “as was surmised, by the act of some divinity”.75 
However, the Romans are again unable to correct themselves: “While this was going on, 
money sent ahead by Gabinius caused him to suffer no serious penalty either while absent 
or upon his return, at least for this affair.”76 This is yet another damning criticism of 
Republican politics and a forceful reminder of the immense power and importance of 
bribes in Late Republican competition. This is further supported as Gabinius is acquitted 
although Cicero “accused him with all the force of his oratory”,77 which reemphasises the 
lack of power of traditional Republican methods in the face of the three destructive 
competitive tools. 
Dio continues this emphasis as Gabinius is only convicted when the people 
threateningly force the issue after the first acquittal: “The people accordingly were almost 
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for putting the jurymen to death also, but, when they escaped, turned their attention to the 
remaining charges against him and caused him to be convicted on those at any rate. For the 
men who were chosen by lot to pass judgment on the charges both feared the people and 
likewise obtained but little from Gabinius”.78 Violence through the people is here 
portrayed as the main cause for Gabinius’ conviction but also the latter’s relative lack of 
bribes is an important reason. Furthermore, the supporters of Gabinius surprisingly attempt 
to win the case through constitutional means as Pompey “addressed them at length in 
behalf of Gabinius, and not only read to them a letter sent to him by Caesar in the man’s 
behalf, but also besought the jurymen, and not only prevented Cicero from accusing him 
again but actually persuaded him to plead for him”.79 These constitutional attempts by 
Pompey’s camp are, unsurprisingly, completely futile as they lack the necessary bribes or 
the use of violence to counter the opposition. This situation hereby demonstrates the 
institutional nature of the problems of the Republic imminently as political success is 
evidently not tied to individuals but rather to the use of certain destructive methods whose 
consistent dominance is dictated by the way institutional competition functions. Thus even 
the conviction of the corrupt Gabinius is used to communicate and support Dio’s 
presentation of the effectiveness of the three main destructive competitive tools, and the 
consequent weakness of constitutional methods. 
The narrative surrounding the restoration of Ptolemy essentially explores the corrupt 
state of Roman competition by focusing on the extreme use of bribes which renders 
constitutional measures consistently futile. It should also be noted that bribery, as violence 
and political manipulation previously, is exceptionally effective and political success is 
clearly tied to the use of it. However, the abundant bribery is not part of a classic moralistic 
narrative of degeneration by Dio. Rather, Ptolemy’s restoration and the subsequent trials 
are the narrative continuation of the previous exposition of the bribery problem and hereby, 
like the consulship of Pompey and Crassus, cumulatively become part of this grander 
institutional problem of competition and connected bribery, which is far more wide 
reaching than this particular episode. Dio has thus yet again managed to present an 
institutional explanation centred on political competition of the problems of the 
deteriorating Republic, which is another testament to the premeditation of his narrative and 
interpretation. 
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5.4: Conclusion 
In the above, I have shown how Dio presents violence, bribery and political 
manipulation as three fundamental tools in the institutional competition of the Late 
Republic. These tools were institutional and political in origin and effect as they emerged 
directly from the institutional political competition and then proceeded to degenerate it 
further. There is of course a moral aspect of these three tools, but they are represented by 
Dio as generated by and part of the political problem of institutional competition which is 
Dio’s main interest. In order to communicate and support these interpretative aims, Dio 
explores the tools thematically by moving the focus away from the dynasts and thereby 
emphasises that these elements were not the products of a few individuals’ acts but rather 
part of an institutional problem that permeated the Republic. In the second half of Book 39, 
Dio then proceeds consistently to portray these tools as the keys to political success, 
whereas the rejection of them necessarily leads to failure – another demonstration of the 
institutional nature of Dio’s interpretation. This interrelated structuring of Book 39 also 
shows again how individual books were important interpretative organisers for Dio.  
This institutional perspective is again seen as the institutional competition and 
consequent disorder in fact cause the civil war. In Book 40, Dio spends the first three 
quarters on external wars, but then continues the narrative from Book 39 of the rivalry 
between the camps of Clodius and Milo, which quickly ends with the former’s death. This, 
combined with constant destructive competition in relation to the consular elections, 
creates the need for the sole consulship of Pompey. Dio comments: “Elated by the novelty 
and unexpectedness of the honour, he [Pompey] no longer formed any plan to gratify the 
populace, but was careful to do everything that pleased the senate.”80 In Dio’s view, 
Pompey has now chosen the side of the senate, which causes his estrangement from Caesar 
and ultimately civil war. Strikingly, however, this estrangement is fundamentally the result 
of institutional competition that has its narrative and interpretative roots in Book 39 and 
then merely reaches a conclusion in the last quarter of Book 40. Furthermore, Dio skilfully 
downplays or removes all the commonly accepted singular causes for civil war, such as the 
triumvirate and Luca, the deaths of Julia and Crassus or the crossing of the Rubicon. We 
are hereby left without singular events with which to explain the outbreak of civil war and 
it is instead Dio’s exploration of competition that takes centre stage. It is, then, not in Book 
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40 but in Book 39 and its thorough examination of the institutional problems of political 
competition that the central exploration of the source of the civil wars is to be found. Dio 
hereby posits an institutional explanation of the outbreak of the civil wars, centred on 
institutionally generated competition that is only perceivable by a close analysis of the 
organisation of the highly cohesive Book 39. 
This highly consistent and interconnected institutional interpretation thus supports the 
previous conclusion, namely that Dio’s work was premeditated and governed by an 
original, overarching interpretative framework with competition at its centre. This 
interpretation is, as shown in chapter 2, unique in the source tradition and undermines both 
the assertion that Dio was unoriginal and the moralising and psychological tradition that 
culminated in Rees.
81
 Furthermore, Dio’s interpretation parallels modern ones to a higher 
degree than other sources and far more than previously admitted by scholars. The central 
role of Republican institutions in Dio’s interpretation also shows that the portrayal of the 
Late Republic in his narrative is not overly influenced by or merely a mirroring of the 
problems of his own time, the Severan age, as has so often been stated.
82
 This does not 
mean that Dio’s Late Republic is wholly divorced from his own time but that the 
relationship is much more complex than a simple mirroring. The Late Republic plays an 
important role in the overall narrative, but the portrayal of this period is thus also an 
exploration on its own terms through an original perspective organised around competition 
– a sharp contrast to the predominant scholarly view.  
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6: Conclusion 
In this part, I will reiterate the most important conclusions from the thesis, which are 
important to situate within the scholarly tradition, and provide concluding thoughts on the 
nature of Dio’s Late Republic. Lastly, I will include a section on potentially fruitful future 
research. Firstly, the widely shared assertion that Dio had no “specific aim in view save 
that of composing the work itself”1 is surely untenable. Dio’s account of the Late Republic 
is highly consistent in its focus on institutional competition as the central problem of the 
period, which is seen both in the deviations from other sources, the use of the annalistic 
tradition and the case studies of Book 36 and 39. Secondly, this problem is inherently 
Republican in nature, growing out of the fundamental institutions of the δημοκρατία, and is 
largely irrelevant to Dio’s own time, when political competition in this form had ceased to 
exist. Furthermore, Dio’s portrayal of the Late Republic cannot be seen as an attempt to 
legitimise monarchy as a governmental form since this was essentially unnecessary in the 
third century AD. In other words, Dio’s Late Republic is not, as for example Kemezis 
would have it, primarily an indirect comment on his own time but rather an exploration of 
this period on its own terms and a genuine attempt at explaining the fall of the Republic. 
Thirdly, the widely held assertion that Dio was unoriginal,
2
 seen also in the newer works of 
Rees and Kemezis,
3
 is on the basis of especially chapter 2, but also supported by the 
following chapters, demonstrably incorrect, at least when compared to the sources 
surviving today. Livy could have had a similar focus on competition, but this cannot be 
ascertained through the Periochae which in any case reveals significant discrepancies with 
Dio. This originality also undermines the Quellenforschung, even as recent as Simons in 
2009,
4
 which through Nissen’s Law, attempted to reconstruct lost parts of sources through 
Dio; the Greek historian seemingly had a very different interpretative framework from 
other writers and manipulated his material to support it, which makes his work impractical 
for reconstructing older sources. The idea that Dio had an interpretative framework with an 
original perspective thus undermines the Quellenforschung that still constitutes a 
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significant part of scholarly work. This could be a central factor in the reluctance to ascribe 
such a framework to the historian.
5
 
In short, I have shown the common criticisms of Dio in newer and older scholarship to 
be problematic. However, some scholarly works have deviated from these standard 
criticisms and deserve mention here. An important example is the psychological or moral 
strand of scholarship, seen in Hose, Sion-Jenkis and Kuhn-Chen,
6
 which found its most 
persuasive expression in the changing human nature of Rees.
7
 Human nature and morality 
were certainly important to Dio, at least on a philosophical level, but are not given 
precedence in Dio’s overall interpretation of the Late Republic. Rather, they are suborned 
to the workings of political institutions and are often presented as part of or as 
manifestations of institutional competition or used to focalise this problem. This 
institutional competition and the connected political world are instead Dio’s central arena 
of investigation. This is clearly seen in Book 39 where the myriad aspects of human nature 
identified by Rees did not take centre stage, as shown in chapter 5 regarding φιλοτιμία.8 
Another instructive example is φιλονεικία, which Rees invests with great importance,9 as it 
only appears once in the fundamental Book 39 where it is even used to describe the 
Alexandrians.
10
 Thus in Book 39, Dio consistently downplays the importance of human 
nature as a cause for the downfall of the Republic. Furthermore, even when numerous, 
these aspects remain political in origin as they grow out of the institutional competition 
that is at the heart of the Republican constitution and they likewise have political 
consequences. A final scholarly perspective that deserves mention here is that of Fechner 
who built on Ferwer’s idea that Dio was in fact critical towards the new monarchy and 
rather a supporter of an ideal Republic.
11
 However, the above shows that Dio went to great 
lengths to portray the Late Republic as inherently untenable and Fechner’s position 
therefore appears problematic.  
This cohesive presentation of the Late Republic also highlights the need to situate this 
period, and the Republic in general, within Dio’s work as a whole. Dio’s institutionally 
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doomed Republic is absolutely central to the work
12
 since it prepares the foundation for the 
presentation of Augustus as a model ruler against whom all subsequent emperors could be 
measured: institutional competition was a central and unavoidable destructive problem in 
Dio’s Late Republic but this problem would naturally disappear under an emperor where 
real political competition ceased to exist. Dio’s institutional approach thus provides far 
stronger support for his argument that monarchy was inevitable and beneficial than a 
typical Late Republican narrative focused on Caesar and Pompey. Had the Late Republic 
merely been a temporary degeneration or brought down by individual people and events, as 
seen in the parallel sources, Augustus could still be portrayed as the destroyer of freedom, 
seen in for example Tacitus. The presentation of the Late Republic as the culmination of an 
institutionally condemned Republic thus becomes fundamental in supporting the 
subsequent positive portrayal of the first princeps, which constitutes the foundation for the 
following imperial period, as Dio could now present an idealised Augustus who had saved 
Rome from the innately impracticable Republic. 
Through the above, Dio’s work emerges as a highly complicated source for the Late 
Republic, which highlights the problematic use of him by modern historians, outlined in 
chapter 1.
13
 Historians should be wary of incorporating Dio’s prejudices uncritically into 
their own works through the problematic assumption that Dio is a simple historian who can 
be easily used. Furthermore, Dio has often been carelessly used as a quarry for individual 
details but, as shown by his omission of for example the meeting at Luca or the crossing of 
the Rubicon, historians should be cautious in this regard and use Dio more carefully; it has 
long been noted that Dio occasionally makes factual mistakes and deviates from strict 
chronology, so modern scholars should be wary of utilising him on these areas.
14
 However, 
scholars can for example more securely use Dio concerning constitutional and institutional 
matters
15
 since these are significant for his interpretative framework wherefore Dio shows 
a keen interest in and knowledge of these areas. Through an appreciation of Dio’s 
framework, the modern historian can thus more safely use Dio as a source for the Late 
Republic. This has been realised by for example Urso who uses Dio exactly to reconstruct 
constitutional and institutional developments for the Early Republic,
16
 but this more 
differentiated use of Dio has not penetrated general scholarship. I have also demonstrated 
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Dio’s cohesive and premeditated institutional interpretation of the fall of the Republic, 
centred on competition, which out of all the ancient sources, most closely parallels modern 
works. This suggests that modern scholars would gain from according Dio’s interpretation 
of the Late Republic attention in its own right, a historical explanation that ought not to be 
rejected out of hand. 
I will conclude with a few remarks on potentially fruitful future areas of scholarship 
against the background of my thesis. A possible area could be Dio’s Republic as a whole; I 
suggested in chapter 1 that Dio’s institutional interpretation was an overarching one, 
spanning the Republic but an in-depth analysis of the fragments of the Early and Mid-
Republic would be a significant support for this argument.
17
 A connected possibility for 
future research is Dio’s work more broadly as the field is in dire need of a comprehensive 
monograph to replace Millar’s, which attempts to interpret and understand the Historia 
Romana as a whole against the background of newer research on Dio; my thesis and other 
recent works have demonstrated the premeditation of Dio’s presentation of individual parts 
but the field would gain greatly from a monograph connecting these and creating an 
overarching interpretation of Dio’s work. 
Another important area, on which this thesis has highlighted the need for future 
research, is the annalistic tradition. I have shown that the definition of this tradition is 
essentially based only on Livy, which is of course untenable. No other extant source 
exhibits the same characteristics as Livy and it is therefore highly necessary to construct a 
broader, more inclusive definition of the annalistic method. Furthermore, a sustained and 
comprehensive analysis of the fragmentary historians preceding Livy could shed important 
light on the origins of the method seen in the latter. If no historians are found to work in 
the same fashion as Livy, it could of course be due to the coincidences of survival, but one 
would also have to acknowledge the possibility that the strict, almost mechanic version 
seen in Livy is his own creation. Livy would then be accorded far more ability and 
independent research than previously thought, and the individual ancient historians both 
before and after would become more autonomous and less bound by tradition, exemplified 
eminently by the original and premeditated institutional interpretation presented by Dio.  
                                                 
17
 See, however, e.g. Lindholmer (forthcoming 2017) or Lange (forthcoming 2017). 
110 
 
 
  
Bibliography 
Beard, M., North, J. and Price, S. (1998): Religions of Rome. Vol. 1. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Bekker, I. (1814-1821): Anecdota Graeca (3 vols.). Berolini: Apud G.C. Nauckium. 
Berrigan, J. (1966): ‘Consolatio Philosophiae in Dio Cassius’ in Classical Bulletin. Vol. 
42: 59-61. 
Blom, H. (2011): ‘Pompey in the Contio’ in Classical Quarterly. Vol. 61, No. 2: 553-573. 
Blumenthal, F. (1914): ‘Die Autobiographie des Augustus’ in Wiener Studien. Vol. 36: 84-
103. 
Brunt, P. (1971): Social conflicts in the Roman Republic. London: Chatto and Windus. 
Burden-Strevens, C. (2015): Cassius Dio’s Speeches and the Collapse of the Roman 
Republic. Dissertation: University of Glasgow.  
Burden-Strevens, C. (forthcoming, 2016): ‘Fictitious speeches, envy, and the habituation to 
authority: writing the collapse of the Roman Republic’ in Lange, C. and Madsen, J. (eds.) 
Cassius Dio: Greek Intellectual and Roman Politician. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Burden-Strevens C. and Lindholmer, M. (eds.) (forthcoming 2017): Cassius Dio’s Secret 
History of Early Rome. Leiden: Brill. 
Carney, T. (1959): ‘Formal Elements in Livy’ in Proceedings of the African Classical 
Associations. Vol. 2: 1-9. 
Cary, E. (1914-1927): Cassius Dio: Roman History (9 vols.). London: Heinemann. 
Cary, E. (1937-1950): Dionysius of Halicarnassus: Roman Antiquities (7 vols.). London: 
Heinemann. 
111 
 
 
  
Charlesworth, M. (1934): ‘Literary Authorities for Roman History’ in Cambridge Ancient 
History. Vol. 10: 866–876. 
Churchill, J. (1999): ‘Ex qua quod vellent facerent: Roman Magistrates’ Authority over 
Praeda and Manubiae’ in Transactions of the American Philological Association. Vol. 129: 
85-116. 
Cipriani, G. (1978): ‘Dione Cassio e l’VIII commentario del Bellum Gallicum’ in 
Bollettino di studi latini. Vol. 8: 28-31. 
Claassen, J. (1996): ‘Dio’s Cicero and the Consolatory Tradition’ in Papers of the Leeds 
Latin Seminar: ninth volume. Wiltshire: Cairns Publishing. 29-45. 
Columba, G. (1902): Cassio Dione e le guerre galliche di Cesare. Napoli: Stab. 
Tipografico della Università. 
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Études Anciennes. Vol. 3, No. 2: 131-139. 
Kemezis, A. (2014): Greek Narratives of the Roman Empire under the Severans. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kemezis, A. (forthcoming, 2016): ‘Dio, Caesar and the Vesontio Mutineers (38.34-47): A 
Rhetoric of Lies’ in Lange, C. and Madsen, J. (eds.) Cassius Dio: Greek Intellectual and 
Roman Politician. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kraus, C. (1994): ‘Introduction’ in Kraus, C. (ed.) Ab Urbe Condita. Book VI. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 1-32. 
Kuhn-Chen, B. (2002): Geschichtskonzeption griechischer Historiker in 2. und 3. 
Jahrhundert n. Chr.: Untersuchungen zu den Werken von Appian, Cassius Dio und 
Herodian. Frankfurt: Peter Lang. 
Lachenaud, G. and Coudry, M. (eds.) (2011): Dion Cassius: Histoire romaine. Livres 38, 
39 & 40. Paris: Les Belles Lettres. 
Lachenaud, G. and Coudry, M. (eds.) (2014): Dion Cassius: Histoire romaine. Livres 36 & 
37. Paris: Les Belles Lettres. 
114 
 
 
  
Lange, C. (forthcoming 2017): ‘Cassius Dio on Violence, Stasis, and Civil War: the Early 
Years’ in Burden-Strevens C. and Lindholmer, M. (eds.) Cassius Dio’s Secret History of 
Early Rome. Leiden: Brill. 
Levene, D. (1993): Religion in Livy. Leiden: Brill. 
Levi, M. (1937): ‘Dopo Azio: Appunti sulle fonti augustee: Dione Cassio’ in Athenaeum. 
Vol. 15: 415-434. 
Libourel, J. (1968): Dio Cassius on the Early Roman Republic. Dissertation: University of 
California.  
Libourel, J. (1974): ‘An Unusual Annalistic Source Used by Dio Cassius’ in American 
Journal of Philology. Vol. 95, No. 4: 383-393. 
Lindholmer (forthcoming, 2017): ‘Breaking the Idealistic Paradigm: Competition in Dio’s 
Republic’ in Burden-Strevens C. and Lindholmer, M. (eds.) Cassius Dio’s Secret History 
of Early Rome. Leiden: Brill. 
Lintott, A. (1968): Violence in Republican Rome. Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
Lintott, A. (1997): ‘Cassius Dio and the History of the Late Roman Republic’ in Aufstieg 
und Niedergang der römischen Welt. Vol. 34.3: 2497-2523. 
Mallan, C. (2013): ‘Cassius Dio on Julia Domna: A Study of the Political and Ethical 
Functions of Biographical Representation in Dio’s Roman History’ in Mnemosyne. Vol. 
66: 734-760. 
Mallan, C. (2014): ‘The Rape of Lucretia in Cassius Dio’s Roman History’ in The 
Classical Quarterly. Vol. 64, No. 2: 758-771. 
Mallan, C. (forthcoming, 2016): ‘Parrhêsia in Cassius Dio’ in Lange, C. and Madsen, J. 
(eds.) Cassius Dio: Greek Intellectual and Roman Politician. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
115 
 
 
  
Mallan, C. (forthcoming, 2017): ‘The Regal Period in the Excerpta Constantiniana and the 
Early Byzantine Extracts from Dio’s Roman History’ in Burden-Strevens C. and 
Lindholmer, M. (eds.) Cassius Dio’s Secret History of Early Rome. Leiden: Brill. 
Manuwald, B. (1979): Cassius Dio und Augustus: philologische Untersuchungen zu den 
Büchern 45-56 des Dionischen Geschichtswerkes. Wiesbaden: Steiner Verlag. 
Martinelli, G. (1989): ‘Motivi originali nei “Discorsi” dell’opera di Cassio Dione’ in Atti 
della Accademia Ligure di Scienze e Lettere. Vol. 46: 411-425. 
Marx, F. (1933): ‘Die Quelle der Germanenkriege bei Tacitus und Dio’ in Klio. Vol. 26: 
321-329. 
McDonald, A. (1957): ‘The style of Livy’ in The Journal of Roman Studies. Vol. 47, No. 
1: 155-172. 
McDougall, J. (1991): ‘Dio and his Sources for Caesar’s Campaigns in Gaul’ in Latomus. 
Vol. 50: 616-638. 
Meier, C. (1966): Res publica amissa: eine Studie zu Verfassung und Geschichte der 
späten römischen Republik. Wiesbaden: Steiner.  
Mehl, A. (2011): Roman historiography: an introduction to its basic aspects and 
development, translated by Mueller, H. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Melber, J. (1891): Der Bericht des Dio Cassius über die gallischen Kriege Caesars. Vol. 1. 
Munich: Straub.  
Micalella, A. (1896): La fonte di Dione Cassio per le guerre galliche di Cesare. Lecce: 
Tipografica cooperativa. 
Millar, F. (1964): A Study of Cassius Dio. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Millar, F. (1998): The crowd in Rome in the late Republic. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press. 
116 
 
 
  
Moscovich, M. (2004): ‘Cassius Dio’s Palace Sources for the Reign of Septimius Severus’ 
in Historia. Vol. 53: 356-368. 
Pelling, C. (1979): ‘Plutarch’s Method of Work in the Roman Lives’ in Journal of Hellenic 
Studies. Vol. 99: 74-96. 
Perrin, B. (1914-1926): Plutarch’s Lives (11 vols.). London: Heinemann. 
Phillips, J. (1974): ‘Form and Language in Livy’s Triumph Notices’ in Classical 
Philology. Vol. 69, No. 4: 265-273. 
Piatowski, A. (1975): ‘L’influence de l’historiographie tragique sur la narration de Dion 
Cassius’ in Actes de la XIIe conférence internationale d’études classique “Eirene”: Cluj-
Napoca, 2-7 Octobre 1972. Amsterdam: Hakkert: 263-270. 
Rasmussen, S. (2003): Public Portents in Republican Rome. Rome: L’Erma di 
Bretschneider.  
Rees, W. (2011): Cassius Dio, Human Nature and the late Roman Republic. Dissertation: 
Oxford. 
Reimarus, H. (1750): Cassius Dio Cocceiani Historiarum Romanarum quae supersunt. 
Vol 1. Hamburg: Herold. 
Rolfe, J. (1921): Sallust: The War With Catiline. London: Heinemann. 
Rich, J. (1989): ‘Dio on Augusts’ in Cameron, A. (ed.) History as Text: The Writing of 
Ancient History. London: Duckworth. 86-110. 
Rich, J. (2011): ‘Structuring Roman History’ in Histos. Vol. 5: 1-43. 
Rich (forthcoming, 2016): ‘Annalistic organization and book division in Dio’s Books 1-35’ 
in Fromentin, V. et al. (eds.) Cassius Dion: nouvelles lectures. Bordeaux: AUSONIUS 
Editions. 
117 
 
 
  
Rodgers, B. (2008): ‘Catulus’ Speech in Cassius Dio 36.31-36’ in Greek, Roman, and 
Byzantine Studies. Vol. 48: 295-318. 
Schettino, M. (2006): ‘L’histoire archaïque de Rome dans les fragments de Dion Cassius’ 
in Caire, E. and Pittia, S. (eds.) Guerre et diplomatie romaines. Aix-en-Provence: 
L’Université de Provence. 61-75. 
Shipley, F. (1924): Velleius Paterculus: Compendium of Roman History. London: 
Heinemann. 
Schwartz, E. (1899): ‘Cassius (40)’ in Pauly-Wissowa Real-Encyclopädie der classischen 
Altertumswissenschaft. Vol. 3
2
: 1684-1722. 
Schlesinger, A. (1959): Livy: History of Rome. Vol. 14. London: Heinemann. 
Scullard, H. (1959): From the Gracchi to Nero. London: Methuen. 
Sihler, E. (1887): ‘The Tradition of Caesar’s Gallic Wars from Cicero to Orosius’ in 
Transactions of the American Philological Association. Vol. 18: 19-29. 
Simons, B. (2009): Cassius Dio und die Römische Republik. Berlin: de Gruyter. 
Sion-Jenkis, K. (2000): Von der Republik zum Prinzipat: Ursachen für den 
Verfassungswandel in Rom im historischen Denken der Antike. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner 
Verlag. 
Sordi, M. (1971): ‘Cassio Dione e il VII libro del De Bello Gallico di Cesare’ in Ferrero, 
L. (ed.) Studi di Storiografia Antica in Memoria di L. Ferrero. Turin: Bottega d’Erasmo. 
167-183. 
Steel, C. (2013): The end of the Roman Republic, 146 to 44 BC. Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press. 
Steidle, W. (1988): ‘Beobachtungen zum Geschichtswerk Cassius Dios’ in Würzburger 
Jahrbücher für die Altertumswissenschaft. Vol. 14: 203-224. 
118 
 
 
  
Stekelenburg, A. (1976): ‘Lucan and Cassius Dio as heirs to Livy: The speech of Julius 
Caesar at Placentia’ in Acta Classica. Vol. 19: 43-57. 
Swan, P. (1987): ‘Cassius Dio on Augustus: A Poverty of Annalistic Sources?’ in Phoenix. 
Vol. 41, No. 3: 272-291.  
Swan, P. (1997): ‘How Dio composed his Augustan Books’ in Aufstieg und Niedergang 
der römischen Welt. Vol. 34.3: 2524-2557. 
Swan, P. (2004): The Augustan Succession: An Historical Commentary on Cassius Dio’s 
Roman History Books 55-56 (9 BC-AD 14). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Townend, G. (1961): ‘The Post of ab epistulis in the Second Century’ in Historia. Vol. 10, 
No. 3: 375-381. 
Urso, G. (2005): Cassio Dione e i magistrati. Le origini della repubblica nei frammenti 
della Storia romana. Milan: Vita e Pensiero. 
Urso, G. (2011): ‘The origin of the consulship in Cassius Dio’s Roman History’ in Beck, 
H. et al. (eds.) Consuls and Res Publica: Holding High Office in the Roman Republic. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 41-60. 
Urso, G. (2013): Cassio Dione e i sovversivi. La crisi della repubblica nei frammenti della 
‘Storia romana’ (XXI-XXX). Milan: LED. 
Urso, G. (2017): ‘Cassius Dion et les Sources Pré-Liviennes: une Version Alternative des 
Premiers Siècles de Rome’ in Burden-Strevens C. and Lindholmer, M. (eds.) Cassius Dio’s 
Secret History of Early Rome. Leiden: Brill. 
Vervaet, F. (2010): ‘Abrogating despotic power through deceit: the Pompeian model for 
Augustan dissimulatio’ in Turner, A., Chong-Gossard, J. and Vervaet, F. (eds.) Private and 
Public Lies. The Discourses of Despotism and Deceit in the Graeco-Roman World. Leiden: 
Brill. 133-166. 
Vlachos, N. (1905): ‘Demosthenes and Dio Cassius’ in Classical Review. Vol. 19, No. 2: 
102-106. 
119 
 
 
  
White, H. (1913): Appian: The Civil Wars. Vol. 3. London: Heinemann. 
Wirth, G. (1985): ‘Einleitung’ in Veh, O. (ed.) Cassius Dio: Römische Geschichte. Zürich: 
Artemis-Verlag. Vol. 1: 7-60. 
Zecchini, G. (1978): Cassio Dione e la guerra gallica di Cesare. Milan: Vita e Pensiero. 
